Shareholder Driven Corporate Governance

"This is a book about the ways in which capital markets have come to be shaped by the ubiquity of sophisticated investors. In particular, the majority of today's investors have the economic might and technical capacity to play a role in the decision-making of the corporations in which they invest. This brings with it a host of benefits, such as better corporate strategy and mechanisms to ameliorate the moral hazard that can exist when the people who bear the risk of corporate activity are different than those who make decisions. It also poses regulatory challenges, and a key element of this book is an examination of the ways in which our thinking about corporations and capital markets must change to reflect the prevalence of sophisticated shareholders"--

This timely and engaging book examines how maximizing shareholder value has played a dominant role in corporate governance over recent decades, and analyzes the resulting effect on share prices in the stock markets. Alongside the rise in corporate power and deepening economic inequality, the author investigates corporate law reform as a corrective remedy.

Corporate governance constitutes the internal and external institutions, markets, policies, and processes designed to help companies maximize their efficiency and value. In this collection of classic and current articles from the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, thought leaders such as Michael Jensen and Robert Monks discuss the corporate mission of value maximization and the accomplishments and limitations of U.S. governance in achieving that end. They address the elements driving corporate value: the board of directors, compensation for CEOs and other employees, incentives and organizational structure, external ownership and control, role of markets, and financial reporting. They evaluate best practice methods, challenges in designing equity plans, the controversy over executive compensation, the values of decentralization, identifying and attracting the "right" investors, the evolution of shareholder activism, creating value through mergers and acquisitions, and the benefits of just saying no to Wall Street's "earnings game." Grounded in solid research and practice, U.S. Corporate Governance is a crucial companion for navigating the world of modern finance.

The process of economic globalization, as product and capital markets have become increasingly integrated since WWII, has placed huge, and it is argued by some, irresistible pressures on the world's 'insider' stakeholder oriented corporate governance systems. Insider corporate governance systems in countries such as Germany, so the argument goes, should converge or be transformed by global product and capital market pressures to the 'superior' shareholder oriented 'outsider' corporate governance model prevalent in the UK and the US. What these pressures from globalization are, how they manifest themselves, whether they are likely to cause such a convergence/transformation and whether these pressures will continue, lie at the heart of the exploration in this volume. The Globalization of Corporate Governance provides a detailed analysis of the evolution of the key corporate governance systems in the UK, the US and Germany from the perspective of the development of economic globalization. As such it is a valuable resource for those interested in how economic and legal reforms interact to produce change within corporate governance systems.

The growth of shareholder value has been a major change in Western economies since the 1980s. This growth has reignited debates concerning relations between investors and managers. This book argues that investors are more than passive providers of finance, on whose behalf managers seek to maximize shareholder returns. Instead, many investors directly influence management practice, through investor engagement. The book examines the role of institutional investors and private equity firms, two types of investors with overlapping but different reasons for engagement. Questions addressed include: What are the incentives, and disincentives, for investment engagement? How is investor engagement organized? What areas of management practice are of particular concern to investors? The discussion shows in detail how private equity firms play a major role in developing new companies, beyond the provision of finance, especially in the IT, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical sectors. The discussion is primarily based on British and US research. The debate has wider international relevance, because there are strong pressures for establishing shareholder value as the international 'norm' for systems of corporate governance. Following a detailed discussion of Germany, the authors conclude that there is no inevitable trend to shareholder value: shareholder value depends upon complementary institutional arrangements in national business systems, which are far from universal. The book concludes with a critical analysis of the justifications for shareholder value and investor engagement, highlighting the weaknesses of both efficiency and equity justifications.

Effective corporate governance, or the set of controls and incentives that drive top management, originates both outside and inside the firm and assures investors who hope to commit their capital. Essential when buying stocks in one's own country, effective corporate governance is even more important abroad, where information can be less reliable and investor influence (or protection) more limited. In this collection of articles from the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, more than thirty leading scholars and practitioners discuss the possibilities and limitations of global corporate finance and governance systems, whether in Europe and North America or in the emerging markets of Israel, India, Korea, and South Africa. Essays discuss the political roots of American corporate finance; the structural and financial variations between international corporations; control premiums and the effectiveness of corporate governance systems; debt, folklore, and cross-country differences in financial structures; the driving forces behind the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997; corporate ownership and control in India, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom; financial and economic lessons of Italy's privatization program; changes in Korean corporate governance; sovereign wealth funds; and the new organization of Canadian business trusts. A special roundtable discussion addresses shareholder activism in the U.K.

Rising defaults in the financial market in 2007, the current widespread economic recession and debt crisis have added impetus to existing doubts about companies’ governance, and cast new light on future trends in shareholder-oriented corporate practice. Taking account of these developments in the field and realising the current need for changes in governance, this book offers a thorough exploration of the origins, recent changes and future development of the corporate objective—shareholder primacy. Legal and theoretical aspects are examined so as to provide a comprehensive and critical account of the practices reflecting shareholder primacy in the UK. In the wake of the financial crisis, this book investigates the direction of future policy, with particular attention to changes in governing rules and regulations and their implications for preserving the objective of shareholder primacy. It examines current UK and EU reform proposals calling for long-term and socially-responsible corporate performance, and the potential friction between proposed legal changes and commercial practices. This book will be useful to researchers and students of company law, and business and management studies.

In this volume, leading management experts offer critical insights into the promises and illusions of shareholder empowerment, the discrepancies between theory and practice, and the challenges posed by variations in global corporate governance regimes.