Slide Rules And Submarines

The classic problem of when to depend on lessons learned from previous conflicts and when to employ new tactics and technology always confronts military leaders. At the beginning of World War II, for example, Allied naval strategists were prepared to do battle using traditional tactics against surface vessels, but - this study contends - not against submarines; because the strategists failed to appreciate either the damage done by submarines in World War I or the tactics that had worked successfully against them. Consequently, from the beginning of World War II to mid-1943, German U-boats were able to mount a devastating campaign against Allied shipping. In Slide Rules and Submarines, Montgomery Meigs describes how the allies learned to counter the U-boat threat. Using new technology - and new tactics derived from scientific methods - they devised countermeasures to defeat the German submarine menace. Then, continuing to apply those successful measures, they went on to negate the Japanese submarine threat in the Pacific. The author cites the crucial role of civilian scientists - the "outsiders" - who worked with military staffs and operational commanders of the campaign at sea. Their open minds and objective methods were essential for the application of such tactical advances as sonar and radar, acoustic torpedoes, depth finders, and code breaking to the battle. As this study illustrates, the importance of such timely and innovative cooperation among scientists, the research and development community, and military commanders in bringing technological knowledge to bear for operational and strategic advantage cannot be overstated. Meigs study of how such cooperation succeeded in the crucible of wartime crisis is itself an example of how the lessons of the past can serve us well today. J. A. Baldwin Vice Admiral, United States Navy President, National Defense University

For the first time, the inside story of the brilliant American engineer who defeated Enigma and the Nazi code-masters Much has been written about the success of the British “Ultra” program in cracking the Germans’ Enigma code early in World War II, but few know what really happened in 1942, when the Germans added a fourth rotor to the machine that created the already challenging naval code and plunged Allied intelligence into darkness. Enter one Joe Desch, an unassuming but brilliant engineer at the National Cash Register Company in Dayton, Ohio, who was given the task of creating a machine to break the new Enigma settings. It was an enterprise that rivaled the Manhattan Project for secrecy and complexity–and nearly drove Desch to a breakdown. Under enormous pressure, he succeeded in creating a 5,000-pound electromechanical monster known as the Desch Bombe, which helped turn the tide in the Battle of the Atlantic–but not before a disgruntled co-worker attempted to leak information about the machine to the Nazis. After toiling anonymously–it even took his daughter years to learn of his accomplishments–Desch was awarded the National Medal of Merit, the country’s highest civilian honor. In The Secret in Building 26, the entire thrilling story of the final triumph over Enigma is finally told.

Submariners are a tight knit group of men bound together by training and experience, and with a language all their own. That language is perhaps a little vulgar, but never intentionally demeaning, and a little irreverent but still worldly. This work is an attempt to preserve and explain some of these curious guys who so proudly wear a shiny metal pin that looks like a strange pair of fish on their left breast. This process of accumulating this new language begins in Boot Camp, and is added to with every change of duty station the sailor undergoes. It is heard aboard the boats and, unknowingly, by family members who can't understand terms like head, deck, and overhead, and who think SOS is a distress signal.

From unpromising beginnings in March 1942, the Allied submarine base at Fremantle on the west coast of Australia became a vital part of the Allied offensive against Japan. Pushed back from the Philippines and the Netherlands’ East Indies, American submariners, accompanied by a small group of Dutch forces, retreated to Fremantle as a last resort. The location was chosen for its good harbor and the fact that it was outside the range of land-based Japanese aircraft. Unfortunately the base was also far from their patrol areas and supply lines, and it was difficult to reinforce should the enemy attack. Thanks largely to a welcoming civilian population, morale quickly improved. The hospitality and sense of belonging fostered by Western Australians became legendary among Allied submariners and remains central to their wartime memories. Perhaps as a result of such a positive experience, the Allied forces became much more successful in combat. Intertwining social and military history, Fremantle’s Submarines relates how courage, cooperation, and community made Fremantle arguably the most successful military outpost of World War II from the standpoint of troop morale.

Documents the story of a small group of scientists who applied intellectual strategies to battle techniques and revolutionized the process of waging wars, citing the contributions of future Nobel winner Patrick Blackett.

Why do nations cooperate even as they try to destroy each other? Jeffrey Legro explores this question in the context of World War II, the "total" war that in fact wasn't. During the war, combatant states attempted to sustain agreements limiting the use of three forms of combat considered barbarous—submarine attacks against civilian ships, strategic bombing of civilian targets, and chemical warfare. Looking at how these restraints worked or failed to work between such fierce enemies as Hitler's Third Reich and Churchill's Britain, Legro offers a new understanding of the dynamics of World War II and the sources of international cooperation. While traditional explanations of cooperation focus on the relations between actors, Cooperation under Fire examines what warring nations seek and why they seek it—the "preference formation" that undergirds international interaction. Scholars and statesmen debate whether it is the balance of power or the influence of international norms that most directly shapes foreign policy goals. Critically assessing both explanations, Legro argues that it was, rather, the organizational cultures of military bureaucracies—their beliefs and customs in waging war—that decided national priorities for limiting the use of force in World War II. Drawing on documents from Germany, Britain, the United States, and the former Soviet Union, Legro provides a compelling account of how military cultures molded state preferences and affected the success of cooperation. In its clear and cogent analysis, this book has significant implications for the theory and practice of international relations.

Includes over 14 photos and maps More than fifty years after World War II, America’s major air power contribution to the war in Europe-in efforts such as Big Week, Regensburg, and Patton’s dash across Europe-live on in the memories of airmen and students of air power. Never before had air forces performed so many roles in so many different types of operations. Air power proved to be extremely flexible: wartime missions included maintaining air superiority, controlling the air space over the battlefield; strategic bombardment, destroying the enemy’s industrial and logistical network; air-ground support, attacking targets on the battlefield; and military airlift, delivering war materiel to distant bases. Perhaps one of the least known but significant roles of the Army Air Forces (AAF) was in antisubmarine warfare, particularly in the European-African-Middle Eastern theater. From the coasts of Greenland, Europe, and Africa to the mid-Atlantic, AAF aircraft hunted German U-boats that sank thousands of British and American transport ships early in the war. These missions supplemented the efforts of the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force Coastal Command, and the U.S. Navy, and helped those sea forces to wrest control of the sea lanes from German submarines.