Strategic Air Warfare

The ability of the American air forces to wage war independently and to carry the battle to the enemy's heartland has played a critical role in American air doctrine and military strategy since the 1930s. Generals LeMay, Johnson, Burchinal, and Catton explain their roles in flying and commanding bombing missions and campaigns during World War II, in creating the atomic force in the immediate postwar years, and in building the Strategic Air Command in the 1950s. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War are also discussed.

This book seeks to recount the air experience and development before World War II, to describe the objectives, plans and effects of strategic air warfare in Europe and in the Pacific, and to offer criticism, opinion, and lessons of that great conflict. MAJOR GENERAL HAYWOOD S. HANSELL, JR., USAF (Retired), is a native of Atlanta, Georgia. A graduate of Georgia Institute of Technology (1924), he entered the U.S. Army Air Corps in 1928. Trained as a fighter pilot, he flew in the Air Corps Aerobatic and Demonstration Team (1932) led by Captain Claire Chennault. In the mid-1930s Hansell specialized in strategic bombardment, teaching tactics and doctrine at the Air Corps Tactical School from 1935 to 1938. Just prior to World War II, he went to Army Air Forces Headquarters where he helped draft the fundamental war requirements plan for the service. In 1942 he became Commanding General, Third Bombardment Wing (B-26s), Eighth Air Force, in the European Theater. Subsequently General Hansell commanded the First Bombardment Division (B-17s), Eighth Air Force, and in 1944-45 the XXI Bomber Command (B-29s), Twentieth Air Force, in the Pacific. The latter command was one of only two long-range B-29 commands conducting strategic air warfare against Japan. In 1946 he retired, suffering from a physical disability. During the Korean War (1950-53), the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force recalled him to active duty, assigning him as Chief, Military Assistance Program Headquarters, USAF, and subsequently as Air Member Review Board, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, reporting to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Development and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After four years as a senior program manager and advisor, General Hansell retired again. He is the author of The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (1972) and Strategic Air War Against Japan (1980).

In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.

A major revision of our understanding of long-range bombing, this book examines how Anglo-American ideas about "strategic" bombing were formed and implemented. It argues that ideas about bombing civilian targets rested on--and gained validity from--widespread but substantially erroneous assumptions about the nature of modern industrial societies and their vulnerability to aerial bombardment. These assumptions were derived from the social and political context of the day and were maintained largely through cognitive error and bias. Tami Davis Biddle explains how air theorists, and those influenced by them, came to believe that strategic bombing would be an especially effective coercive tool and how they responded when their assumptions were challenged. Biddle analyzes how a particular interpretation of the World War I experience, together with airmen's organizational interests, shaped interwar debates about strategic bombing and preserved conceptions of its potentially revolutionary character. This flawed interpretation as well as a failure to anticipate implementation problems were revealed as World War II commenced. By then, the British and Americans had invested heavily in strategic bombing. They saw little choice but to try to solve the problems in real time and make long-range bombing as effective as possible. Combining narrative with analysis, this book presents the first-ever comparative history of British and American strategic bombing from its origins through 1945. In examining the ideas and rhetoric on which strategic bombing depended, it offers critical insights into the validity and robustness of those ideas--not only as they applied to World War II but as they apply to contemporary warfare.

An Interview with Generals Curtis E. LeMay, Leon W. Johnson, David A. Burchinal, and Jack J. Catton. In June, 1984 some thirty-five of the retired four-star generals of the USAF gathered in Washington D.C. Form that group, several agreed to participate in a group oral interview on the history of strategic air warfare. Strategic Air Warfare is part of a continuing series of historical volumes produced by the Office of Air Force History in direct support of Project Warrior. Since its beginnings, Project Warrior has captured the imagination of Air Force people around the world and reawakened a keener appreciation of its fundamental purpose as a service - to deter war, but to be prepared to fight and wind should deterrence fail.

The Air War, 1939-1945 was first written in the late 1970s when there was very little academic interest in the history of air power. What there was focused largely on combat. The book was intended to provide a global history of the air war by looking at combat, but also the broader context of technology, production, intelligence and leadership. The book sought to address the question of why the Allies in the end won decisively the war in the air, and concluded that Axis air forces were too tied to a narrow conception of air power attached to surface forces, rather than air power exercised in a broader framework of air defense, logistics, strategic bombing and technological development. The book has been assigned reading in military and air force academies for the past forty years. “The Air War, 1939-1945... immediately and permanently altered the way that historians have examined the nature of aerial warfare during World War II. Overy’s ingenious examination of the global nature of planning, building, deploying, and utilizing air forces remains the finest overall study of the topic more than a quarter-century after its first publication... conclusions drawn in this work... are even today an integral part of U.S. Air Force doctrine.” — Dik A. Daso, US Air Force Chief of Staff’s Reading List “This is an outstanding book on a subject in which past controversy has often generated more heat than light... The strength of the book is... Overy’s masterly discussion of the economic problems of sustaining air forces in war and of hitting the right balance between quantity production of current models and diversion of resources to research and technical innovation... Truly this is a book that deserves attention from all those who wish to study, and learn from, the history of warfare.” — G. C. Peden, Naval War College Review “[T]ightly written... The Air War, 1939-1945 is essential reading for all military historians.” — James J. Hudson, Military Affairs “[O]ne of the best books on aviation in World War II.” — Kenneth P. Werrell, Air Power History “An important and successful book.” — The Economist “Highly effective. The result, as so often with sound scholarship, is the ruthless dispelling of myths.” — A. J. P. Taylor, author of The Origins of the Second World War “The Air War is... an excellent and stimulating book which both needs and deserves slow and careful reading. It is an ambitious book, too, and Dr. Overy should be congratulated for breaking down national histories in writing his history of air power during the Second World War.” — Malcolm Smith, The International History Review “[A] recognized classic.” — Richard B. Frank, The Journal of American History “Originally published in 1980 and still the best one-volume aerial history of World War II, Richard Overy’s classic work remains profound and highly original... [it] deepens our understanding not only of World War II but of military history in general.” — The SHAFR Guide Online “[A]n outstanding book... The Air War is a serious and profound treatise that analyses those various military and civilian themes which, in combination, determined the nature of the struggle in the air during the Second World War... The Air War is something of a novelty in aeronautical literature. It is to be hoped that it will serve as a model for other books to come in this important field.” — Alfred Gollin, The English Historical Review “Overy provides operational accounts of the air-forces’ role in Europe... and in the Pacific. Then, and most exceptionally, he deals separately with all facets of the air war: planning, organization, manpower, equipment, and doctrine... honest... broadly informed, and... well-stocked with useful data.“ — Kirkus “R. J. Overy examines the whole war period from the point of view of each of the warring powers and gives us not only a study of military campaigns but also a highly successful examination of aerial doctrine, economic and scientific mobilization, and the political, diplomatic, and military aspects of the management of hostilities. This fine study analyzes the achievements and the failures of the aerial component of the war... This good analysis of many studies done on this subject... makes possible a new, balanced synthesis from an objective point of view.” — Sam H. Frank, The American Historical Review