Submarine Operational Effectiveness In The 20th Century

The submarine emerged as a serious weapons system during the First World War (1914 - 1918). During that conflict Germany with its unrestricted submarine warfare campaign of 1917 nearly drove Great Britain to the negotiating table. Its U-boats sank 6,196 ships of 13,438,632 gross register tons. Despite post-war attempts to ban the submarine from warfare, it survived. Both Italy and Germany used submarines, covertly, during the Spanish Civil War (1936 - 1939). This book, Part Two of a series, discusses the use of submarines during World War Two (1939 - 1945) and their effectiveness. It focuses principally on two strategic submarine campaigns. The first is about German U-boats against British and neutral commerce. That campaign finally failed during the Battle of The Atlantic in 1943. The second deals with American submarines against Japanese shipping from Southeast Asia to the home islands, a campaign that successfully isolated Japan from its sources of raw materials and foodstuffs during 1944 and effectively defeated Japan.

A very new weapons system, the lurking submarine with its self-propelled torpedoes fired from ambush changed the complexion of naval warfare forever. Both warships and merchant ships were at risk. In 1914 U-boats demonstrated their capability to sink major warships. During 1915 they turned their attention to merchant ships and began to sink or capture them in wholesale lots. U-boats nearly won the First World War for Germany by forcing Great Britain into peace negotiations in late 1917. U-boats sank or captured over 6,100 ships during WW I. In April 1917 England had only six weeks grain supply left, and apparently had no adequate way to deal with the unrestricted U-boat offensive that Germany unleashed in February of that year. Submarine Operational Effectiveness in the 20th Century deals with the first strategic submarine campaign and its outcome. It goes on to outline submarine development by major nations during the 1920s and 1930s, including submarine use during the Spanish Civil War. It ends in 1939, on the eve of World War Two, a war in which two massive submarine campaigns would be waged: the first by Nazi Germany against the Allies; and the second by the United States against the Empire of Japan.

A very new weapons system, the lurking submarine with its self-propelled torpedoes fired from ambush changed the complexion of naval warfare forever. Both warships and merchant ships were at risk. In 1914 U-boats demonstrated their capability to sink major warships. During 1915 they turned their attention to merchant ships and began to sink or capture them in wholesale lots. U-boats nearly won the First World War for Germany by forcing Great Britain into peace negotiations in late 1917. U-boats sank or captured over 6,100 ships during WW I. In April 1917 England had only six weeks grain supply left, and apparently had no adequate way to deal with the unrestricted U-boat offensive that Germany unleashed in February of that year. Submarine Operational Effectiveness in the 20th Century deals with the first strategic submarine campaign and its outcome. It goes on to outline submarine development by major nations during the 1920s and 1930s, including submarine use during the Spanish Civil War. It ends in 1939, on the eve of World War Two, a war in which two massive submarine campaigns would be waged: the first by Nazi Germany against the Allies; and the second by the United States against the Empire of Japan.

This work examines how the navies of Great Britain, the USA, Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, France and Italy confronted the various technological changes posed during different periods in the 20th century.

This is the first comprehensive account of how intelligence influenced and sustained British naval power from the mid nineteenth century, when the Admiralty first created a dedicated intelligence department, through to the end of the Cold War. It brings a critical new dimension to our understanding of British naval history in this period while setting naval intelligence in a wider context and emphasising the many parts of the British state that contributed to naval requirements. It is also a fascinating study of how naval needs and personalities shaped the British intelligence community that exists today and the concepts and values that underpin it. The author explains why and how intelligence was collected and assesses its real impact on policy and operations. It confirms that naval intelligence was critical to Britain’s survival and ultimate victory in the two World Wars but significantly reappraises its role, highlighting the importance of communications intelligence to an effective blockade in the First, and according Ultra less dominance compared to other sources in the Second. It reveals that coverage of Germany before 1914 and of the three Axis powers in the interwar period was more comprehensive and effective than previously suggested; and while British power declined rapidly after 1945, the book shows how intelligence helped the Royal Navy to remain a significant global force for the rest of the twentieth century, and in submarine warfare, especially in the second half of the Cold War, to achieve influence and impact for Britain far exceeding resources expended. This compelling new history will have wide appeal to all readers interested in intelligence and its crucial impact on naval policy and operations.

It is a century since Mahan and his disciples taught the world that a battlefleet was indispensable to a great power. Great and not-so-great powers till keep powerful navies today, but we have no generally accepted principles to explain why. In this book historians and naval officers from Britain, the United States and other countries study the use of naval power over the present century, and ask what it is for, and what it can do. It will be essential reading for modern historians, policy-makers and strategists.

The classic problem of when to depend on lessons learned from previous conflicts and when to employ new tactics and technology always confronts military leaders. At the beginning of World War II, for example, Allied naval strategists were prepared to do battle using traditional tactics against surface vessels, but - this study contends - not against submarines; because the strategists failed to appreciate either the damage done by submarines in World War I or the tactics that had worked successfully against them. Consequently, from the beginning of World War II to mid-1943, German U-boats were able to mount a devastating campaign against Allied shipping. In Slide Rules and Submarines, Montgomery Meigs describes how the allies learned to counter the U-boat threat. Using new technology - and new tactics derived from scientific methods - they devised countermeasures to defeat the German submarine menace. Then, continuing to apply those successful measures, they went on to negate the Japanese submarine threat in the Pacific. The author cites the crucial role of civilian scientists - the "outsiders" - who worked with military staffs and operational commanders of the campaign at sea. Their open minds and objective methods were essential for the application of such tactical advances as sonar and radar, acoustic torpedoes, depth finders, and code breaking to the battle. As this study illustrates, the importance of such timely and innovative cooperation among scientists, the research and development community, and military commanders in bringing technological knowledge to bear for operational and strategic advantage cannot be overstated. Meigs study of how such cooperation succeeded in the crucible of wartime crisis is itself an example of how the lessons of the past can serve us well today. J. A. Baldwin Vice Admiral, United States Navy President, National Defense University

The book is a survey of emerging technologies applicable to combat submarines, using worldwide sources.