Soldiers And Diplomacy In Burma

Soldiers and Diplomacy addresses the key question of the ongoing role of the military in BurmaÍs foreign policy. The authors, a political scientist and a former top Asia editor for the BBC, provide a fresh perspective on BurmaÍs foreign and security policies, which have shifted between pro-active diplomacies of neutralism and non-alignment, and autarkical policies of isolation and xenophobic nationalism. They argue that important elements of continuity underlie BurmaÍs striking postcolonial policy changes and contrasting diplomatic practices. Among the defining factors here are the formidable dominance of the Burmese armed forces over state structure, the enduring domestic political conundrum and the peculiar geography of a country located at the crossroads of India, China and Southeast Asia. Egreteau and Jagan argue that the Burmese military still has the tools needed to retain their praetorian influence over the countryÍs foreign policy in the post-junta context of the 2010s. For international policymakers, potential foreign investors and BurmaÍs immediate neighbors, this will have strong implications in terms of the countryÍs foreign policy approach.

Wooing the Generals: India's New Burma Policy.

A genuine democracy movement lives in Burma, but it continues to be brutally suppressed by the ruling military government. In 1990, the National League for Democracy (NLD)-led by Aung San Suu Kyi-won 82 percent of the seats in a multiparty parliamentary election. The regime ignored the elections and the democratically elected representatives never took office. Aung San Suu Kyi, who was imprisoned after violent government-orchestrated attacks on democracy supporters on May 30, 2003, has spent more than half of the past fourteen years under house arrest. Burma remains one of the most tightly controlled dictatorships in the world. Recognizing that democracy and the NLD cannot survive in Burma without the help of the United Sates and the international community, the Council-sponsored Independent Task Force on Burma sounds a clarion call for change. In response to the governments recent crackdown on the democratic opposition, the Task Force urges the United Nations to call for the immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners, and to impose sanctions on Burma, including bans both on new investment in Burma and on the importation of goods produced in Burma. The Task Force report also offers specific recommendations for U.S. policy in four areas: humanitarian assistance; promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law; narcotics control policy; and refugees, migrants, and internally displaced persons. Led by Mathea Falco, president of Drug Strategies and former assistant secretary of state for international narcotics matters, this bipartisan Task Force comprises members with a wide range of experience in international business, law, government, media, academia, publichealth, and human rights advocacy, among other areas. Its recommendations are intended to inform U.S. government action as well as to increase U.S. cooperation with other countries, especially in Asia, to bring about a long overdue political, economic, and social transformation of Burma.

In 2012, Barack Obama became the first U.S. president ever to visit Myanmar, formerly known as Burma. This official state visit marked a new period in the long and sinuous diplomatic relationship between the United States and Burma/Myanmar, which Kenton Clymer examines in A Delicate Relationship. From the challenges of decolonization and heightened nationalist activities that emerged in the wake of World War II to the Cold War concern with domino states to the rise of human rights policy in the 1980s and beyond, Clymer demonstrates how Burma/Myanmar has fit into the broad patterns of U.S. foreign policy and yet has never been fully integrated into diplomatic efforts in the region of Southeast Asia. When Burma, a British colony since the nineteenth century, achieved independence in 1948, the United States feared that the country might be the first Southeast Asian nation to fall to the communists, and it embarked on a series of efforts to prevent this. In 1962, General Ne Win, who toppled the government in a coup d’état, established an authoritarian socialist military junta that severely limited diplomatic contact and led to a period in which the primary American diplomatic concern became Burma’s increasing opium production. Ne Win’s rule ended (at least officially) in 1988, when the Burmese people revolted against the oppressive military government. Aung San Suu Kyi emerged as the charismatic leader of the opposition and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. Amid these great changes in policy and outlook, Burma/Myanmar remained fiercely nonaligned and, under Ne Win, isolationist. The limited diplomatic exchange that resulted meant that the state was often a frustrating puzzle to U.S. officials. Clymer explores attitudes toward Burma (later Myanmar), from anxious anticommunism during the Cold War to interventions to stop drug trafficking to debates in Congress, the White House, and the Department of State over how to respond to the emergence of the opposition movement in the late 1980s. The junta’s brutality, its refusal to relinquish power, and its imprisonment of opposition leaders resulted in public and Congressional pressure to try to change the regime. Indeed, Aung San Suu Kyi’s rise to prominence fueled the new foreign policy debate that was focused on human rights, and in that climate Burma/Myanmar held particularly large symbolic importance for U.S. policy makers. Congressional and public opinion favored sanctions, while U.S. presidents and their administrations were more cautious. Clymer’s account concludes with President Obama’s visits in 2012 and 2014, and visits to the United States by Aung San Suu Kyi and President Thein Sein, which marked the establishment of a new, warmer relationship with a relatively open Myanmar.

The United Wa State Army (UWSA) is a nonstate armed group that administers an autonomous zone in the difficult-to-reach Wa Hills of eastern Myanmar. As China expands its geopolitical interests across Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative, the Wa have come to play a pivotal role in Beijing's efforts to extend its influence in Myanmar. In a book relevant to current debates about geopolitics in Asia, the illicit drug trade, Myanmar's decades-long civil wars, and ongoing efforts to negotiate a settlement, Bertil Lintner, the only foreign journalist to visit the Wa areas when they were controlled by the Communist Party of Burma, traces the history of the Wa Hills and the struggles of its people, providing a rare look at the UWSA.

This book argues that the Burmese military regime has always favoured an isolationist-type policy that finds its grassroots in Ne Win’s autarchic and xenophobic era as well as in Burma’s royal traditions, but without being completely cut off from the outside world. This policy approach is well suited to the Burmese authoritarian state which boasts an important strategic position in the region. In the past decade, the politics of “isolationism without isolation” has been skilfully developed by Burma’s military elite in order to preserve itself from both internal and external threats. Since the Depayin crackdown in May 2003, every step the Burmese junta has taken indicates that it has been consciously defining both its foreign policy and its internal political agenda according to these isolationist tendencies, as the recent fallbacks that followed the “Saffron Revolution” (September 2007) and the Cyclone Nargis (May 2008) illustrate. Not only does the military regime tend to strategically withdraw itself from the regional scene, by choosing only a few but crucial diplomatic and commercial partners like China, India, Singapore, Russia or Thailand, but it also gradually isolates itself from the rest of the Burmese society, by opting for a strategic and nationalist entrenchment which was perfectly highlighted by the purge of the pragmatic Military Intelligence Services (2004), the transfer of the capital to Naypyidaw (2005) and the strict control over the transitional process initiated by its own “Road Map towards a disciplined democracy” and undisrupted by the recent crises.