State Behavior And The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

This is the first book-length study of why states sometimes ignore, oppose, or undermine elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime--even as they formally support it. These essays show that success must be measured not only by how many states join the effort but also by how they participate once they join.

Too often, our focus on the relative handful of countries with nuclear weapons keeps us from asking an important question: Why do so many more states not have such weapons? More important, what can we learn from these examples of nuclear restraint? Maria Rost Rublee argues that in addition to understanding a state's security environment, we must appreciate the social forces that influence how states conceptualize the value of nuclear weapons. Much of what Rublee says also applies to other weapons of mass destruction, as well as national security decision making in general. The nuclear nonproliferation movement has created an international social environment that exerts a variety of normative pressures on how state elites and policymakers think about nuclear weapons. Within a social psychology framework, Rublee examines decision making about nuclear weapons in five case studies: Japan, Egypt, Libya, Sweden, and Germany. In each case, Rublee considers the extent to which nuclear forbearance resulted from persuasion (genuine transformation of preferences), social conformity (the desire to maximize social benefits and/or minimize social costs, without a change in underlying preferences), or identification (the desire or habit of following the actions of an important other). The book offers bold policy prescriptions based on a sharpened knowledge of the many ways we transmit and process nonproliferation norms. The social mechanisms that encourage nonproliferation-and the regime that created them-must be preserved and strengthened, Rublee argues, for without them states that have exercised nuclear restraint may rethink their choices.

Too often, our focus on the relative handful of countries with nuclear weapons keeps us from asking an important question: Why do so many more states not have such weapons? More important, what can we learn from these examples of nuclear restraint? Maria Rost Rublee argues that in addition to understanding a state's security environment, we must appreciate the social forces that influence how states conceptualize the value of nuclear weapons. Much of what Rublee says also applies to other weapons of mass destruction, as well as national security decision making in general. The nuclear nonproliferation movement has created an international social environment that exerts a variety of normative pressures on how state elites and policymakers think about nuclear weapons. Within a social psychology framework, Rublee examines decision making about nuclear weapons in five case studies: Japan, Egypt, Libya, Sweden, and Germany. In each case, Rublee considers the extent to which nuclear forbearance resulted from persuasion (genuine transformation of preferences), social conformity (the desire to maximize social benefits and/or minimize social costs, without a change in underlying preferences), or identification (the desire or habit of following the actions of an important other). The book offers bold policy prescriptions based on a sharpened knowledge of the many ways we transmit and process nonproliferation norms. The social mechanisms that encourage nonproliferation-and the regime that created them-must be preserved and strengthened, Rublee argues, for without them states that have exercised nuclear restraint may rethink their choices.

Nuclear technology has long been recognized as capable of both tremendous benefits and tremendous destruction. With this in mind, countries have devised international arrangements intended to promote peaceful nuclear applications while preventing the spread of materials, equipment, and technologies useful for producing nuclear weapons. Today, however, it is clear that this global nonproliferation regime is falling short. North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and has since tested two nuclear devices. Iran, while still a party to the NPT, has developed the capacity to enrich significant amounts of uranium; many believe it is seeking to build nuclear weapons or at least attain the ability to do so. In addition, there is the challenge of facilitating the expansion of nuclear energy, something that could help reduce carbon emissions, while preventing countries from using related technologies for military purposes. Finally, the prevalence of nuclear materials only intensifies the fear that terrorist groups could acquire them through theft or a deliberate transfer from a state.Given these challenges, it is fitting that nuclear issues are near the top of today's foreign policy agenda. President Barack Obama organized a nuclear security summit in April to discuss ways to secure nuclear materials and reduce the threat of terrorism, and NPT signatories will gather in May for the five-yearly NPT review conference. The United States and Russia have reached a successor agreement calling for further reductions in their nuclear arsenals. And the United States and others continue to pursue both sanctions and negotiations with the aim of limiting Iran's nuclear capabilities.In this Council Special Report, Paul Lettow examines the shortcomings of the nonproliferation regime and proposes a comprehensive agenda to shore it up. He first explores the challenges facing current arrangements, chief among them the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies needed to produce fissile material. Lettow then makes a variety of recommendations. First, he calls for tighter sanctions on Iran with the goal of dissuading it from continuing its nuclear advances and discouraging others from following Tehran's path. To combat the spread of enrichment and reprocessing, the report urges the United States to lead nuclear suppliers in developing a system that would allow the sale of relevant equipment and technology only to countries that meet demanding criteria. As regards a potential multilateral nuclear fuel bank, the report argues for limiting participation to states that have a strong nonproliferation record and agree not to make their own nuclear fuel. Lettow further recommends a larger budget, more authority, and various policy changes for the International Atomic Energy Agency so that it can better detect dangerous violations of nonproliferation agreements. Finally, he urges a series of steps in the United Nations Security Council to punish violators and deal with countries that seek to withdraw from the NPT while in noncompliance with their obligations.Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime provides an authoritative look at today's nuclear-related concerns and what can be done to address them. With its thoughtful analysis and comprehensive recommendations, it makes a strong contribution on a subject of vital importance. And given the challenges now testing the nonproliferation regime, as well as the issue's prominence in the foreign policy debate, the report could not come at a better time.

For more than fifty years, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the wider nuclear nonproliferation regime have worked to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Analysts and pundits have often viewed the regime with skepticism, repeatedly warning that it is on the brink of collapse, and the NPT lacks many of the characteristics usually seen in effective international institutions. Nevertheless, the treaty continues to enjoy near-universal membership and high levels of compliance. This is the first book to explain why the nonproliferation regime has been so successful, bringing to bear declassified documents, new data on regime membership and weapons pursuit, and a variety of analytic approaches. It offers important new insights for scholars of nuclear proliferation and international security institutions, and for policymakers seeking to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and tighten international constraints on the spread of nuclear weapons.

The articles compiled in this volume grapple with questions and dilemmas that arise from a growing sense in recent years that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has reached a critical juncture, and that its continued role as the centerpiece of the nuclear nonproliferation regime is at risk. This is the result of a process that has unfolded gradually since the end of the Cold War, which also spelled the end of the bipolar global structure that, in the minds of many, helped keep nuclear proliferation in check.

"Examines the history and effectiveness of US efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons"--

Nuclear Logics examines why some states seek nuclear weapons while others renounce them. Looking closely at nine cases in East Asia and the Middle East, Etel Solingen finds two distinct regional patterns. In East Asia, the norm since the late 1960s has been to forswear nuclear weapons, and North Korea, which makes no secret of its nuclear ambitions, is the anomaly. In the Middle East the opposite is the case, with Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Libya suspected of pursuing nuclear-weapons capabilities, with Egypt as the anomaly in recent decades. Identifying the domestic conditions underlying these divergent paths, Solingen argues that there are clear differences between states whose leaders advocate integration in the global economy and those that reject it. Among the former are countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, whose leaders have had stronger incentives to avoid the political, economic, and other costs of acquiring nuclear weapons. The latter, as in most cases in the Middle East, have had stronger incentives to exploit nuclear weapons as tools in nationalist platforms geared to helping their leaders survive in power. Solingen complements her bold argument with other logics explaining nuclear behavior, including security dilemmas, international norms and institutions, and the role of democracy and authoritarianism. Her account charts the most important frontier in understanding nuclear proliferation: grasping the relationship between internal and external political survival. Nuclear Logics is a pioneering book that is certain to provide an invaluable resource for researchers, teachers, and practitioners while reframing the policy debate surrounding nonproliferation.