Study Of Experience In Industrial Mobilization In World War Ii Wartime Labor Control In Japan

Contents: Mobilization activities before Pearl Harbor day; education for mobilization; interwar planning for industrial mobilization; mobilizing for war: 1939-1941; the war production board; the controlled materials plan; the office of war mobilization & reconversion; U.S. production in World War II; balancing military & civilian needs; overcoming raw material scarcities; maritime construction; people mobilization: Rosie the RiveterÓ; conclusions. Appendix: production of selected munitions items; the war agencies of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.

This book provides a new quantitative view of the wartime economic experiences of six great powers; the UK, the USA, Germany, Italy, Japan and the USSR. What contribution did economics made to war preparedness and to winning or losing the war? What was the effect of wartime experiences on postwar fortunes, and did those who won the war lose the peace? A chapter is devoted to each country, reviewing its economic war potential, military-economic policies and performance, war expenditures and development, while the introductory chapter presents a comparative overview. The result of an international collaborative project, the volume aims to provide a text of statistical reference for students and researchers interested in international and comparative economic history, the history of World War II, the history of economic policy, and comparative economic systems. It embodies the latest in economic analysis and historical research.

An analysis of the complex tasks associated with Army procurement and economic mobilization featuring the War Department2s business relationships from prewar planning and the determination of military requirements to the settlement and liquidation of the wartime procurement effort.

Using a very wide range of detailed sources, the book surveys the many different experiences of women during the Second World War.

Although most economists maintain a mistrust of a government's goals when it intervenes in an economy, many continue to trust its actual ability. They retain, in other words, a faith in state competence. For this faith, they adduce no evidence. Sharing little skepticism about the government's ability, they continue to expect the best of governmental intervention. To study government competence in World War II Japan offers an intriguing laboratory. In this book, Yoshiro Miwa shows that the Japanese government did not conduct requisite planning for the war by any means. It made its choices on an ad hoc basis and the war itself quickly became a dead end. That the government planned for the war incompetently casts doubts on the accounts of Japanese government leadership more generally.