Slim Chance The Pivotal Role Of Air Mobility In The Burma Campaign

This study applies lessons learned from air mobility’s pivotal role in Field Marshal Sir William Slim’s World War II Burma campaign to contemporary air mobility operations. The author begins by tracing the evolution of air mobility from its pre-World War I roots to the Second World War, noting how its development proceeded despite the lack of coherent, codified doctrine. Next the author assesses Slim’s Burma campaign and how the key elements of organization, training and leadership, apart from air mobility, proved critical to Allied victory. Building upon this, the discussion turns to air mobility’s contributions to Slim’s joint campaign. From this analysis, the author identifies the tenets of air superiority, organization and air mobility normalization as being critical and enduring airpower lessons from the Burma theater. The closing chapters offer a primer on contemporary mobility operations before arguing that modern air mobility practitioners must account for five key essentials: superiority across the air and space domains; proper organization that promotes relationship building at the operational level of war; normalization of the complete air mobility supply chain and its accompanying idea of “air mobility mindedness”; training focused on increased interoperability; and the vital role of leadership.

This book applies lessons learned from air mobility's pivotal role in Field Marshal Sir William Slim's World War II Burma campaign to contemporary air mobility operations. The author begins by tracing the evolution of air mobility from its pre-World War I roots to the Second World War, noting how its development proceeded despite the lack of coherent, codified doctrine. Next the author assesses Slim's Burma campaign and how the key elements of organization, training and leadership, apart from air mobility, proved critical to Allied victory. Building upon this, the discussion turns to air mobility's contributions to Slim's joint campaign. From this analysis, the author identifies the tenets of air superiority, organization and air mobility normalization as being critical and enduring airpower lessons from the Burma theater. The closing chapters offer a primer on contemporary mobility operations before arguing that modern air mobility practitioners must account for five key essentials: superiority across the air and space domains; proper organization that promotes relationship building at the operational level of war; normalization of the complete air mobility supply chain and its accompanying idea of air mobility mindedness; training focused on increased interoperability; and the vital role of leadership.

This unique book reproduces three reports and studies about Field Marshall William J. Slim and the famous Burma campaigns of World War II: Field Marshal William J. Slim: The Great General and the Breaking of the Glass Ceiling - Slim Chance: The Pivotal Role of Air Mobility in the Burma Campaign - Field Marshal Slim - Theoretical Thinking and the Impact of Theory on Campaign Planning Field Marshal William J. Slim is considered by many historians to be one of the finest generals of World War II. His accomplishments were truly extraordinary. He commanded a polyglot army, consisting of six different nationalities speaking eight different languages, that fought in some of the most inhospitable, disease-ridden country in the world against the war's toughest opponent, the Japanese. In March 1942, he assumed command of a British-Indian force in Burma half way through the longest retreat in the British Army's history. Even though he was unable to reverse the disaster, he kept his force intact and led it to safety. Over the next three and one half years, despite very limited resources and several inept senior commanders, he rebuilt his force into an army that was able to inflict on the Japanese their greatest land defeat of World War II. In the process, he conducted four of the most classic operational campaigns of the war-the battle of the Second Arakan; the battles of Kohima and Imphal; the capture of Mandalay and Meiktila; and the pursuit to Rangoon. Throughout his career, but especially during World War II, Slim met all the criteria for a great general and strategic leader as set forth in Lord Wavell's generals and generalship. Despite these great accomplishments, Slim ran into several "glass ceilings" during World War II. Twice he was relieved of command, once immediately after his greatest battlefield victory. This study examines Field Marshal' Slim's leadership. It takes a brief look at his biography, then compares him against Wavell's standards for generalship by highlighting events from his career that illustrate each standard. Finally, it addresses the issue of the "glass ceiling"--what it is, the events surrounding Slim's encounters with it, and how Slim was able to overcome it. The intent is to show that Slim was not only a great World War II general, but is still a model of leadership worthy of study by the U.S. Army. This study applies lessons learned from air mobility's pivotal role in Field Marshal Sir William Slim's World War II Burma campaign to contemporary air mobility operations. The author begins by tracing the evolution of air mobility from its pre-World War I roots to the Second World War, noting how its development proceeded despite the lack of coherent, codified doctrine. Next the author assesses Slim's Burma campaign and how the key elements of organization, training and leadership, apart from air mobility, proved critical to Allied victory. Building upon this, the discussion turns to air mobility's contributions to Slim's joint campaign. From this analysis, the author identifies the tenets of air superiority, organization and air mobility normalization as being critical and enduring airpower lessons from the Burma theater. The closing chapters offer a primer on contemporary mobility operations before arguing that modern air mobility practitioners must account for five key essentials: superiority across the air and space domains; proper organization that promotes relationship building at the operational level of war; normalization of the complete air mobility supply chain and its accompanying idea of "air mobility mindedness"; training focused on increased interoperability; and the vital role of leadership.

Updated by popular demand, this is the fourth edition of this important bibliography. It lists a wide selection of works on or about Myanmar published in English and in hard copy since the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, which marked the beginning of a new era in Myanmar’s modern history. There are now 2,727 titles listed. They have been written, edited, translated or compiled by over 2,000 people, from many different backgrounds. These works have been organized into thirty-five subject chapters containing ninety-five discrete sections. There are also four appendices, including a comprehensive reading guide for those unfamiliar with Myanmar or who may be seeking guidance on particular topics. This book is an invaluable aid to officials, scholars, journalists, armchair travellers and others with an interest in this fascinating but deeply troubled country.

In Epidemics and the American Military, Dr. Jack McCallum examines the major role the military has played propagating and controlling disease throughout this nation’s history. The U.S. armed forces recruit young people from isolated rural areas and densely populated cities, many of whom have been exposed to a smorgasbord of germs. After training and living in close contact with each other for months, soldiers are shipped across countries and continents and meet civilians and other armies. McCallum argues that if one set out to design a perfect world for an aggressive pathogen, it would be hard to do better than an army at war. There are four ways to combat epidemic infectious diseases: quarantine, altering the ecology in which infections spread, medical treatment of infection, and immunization. Each has played a specific but often overlooked role in American wars. A case can be made that General George Washington saved the American Revolution when he mandated inoculation of the Continental Army with smallpox. The Union Army might very well have taken Richmond in 1862 had it not been for an epidemic of typhoid fever during the Peninsular Campaign. Yellow fever was a proximate cause of the American invasion of Cuba in 1898, and its control enabled a continued U.S. presence on the island and in the rest of the Caribbean. Had it not been for influenza, German Gen. Erich Ludendorff might well have succeeded in his offensive in the closing years of World War I. Before senior Army and Naval officers recognized the importance of anti-malarial prophylaxis and forced its acceptance by hesitant troops, the World War II Solomon and New Guinea campaigns were in danger of collapsing.

"Author Derek Salmi provides a comprehensive theory of air mobility, examining its five key factors of freedom of movement, command and control, integrated logistics, technology, and training, then illustrating these factors' criticality to mission success through case studies. This guidebook serves as a one-stop shop for military practitioners and civilian policy makers to use in framing current possibilities while spurring imagination for the future."--