Special Operations In Wwii

A brief history of secret British and American World War II organizations, their training, tools, successes, and their legacy. Winston Churchill famously instructed the head of the Special Operations Executive to “Set Europe ablaze!” Agents of both the British Special Operations Executive and the American Office of Strategic Services underwent rigorous training before making their way, undetected, into occupied Europe to do just that. Working alone or in small cells, often cooperating with local resistance groups, agents undertook missions behind enemy lines involving sabotage, subversion, organizing resistance groups and intelligence-gathering. SOE’s first notable success was the destruction of a power station in France, stopping work at a vital U-boat base. Later operations included the assassination of Himmler’s deputy Reinhard Heyrich and ending the Nazi atomic bomb program by destroying the heavy water plant at Vemork, Norway. OSS operatives established anti-Nazi resistance groups across Europe, and managed to smuggle operatives into Nazi Germany, including running one of the war’s most important spies, German diplomat Fritz Kolbe. All missions were incredibly dangerous and many agents were captured, tortured, and ultimately killed—the life expectancy of an SOE wireless operator in occupied France was just six weeks. In this short history, historian James Stejskal examines why these agencies were established, the training regime and ingenious tools developed to enable agents to undertake their missions, their operational successes, and their legacy.

From a small number of clandestine activities against the German occupation of Denmark in 1940, a sophisticated resistance movement developed which by 1944, with the support of Special Operations Executive, had become a highly effective intelligence gathering and sabotage organisation. Denmark is composed of a mainland and more than 500 islands, a fifth of which are inhabited, and the countryside is devoid of any inaccessible or mountainous region. Together this made communication between resistance cells difficult and meant that there were no natural bases from which guerrilla operations could be mounted. Nevertheless, thanks to supply drops of explosives, weapons and ammunition arranged by SOE, the Danes harassed the Germans and raised the moral of the Danish people in the latter, and most brutal, stages of the war. This largely forgotten story of SOE and its agents in Denmark, the latter facing extremely hazardous conditions, was written immediately after the war by a SOE staff member and read and validated by the Director of SOE, Major General Colin Gubbins. A very large number of documents were burned at SOE’s London headquarters in Baker Street when the organisation was wound down in 1946 making this history of the Danish Section an invaluable and irreplaceable study. SOE in Denmark was written at a time when SOE was still largely unknown to the general public and its operations a closely guarded secret. It was expected that its activities would never be officially acknowledged and the study of its actions in Denmark was compiled with the aim of provide a lasting record of its achievement. Within its pages we read of the dangers the agents faced, the logistical mountains they had to overcome, and the successes achieved in the face of a ruthless enemy. Completed with unique photographs from the Danish archives, SOE in Denmark is an essential addition to the SOE literature.

Illustrated with 11 maps and 35 Illustrations From the plains of Europe to the jungles of the Pacific, the U.S. Army in World War II employed a variety of commando and guerrilla operations to harass the Axis armies, gather intelligence, and support the more conventional Allied military efforts. During the Allied invasion of northern France on D-day, elite American infantry scaled the sheer cliffs of the Normandy coast, while smaller combat teams and partisans struck deep behind German lines, attacking enemy troop concentrations and disrupting their communications. On the other side of the globe, U.S. soldiers led guerrillas against Japanese patrols in the jungles of the Philippines and pushed through uncharted paths in the rugged mountains of northern Burma to strike at the enemy rear. Special operations such as these provided some of the most stirring adventure stories of the war, with innumerable legends growing from the exploits of Darby’s and Rudder’s Rangers, Merrill’s Marauders, the Jedburghs, the guerrillas of the Philippines, and the Kachins of northern Burma. Despite the public and historical attention paid to the exploits of American special operations forces in World War II, their significance remains a matter of dispute. Both during and after the conflict, many officers argued that such endeavors contributed little in a war won primarily by conventional combat units. They perceived little, if any, place for such units in official Army doctrine. Yet others have contended that a broader, more intelligent use of special operations would have hastened the triumph of Allied arms during World War II. In their eyes, the experience gained by the U.S. Army in the field during the war was important and foreshadowed the shape of future military operations.

U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II fills a gap in the Army's record of its overseas activities. As David W. Hogan so clearly states, a variety of commando and guerrilla operations were conducted on the plains of Europe and in the jungles of the Pacific to harass the Axis armies, to gather intelligence, and to support the more conventional Allied military efforts, yet their significance was a matter of dispute. Hogan examines the critical issues underlying special operations and shows how American leaders employed commandos-rangers in Army parlance-and guerrillas extensively, if not systematically, during the war. An important overview of the Army's past experience, the study contains useful lessons at a time of keen interest in the critical role being played by special operation forces in meeting today's contingencies.

"1943, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, the commanding general of U.S. Army Air Forces, wanted to demonstrate that Allied forces could use "ships in the air" (just like the Navy used ships on the sea)to stage an aerial invasion of Burma. Air Commandos against Japan tells the story of how within a few short months these daring aviators trained and equipped an entirely new kind of organization, moved it to India, established bases, and then led it into combat in support of an eccentric and combative British officer named Orde C. Wingate." "In Japanese-occupied Burma, where terrain made a textbook frontal assault on the Japanese impossible, the Air Commandos took an unorthodox approach to the fight, using unconventional hit-and-run tactics to confuse the enemy and to destroy their lines of communication and supply. This book describes how the unit successfully attacked the enemy from the air, resupplied British commandos on the ground, and airlifted the wounded out of the battle area - eventually driving the Japanese out of Burma."--BOOK JACKET.

James D. Kiras shows how a number of different special operations, in conjunction with more conventional military actions, achieve and sustain strategic effect(s) over time. In particular, he argues that the root of effective special operations lies in understanding the relationship existing between moral and material attrition at the strategic level. He also presents a theoretical framework for understanding how special operations achieve strategic effects using a unique synthesis of strategic theory and case studies. This study shows how the key to understanding how special operations reside in the concept of strategic attrition and in the moral and material nature of strategy. It also highlights major figures such as Carl von Clausewitz, Hans Delbrück, and Mao Zedong, who understood these complexities and were experts in eroding an enemy’s will to fight. These and other examples provide a superb explanation of the complexities of modern strategy and the place of special operations in a war of attrition. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars with an interest in special forces and of strategic and military studies in general.