Samuelson And Neoclassical Economics

This is not a festschrift, but a study of the prodigious Samuelson phe nomenon, his history-making contributions to and impact on the econom ics of our age, and the intricate, often perplexing, and divergent trends in modern economics - all intensely controversial subjects that will be argued, scrutinized, and periodically reassessed by economists of various strands and traditions for years to come, for, as Samuelson wrote of Pigou, "immortality does have its price. " A scholar with such an out standing body of contributions "must expect other men to swarm about it" (1966, p. 1233), subject it to scholarly scrutiny, and challenge it. Although Paul Samuelson was 65 on May 15, 1980 (and our best wishes go out to him for long life and continued enrichment of economics), this is neither a birthday party nor a gathering of only the Good Fairies, for, as he himself has said of Marx, "a great scholar deserves the compliment of being judged seriously" and critically (1972, p. 268). In accordance with the rule of Roman law, audiatur et altera pars, I have invited representative scholars of widely divergent perceptions to offer their critical evaluation of the "age of Samuelson. " While the response was by and large gratifying, some scholars were unable to meet the deadline, ix x PREFACE and with much compunction I have had to expand my own essays to partly fill the gaps.

This new volume explores two alternative economic theories - the classical theory and the marginalist or neoclassical theory- through a discussion between two eminent economists, Pierangelo Garegnani and Paul Samuelson. The key themes of the volume are the difference in approaches to the explanation of the distribution of income and relative prices, and therefore different approaches to all other economic problems, in particular capital accumulation and economic growth. The book discusses whether there is a 'classical' approach to the theory of value and distribution at the core of economic theory that is fundamentally different from the later marginalist or neoclassical theory. In the volume, the late Pierangelo Garegnani argues for the validity of Piero Sraffa's position on this issue, whilst the late noble laureate Paul Samuelson vehemently contests it. At a time of economic crisis, the future of the discipline is far from certain, and so it is extremely important to bring these debates back into the light, by reproducing them together for the first time. A comprehensive introduction by Heinz Kurz sets the debate in this context, and provides crucial background to the arguments.

This work examines the claim to scienific status made by supporters and practitioners of neoclassical economics. The approach taken is that of the history and philosophy of science. Analysis points to the conclusion that theories of economic choice are necessarily normative, essentially because of the nature of human behavior.

"The underlying notion in this volume is to spotlight, critically assess, and illuminate Paul A. Samuelson's extraordinarily voluminous, diverse, and groundbreaking contributions that encompass the entire field of economics through the lens of most eminent scholars. All this in honor of his ninetieth birthday celebrated on May 15, 2005 in Fairmont Hotel in Boston in the company of hundreds of scholars and their spouses."--Pref.

Warren J. Samuels Each book in this series explores the present status of its field in terms of where it is, how it got there, the existing tensions within the field, and something of how the field might develop in the future. Each book presumes that work in each field is neither settled nor unequivocal. Each book attempts to comprehend its field as an evolving, developmental process or set or efforts. This particular book, covering neoclassical economics, is the third of three in the field of the History of Economic Thought. The others are Pre-Classical Economic Thought, edited by S. Todd Lowry, and Classical Political Economy, edited by William O. Thweatt. Each one conducts the same kind of analysis as the others in the series, with the understanding that here we are dealing with the history of interpretation, rather than a substantive body of analysis of a certain aspect of the economy: for example, labor or international trade. (That understanding must be com plex and subtle, inasmuch as revision of interpretation of earlier ideas is part of the process-both cause and consequence-of re-analyzing the economy. ) In this group we are interested in how recent and contemporary writers have interpreted the history of economic thought differently, both among themselves and from earlier writers. 1 NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC lHEORY 2 Several topics must be discussed to place such work in perspective, in part as it is here applied to the history of the interpretation of neoclassical economics.

'...the history of economic theory at its best.'-EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL

Many consider Foundations of Economic Method to be Lawrence Boland's best work. This updated edition is radically changed from the original and will be much appreciated by thinkers within economics. The book positions methodology vis-à-vis the current practice of economists and is all the better for it. Yet another book that not only deserves to be read by those within the field of economic methodology, but also by those involved in economics at all. Boland is back.

There are quite a lot of recent books on the methodology of economics, but all proceed from one or more of the following three fundamental assumptions: 1) Meta-apriorism: it is a priori believed that the results of the philosophy of science of the past decades, associated with the names of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, yield conceptual frameworks that can be used to describe the product of the economist's endeavours. 2) Synchronism: it is believed that the inspection of a "theory" of economics, the presentation of some economic belief at a point in time, reveals its logical structure and ipso facto the "method" by which the "theory" is constructed. 3) CreduZity: it is believed that what economists themselves say on their own methods is true, or at least of primary relevance. In this book, I endeavour to show that these assumptions are false. First, the philosophies of science by Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos did not succeed in constructing a conceptual framework capable of describing theory development in economics. Secondly, this can only be seen as soon as not Zogic but history is taken to be the referee judging the adequacy of metatheories (diachronism). Thirdly the results of metaempiricaZ (not-meta-aprioristic), diachronic (not-synchronic) research reveals that even economists themselves turn out frequently to have inadequate metatheories upon which it is dangerous to rely (suspicion instead of credulity) .