Security Assurances To Non Nuclear Weapon States

While policy makers and scholars have long devoted considerable attention to strategies like deterrence, which threaten others with unacceptable consequences, such threat-based strategies are not always the best option. In some cases, a state may be better off seeking to give others a greater sense of security, rather than by holding their security at risk. The most prominent use of these security assurances has been in conjunction with efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Ongoing concerns about the nuclear activities of countries like Iran and North Korea, and the possible reactions of other states in their regions, have catapulted this topic into high profile. This book represents the first study to explore the overall utility of assurance strategies, to evaluate their effectiveness as a tool for preventing nuclear proliferation, and to identify conditions under which they are more or less likely to be effective.

Background -- ENDC negotiations (1964) Nonaligned developments -- First Chinese Communist test -- Disarmament Commission discussions (1965) -- Eighth session of the ENDC (1965) -- Twentieth General Assembly (1965) -- NATO and Warsaw Treaty arrangements -- Pastore resolutions -- Ninth session of the ENDC, January 27-May 10, 1966 -- Tenth session of the ENDC, June 14-August 25, 1966 -- Tenth General Conference of the IAEA, September 21-28, 1966 -- Twenty-first General Assembly (1966) -- Concerns of non-nuclear-weapon nations -- Draft nonproliferation treaty, August 24, 1967 -- Report by Secretary-General Thant, October 10, 1967 -- Twenty-second General Assembly (Part I) -- Thirteenth session of the ENDC, January 18-March 14, 1968 -- Twenty-second General Assembly (Part II) -- Security Council action on the Tripartite Assurances Proposal -- Signing of the treaty -- Documentary annex.

UNIDIR/91/68