Strategic Relations Between The Us And Turkey 1979 2000

Taking the period from the end of the 1970s to the end of the 1990s, this book critically examines the evolution of the strategic relationship between the US and Turkey during this period, with a particular focus on the Middle Eastern context. Strategic Relations Between the US and Turkey employs interviews with US, Turkish and Israeli officials and archival research in order to offer an alternative reading of the realities that shaped bilateral co-operation through multi-level analysis. The unraveling of these realities enlightens the reader about the past course of events but also aids the understanding of the dynamics of the relationship today. Essential reading for students and scholars of U.S. and Turkish foreign policy, this study of co-operation between a super-power and a relatively weak state in the international system will also be of use to those interested in International Relations, Diplomatic History and World Politics more broadly.

This book examines Turkey's relations with the state of Israel since its establishment in 1948. It analyses the evolution of these relations and seeks to place them within the wider historical framework of Turkey's foreign policy behavior.

Assesses the state of U.S.-Turkey relations as well as Turkey's relations with its closest neighbors, and offers a way forward for strengthening relations between the United States and Turkey by focusing on strategic issues of mutual concern.

The resignation in June of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamist Refah Party-and the collapse of the government he headed with Deputy Prime Minister Tansu Ciller-ended, at least for the moment, the confrontation between the Islamists and the Turkish General Staff, avowed guardians of the secular legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. However, the conflict could resurface because the differences between the two are deepseated; involving Turkish national identity, political philosophy, social policy, security, and foreign relations. Whatever the result, the crisis will have profound implications for the strategic relationship with the United States. The Turkish General Staff will expect U.S. support, and it is unlikely to heed warnings that its actions place Turkey's fragile democracy at risk.

Current debates on Turkish foreign policy flamed by Turkey’s purchase of S-400 air defense systems from Russia throws into question Turkey-US relations and poses a challenge to Turkey’s membership in NATO, which has been regarded as the most important symbol of Turkey’s alliance with the West. However, Turkey’s maneuvers between the US and Russia are not unique to the present era as they can be traced back to the Cold War period. In fact, Turkey’s alliance with the West did not prevent Turkey from establishing special relations with the Soviet Union. This book, which is spurred by Glenn Snyder’s theory on alliance politics, indicates that Turkey’s foreign policy moves shaped in accordance with the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment with regards to its relations with the US, did not only stay within the boundaries of the Cold War, but further moved beyond that era. The authors argue that Turkey’s maneuvers to balance the US with Russia in the historical context constitute a strong element of continuity and a significant pattern in Turkish foreign policy. Yet, the authors underline that the motives behind this legacy have changed in the 2010s due to the transformations occurred within global, regional as well as domestic contexts.

For the last seventy years, experts have tried to define the nature of Turkey's partnership with the US. While Turkish-US relations have always been susceptible to different crises, they enjoyed a brief “golden era” in the 1950s. This book argues that a false nostalgia about that period - when the strategic interests of two countries fully converged - has distorted analyses by scholars and policymakers ever since. To provide a more accurate assessment, this book look at the patterns of crises between the two countries throughout history and how these relate to the current points of tension in Turkish-American relations today. It coins a new conceptual framework to understand the Turkey-US partnership: the “vulnerable partnership”. The book outlines the key causes of this vulnerability, showing that for the last 70 years, there have been recurring frictions and faultlines that have been repeated across different political periods. These especially involve the US congress, public opinion, Russia, and crises in the Middle East. Based on journalistic, archival and scholarly sources, the topic of the book is at the intersection foreign policy studies, Middle East politics, the history of Turkish-American relations, and foreign policy making.

This book examines the role of the United States in Greek–Turkish relations and fills an important gap in alliance theory regarding the guardian’s dilemma. The strategy of a great power involves not only tackling threats from enemies, but also dealing with problems that arise between allies. Every time Greece and Turkey threatened to go to war against each other, the United States had to effectively restrain its two strategic allies without straining relations with either one of them. This book explores how the United States responded to the guardian’s dilemma in six crises during the Cold War, pursuing a policy of dual restraint to prevent an intra-alliance conflict, mitigate the consequences of each crisis, and maintain effective control of the Rimland Bridge. From a neoclassical-realist standpoint, the book examines how the United States responded to each Greek–Turkish crisis, for what reasons, and with what results. It will be of interest to scholars of foreign policy, security studies, geopolitics, and international relations.

This comparative study explores the involvement of the United States in four successful military coups in Turkey and Pakistan during the Cold War. Focusing on military-to-military relations with the US in each country, the book offers insight into how external actors can impact the outcomes of coups, particularly through socialization via military training, education, and international organizations such as NATO. Drawing upon recently declassified government documents and a trove of unexplored interviews with high-ranking officials, Ömer Aslan also examines how coup plotters in both countries approached the issue of US reaction before, during, and after their coups. As armed forces have continued to make and unmake Turkish and Pakistani governments well into the twenty-first century, this volume offers original, probing analysis of the circumstances which make coups possible.