Strategic Implications Of The U S Dprk Framework Agreement

On October 21, 1994, the United States and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed an Agreed Framework which is designed to provide the procedure to resolve the dispute over North Korea?s nuclear weapons program. If and when successfullyexecuted,it willsatisfyU.S. negotiating objectives, but, in the process, propel the United States into thecenter of North-South conflict. For South Korea, in addition to the explicit benefits of the provisions, it will facilitate more frequent and meaningful communication between the two halves of the now divided peninsula and a gradual, rather than chaotic, path to unification. Generally, the Agreed Framework obligates North Korea to: *eliminate its existing capability to produce weapons grade plutonium; *resume, after several years delay, full membership in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, including the require- ment to comply completely with its safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which mandates allowing IAEA inspectors to investigate suspected nuclear waste sites and to place any nuclear material not previously identified under IAEA safeguards. *consistently takesteps to execute the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and *engage in North-South dialogue. An international consortium led by the United States (Korea Energy Development Organization [KEDO] ), with South Korea and Japan paying most of the costs, will have provided North Korea with: *two 1,000 mw(e) lightwaterreactor (LWR) power plants, priced at some $4 billion; and *heavy oil, reaching 500,000 tons annually, to compensate for the capacity forfeited by North Korea by freezing its graphite-modulated reactors. The United States and the DPRK each agreed to: *open liaison offices in the capital of the other, and *reduce barriers to trade and investment. As of the end of February 1995, Pyongyang has complied scrupulously with technical aspects of the agreement, but has resisted the resumption of dialogue with Seoul. It also was threatening to reject the contract with KEDO, presumably to be presented in April, which will specify South Korean LWR power plants.

On October 21, 1994, the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed an "Agreed Framework" which is designed to provide the procedure to resolve the dispute over North Korea's nuclear weapons program. If and when successfully executed, it will satisfy U.S. negotiating objectives, but, in the process, propel the United States into the center of North-South conflict. For South Korea, in addition to the explicit benefits of the provisions, it will facilitate more frequent and meaningful communication between the two halves of the now divided peninsula and a gradual, rather than chaotic, path to unification. Generally, the Agreed Framework obligates North Korea to: -eliminate its existing capability to produce weapons grade plutonium; -resume, after several years delay, full membership in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, including the requirement to comply completely with its safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which mandates allowing IAEA inspectors to investigate suspected nuclear waste sites and to place any nuclear material not previously identified under IAEA safeguards. -consistently take steps to execute the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and engage in North-South dialogue. An international consortium led by the United States (Korea Energy Development Organization [KEDO] ), with South Korea and Japan paying most of the costs, will have provided North Korea with two 1,000 mw(e) light water reactor (LWR) power plants, priced at some $4 billion; and heavy oil, reaching 500,000 tons annually, to compensate for the capacity forfeited by North Korea by freezing its graphite-modulated reactors. The United States and the DPRK agreed to open liaison offices in the capital of the other, and reduce barriers to trade and investment. As of the end of February 1995, Pyongyang has complied scrupulously with technical aspects of the agreement, but has resisted the resumption of dialogue with Seoul. It also was threatening to reject the contract with KEDO, presumably to be presented in April, which will specify South Korean LWR power plants. Washington's obligations to implement the agreement would be challenging under the best of circumstances, when all the principal parties shared a broad political consensus. But only a limited consensus exists, with serious differing interpretations of several provisions of the Agreed Framework. Moreover, there may be significant political changes within all of the governments: United States, ROK, Japan, China, Russia, and the DPRK-involved in carrying out the agreement. Therefore, to see that North Korea's nuclear weapons program is terminated, North-South dialogue is resumed, and all of the other requirements of the Agreed Framework are met, Washington necessarily will be involved in sensitive and extremely difficult negotiations. It must simultaneously be a mediator between the DPRK, a long-time enemy, and the ROK, a long-time ally, and continue to be ally and friend of South Korea. How the United States performs this role will not only affect the global campaign against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, North-South confrontation on the Korean peninsula, and regional stability, but also U.S. credibility among allies everywhere.

The United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed an unprecedented framework agreement in October 1994 to halt the latter's nuclear weapons program, establish low-level diplomatic contacts between Washington and Pyongyang, and reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula. In this study, the author argues that it also places the United States, South Korea's historically and partner with South Korea in the Combined Forces Command, in a new and unfamiliar role as mediator of conflict on the peninsula. The author contends that the responsibility for implementing this complicated agreement, which involves sensitive political issues for all nations involved, falls primarily on the United States. He contends that U.S. performance of its responsibilities under the agreement will profoundly affect the strategic environment of Northeast Asia.

Many actors—from the president and members of Congress to interest groups, NGOs, and the media—compete to shape U.S. foreign policy. Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy: From Terrorism to Trade, Fifth Edition, edited by Ralph G. Carter, captures this strategic interplay using 15 real-world cases, of which four are brand new: the death of Osama bin Laden and the use of targeted assassinations, nonproliferation policy and the U.S.–India nuclear agreement, the U.S. reaction to Egypt’s collision with the Arab Spring, and the surprise asylum request of blind Chinese dissident Chen Guangcheng. Fully updated to cover the Obama administration, all cases have been revised to reflect recent developments. Whether grappling with use-of-force questions, the international financial crisis, legal and human rights, trade issues, multilateral approaches to the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran, or climate change, Carter’s engaging case study approach encourages students to question motives, consider alternatives, and analyze outcomes.

The United States faces a small number of rogue states that either have or are working to acquire weapons of mass destruction. These NASTIs, or NBC-Arming Sponsors of Terrorism and Intervention, include such states as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria. U.S. nonproliferation programs and policies have helped to keep this number small, but U.S. and allied counterproliferation programs are essential to reduce the danger. It is up to deterrence, active defenses, passive defenses, decontamination, and counterforce to turn enemy weapons of mass destruction into instruments of limited destructive effect. Warfighters will also have to adopt a different strategy and concept of operations in fighting an adversary that is so heavily armed. This strategy will feature a combination of deception, dispersion, mobility and maneuver, diffused logistics, remote engagement, missile defense bubbles, non-combatant evacuation operations, and large area decontamination. It will also involve upgrades to NBC passive defense measures and equipment, as well as a counterforce capability that can find and destroy a variety of adversary targets, including mobile launchers and deeply buried and hardened underground structures.

This unique work examines the highly topical national and international legal issues of economic cooperation between North and South Korea under the current divided situation. In recent years, the relationship between the two Koreas has been generating more concern than in earlier times. This new interest has been followed by two epoch-making developments over the past decade: the conclusion of the Basic Agreement of 1991 and the Declaration of the North-South Summit of 2000. These events have caused remarkable changes in political, as well as economic, relations between the north and the south. This book reviews the current legal regime and the setting up of a positive legal framework for inter-Korean economic cooperation, beginning to be regulated by international law. This research provides two ultimate outcomes. One is to resolve the legal problems for transnational economic cooperation relating to North and South Korea; the other is to develop a juridical model of south-north cooperation as a new world economic framework for the 21st century. Three interrelated areas are involved in this work. The first part describes the external environmental factors regarding inter-Korean economic cooperation from an international legal perspective. The second part deals with the legal framework of inter-Korean economic cooperation, examining concrete issues arising from practical economic exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas. The last part discusses the legal foundations for inter-Korean economic integration beyond economic cooperation. This book clarifies the significance of the legal environment as an indispensable servant for the parts of a divided country to recover their relationship, offering both a normative and practical framework.