Self Defense Necessity And Punishment

This book offers a philosophical analysis of the moral and legal justifications for the use of force. While the book focuses on the ethics self-defense, it also explores its relation to lesser evil justifications, public authority, the justification of punishment, and the ethics of war. Steinhoff’s account of the moral use of force covers a wide range of topics, including the nature of justification in general, the precise elements of different justifications, the logic of claim- and liberty-rights and of rights forfeiture, the value of human life and its limits, and the principles of reciprocity and precaution. While the author’s analysis is primarily philosophical, it is informed by a metaethical stance that also places heavy emphasis on existing law and legal scholarship. In doing so, the book appeals to widely shared moral intuitions, precepts, and concepts grounded in criminal law. Self-Defense, Necessity, and Punishment offers the most comprehensive and systematic account of the ethics of self-defense. It will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in applied ethics and moral philosophy, philosophy of law, and political philosophy.

Do individuals have a positive right of self-defence? And if so, what are the limits of this right? Under what conditions, if any, does this use of force extend to the defence of others? These are some of the issues explored by Dr Uniacke in this comprehensive philosophical discussion of the principles relevant to self-defence as a moral and legal justification of homicide. She establishes a unitary right of self-defence and defence of others, one which grounds the permissibility of the use of necessary and proportionate defensive force against culpable and non-culpable, active and passive, unjust threats. Particular topics discussed include: the nature of moral and legal justification and excuse; natural law justifications of homicide in self-defence; the Principle of Double Effect and the claim that homicide in self-defence is justified as unintended killing; and the question of self-preferential killing. This is a lucid and sophisticated account of the complex notion of justification, revolving around a critical discussion of recent trends in the law of self-defence.

This major study advances an interpretation of criminal justification defences that views them as an integral component of the structure of the criminal law. A definition of criminal law is included in this book.

This book combines a careful philosophical discussion of the rationale justifying self-defence with a detailed discussion of the range of statutory self-defence requirements, as well as discussions of numerous other relevant issues (i.e. putative self-defense, excessive self-defense, earlier guilt and battered women). The book argues that before formulating definitions for each aspect of self-defence (necessity, proportionality, retreat, immediacy, mental element, etc.) it is imperative to determine the proper rationale for self-defence and, only then to derive the appropriate solutions. The first part contains an in-depth discussion of why society allows a justification for acts but does not excuse the actor from criminal liability, and the author critically analyzes current theories (culpability of the aggressor; autonomy of the attacked person; protection of the social-legal order; balancing interests; choice of the lesser evil) and points out the weaknesses of each theory before proposing a new theory to explain the justification of self-defence. The new theory is that for the full justification of self-defence, a balance of interests must be struck between the expected physical injury to the attacked person and the expected physical injury to the aggressor, as well as the relevant abstract factors: the autonomy of the attacked person, the culpability of the aggressor, and the social-legal order. The author demonstrates how ignoring one or more of these factors leads to erroneous results and how the proposed rationale can be applied to develop solutions to the complex questions raised.

Self-defence – the 'ancient right' – has never been more relevant than in the present era of widespread calls for criminal justice reform. The book substantially advances the patinaed discussion by introducing for the first time a comprehensive value-centric approach to thinking about the defence's deeper rationale. It tackles core issues such as the relative importance of the State's claimed monopoly on force, procedural justice and the need to shore up the justice system's legitimacy and creditworthiness, everyone's presumptive 'right to life,' and the importance of ensuring equal standing between citizens. And, in so doing, the book breaks ground by addressing public perceptions of 'just' and 'right' outcomes, as well as the emphasis legal systems place (and should place) on State power.

In what circumstances should we be allowed to kill an intruder who breaks into our home? Should battered women be forgiven for killing their husbands? This book analyses the questions raised by the argument of self-defence, and offers a theoretical framework for understanding the defence in the context of human rights norms.

When is it right to go to war? The most persuasive answer to this question has always been 'in self-defence'. David Rodin shows what's wrong with this answer. He proposes a comprehensive new theory of the right of self-defence which resolves many of the perplexing questions that have dogged both jurists and philosophers.

Legal expert George Fletcher uses the celebrated trial of New York's "Subway Vigilante", Bernhard Goetz, as a springboard to probe the profound relationship between this defensive action, the public's understanding of it, and the court's interpretation of it according to the law.