Sanctions As Economic Statecraft

This book approaches economic sanctions as a form of statecraft in order to better study the oft used but not well understood policy. The chapters study a variety of historical and current cases involving the use of economic threats and promises. Their authors come from both academic and policy making fields, as well as different disciplinary backgrounds (political science and economics). They apply different research approaches (case studies, statistical analysis, formal economics) to increase our understanding of the sanction puzzle.

This book develops a unified theory of economic statecraft to clarify when and how sanctions and incentives can be used effectively to secure meaningful policy concessions. High-profile applications of economic statecraft have yielded varying degrees of success. The mixed record of economic incentives and economic sanctions in many cases raises important questions. Under what conditions can states modify the behaviour of other states by offering them tangible economic rewards or by threatening to disrupt existing economic relations? To what extent does the success of economic statecraft depend on the magnitude of economic penalties and rewards? In order to answer these questions, this book develops two analytic models: one weighs the threats economic statecraft poses to the Target’s Strategic Interests (TSI); while the other (stateness) assesses the degree to which the target state is insulated from domestic political pressures that senders attempt to generate or exploit. Through a series of carefully crafted case studies, including African apartheid and Japanese incentives to obtain the return of the Northern Territories, the authors demonstrate how their model can yield important policy insights in regards to contemporary economic sanctions and incentives cases, such as Iran and North Korea. This book will be of much interest to students of statecraft, sanctions, diplomacy, foreign policy, and international security in general.

Smart Sanctions explores the emerging concept of targeted sanctions and provides a comprehensive framework for new sanctions strategies for the 21st century. It includes essays by experts and analysts from the United Nations community, the European Union, the United States Government, and the academic community. Visit our website for sample chapters!

Introduction -- Techniques of statecraft -- What is economic statecraft? -- Thinking about economic statecraft -- Economic statecraft in international thought -- Bargaining with economic statecraft -- National power and economic statecraft -- "Classic cases" reconsidered -- Foreign trade -- Foreign aid -- The legality and morality of economic statecraft -- Conclusion -- Afterword : economic statecraft : continuity and change / Ethan B. Kapstein.

Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.--Publisher description.

Economic sanctions provide an alternative to waging war or a means to advance human rights. But are they morally justifiable? Philosophers have explored the ethics of war but rarely the ethics of carrots and sticks. Cécile Fabre offers a defense of economic statecraft, laying out a normative framework for this critical tool of diplomacy.

The essays here address the relationship between economic interdependence and international conflict, the political economy of economic sanctions, and the role of economic incentives in international statecraft.

This study explains how US policy-makers crafted and used instruments of economics statecraft against states that posed vital threats to the survival of the USA.