Signals Intelligence Sigint In South Asia

Signals intelligence (SIGINT), or the collection of intelligence by the interception of communications or monitoring of other electronic signals, is the most productive source of intelligence available to governments and their defence establishments. In the Asia-Pacific region, there are moves to greater defence self-reliance. Throughout the region there has been a significant expansion of SIGNIT capabilities and operations over the past decade, and this is expected to continue over the foreseeable future. Signals Intelligence in the Post-Cold War Era describes these recent developments in global and regional SIGINT capabilities and operations, and provides some explanation for their developments.

With a distinguished career spanning more than four decades, Professor Desmond Ball is one of the world's greatest scholars of strategy and defence, Australia's home-grown giant. In this collection of essays, leading political, media and academic figures, including former United States President Jimmy Carter, pay tribute to his remarkable contributions. From a base at the Australian National University in Canberra, Professor Ball has unflinchingly researched topics from Cold War nuclear strategy and the defence of Australia to spy scandals and Southeast Asian paramilitaries. His roaming intellect, appetite for getting the facts and commitment to publishing on sensitive topics ensure he is a towering figure who has provided impeccable service to Strategic Studies, the Asia-Pacific region and the Australian community.

This book examines India’s foreign intelligence culture and strategic surprises in the 20th century. The work looks at whether there is a distinct way in which India ‘thinks about’ and ‘does’ intelligence, and, by extension, whether this affects the prospects of it being surprised. Drawing on a combination of archival data, secondary source information and interviews with members of the Indian security and intelligence community, the book provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Indian intelligence culture from the ancient period to colonial times and, subsequently, the post-colonial era. This evolutionary culture has played a significant role in explaining the India’s foreign intelligence failure during the occurrences of strategic surprises, such as the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1999 Kargil War, while it successfully prepared for surprise attacks like Operation Chenghiz Khan by Pakistan in 1971. The result is that the book argues that the strategic culture of a nation and its interplay with intelligence organisations and operations is important to understanding the conditions for intelligence failures and strategic surprises. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, Asian politics and International Relations.