Subnational Capital Markets In Developing Countries

This publication has been prepared by staff members of the World Bank and selected guest contributors. It sets out a framework to study subnational governments as borrowers and the range of credit markets in which they may operate. It also contains a number of case studies which detail the recent experience of 18 countries in developing markets for subnational borrowers., and offer insights into lessons to be drawn on fostering responsible credit market access within a framework of fiscal and financial discipline. Other issues discussed include: the issuing of municipal debt and its characteristics, and the role of macroeconomic conditions and market development in the success or failure of those borrowings.

A comprehensive explanation of information institutions as they relate to the success of subnational capital markets Global trends in decentralization and the growing role of world cities have increased the importance of infrastructure development. But with competing incentives of suppliers and borrowers of capital in the web of institutional governance arrangements, information problems are inevitable. Understanding how local choices affect these larger trends can help national and city actors not just avoid being paralyzed by information problems, but actually improve information resolution. In this book Christine R. Martell, Tima Moldogaziev, Salvador Espinosa argue that capital markets are a viable financing alternative for subnational borrowers. They explain how subnational governments can manage their fiscal and debt choices to leverage capital markets to finance efficient, effective, and equitable infrastructure provision. The book builds on previous work by exploring the role of information institutions as they relate to the success of subnational capital markets and by advancing options for subnational government to gain agency as active market participants. With broad geographic coverage, Information Resolution and Subnational Capital Markets answers core questions: How does information permeate the landscape and outcomes of subnational government borrowing, both at the aggregate national level and at the city level? What measures and mechanisms can national and subnational governments take to resolve information problems? And, what can cities do to enhance their agency vis-à-vis central governments and capital market actors, so that they can command a voice in managing internal and external sources of capital financing?

With decentralization and urbanization, the debts of state and local governments and of quasi-public agencies have grown in importance. Rapid urbanization in developing countries requires large-scale infrastructure financing to help absorb influxes of rural populations. Borrowing enables state and local governments to capture the benefits of major capital investments immediately and to finance infrastructure more equitably across multiple generations of service users. With debt comes the risk of insolvency. Subnational debt crises have reoccurred in both developed and developing countries. Restructuring debt and ensuring its sustainability confront moral hazard and fiscal incentives in a multilevel government system; individual subnational governments might free-ride common resources, and public officials at all levels might shift the cost of excessive borrowing to future generations. This book brings together the reform experiences of emerging economies and developed countries. Written by leading practitioners and experts in public finance in the context of multilevel government systems, the book examines the interaction of markets, regulators, subnational borrowers, creditors, national governments, taxpayers, ex-ante rules, and ex-post insolvency systems in the quest for subnational fiscal discipline. Such a quest is intertwined with a country’s historical, political, and economic context. The formal legal framework interacts with political reality to influence the dynamics of and incentives for reform. Often, the resolution of a subnational debt crisis unfolds in the context of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms. The book includes reforms that have not been covered by previous literature, such as those of China, Colombia, France, Hungary, Mexico, and South Africa. The book also presents a comprehensive review of how the United States developed its debt market for state and local governments, through a series of reforms that are path dependent, including the reforms and lessons learned following state defaults in the 1840s and the debates that shaped the enactment of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1937. Looking forward, pressures on subnational finance are likely to continue—from the fragility of global recovery, the potentially higher cost of capital, refinancing risks, and sovereign risks. This book is essential reading for anyone wanting to know the challenges and reform options in debt restructuring, insolvency frameworks, and public debt market development.

This paper presents various models of control with advantages and disadvantages, the balance of which would make it more or less suitable to a particular country's circumstances. As these circumstances evolve—as fiscal and macro imbalances improve or worsen—the preferable model may change over time. Although appealing in principle, sole reliance on market discipline for government borrowing is unlikely to be appropriate in many circumstances. This is so, because one or more of the conditions for its effective working frequently are not realized in each particular country. The increasing worldwide trend toward devolution of spending and revenue-raising responsibilities to subnational governments seems likely to come into growing conflict with systems of administrative controls by the central government on subnational borrowing. Rules-based approaches to debt control would appear preferable, in terms of transparency and certainty, to administrative controls and also to statutory limits defined in the context of the annual budget process, the outcome of which may be unduly influenced by short-term political bargaining.

Because of the trend toward decentralization in more than 70 countries where the World Bank is active, subnational entities (states regions, provinces, counties and municipalities, and the local utility companies owned by them) are now responsible for delivering services and investing in infrastructure. And infrastructure investments are growing rapidly to meet increasing urban demand. How should the World Bank Group help?

Abstract: Subnational insolvency is a reoccurring event in development, as demonstrated by historical and modern episodes of subnational defaults in both developed and developing countries. Insolvency procedures become more important as countries decentralize expenditure, taxation, and borrowing, and broaden subnational credit markets. As the first cross-country survey of procedures to resolve subnational financial distress, this paper has particular relevance for decentralizing countries. The authors explain central features and variations of subnational insolvency mechanisms across countries. They identify judicial, administrative, and hybrid procedures, and show how entry point and political factors drive their design. Like private insolvency law, subnational insolvency procedures predictably allocate default risk, while providing breathing space for orderly debt restructuring and fiscal adjustment. Policymakers' desire to mitigate the tension between creditor rights and the need to maintain essential public services, to strengthen ex ante fiscal rules, and to harden subnational budget constraints are motivations specific to the public sector.

Because of the trend toward decentralization in more than 70 countries where the World Bank is active, subnational entities - states, regions, provinces, counties, and municipalities, and the local utility companies owned by them - are now responsible for delivering services and investing in infrastructure. And infrastructure investments are growing rapidly to meet increasing urban demand. How should the World Bank Group help?Subnational debt markets can be a powerful force in a country's development. Through delegated monitoring by financial intermediaries and through debt placed directly with investors, sub-national debt markets account for about 5 percent of GDP in Argentina and Brazil. But they remain embryonic in most developing and transition economies.To resolve a potential clash between the increased financing needs of subnational entities and the limited development of domestic subnational debt markets, it is critical to support the orderly, efficient emergence of such debt markets.As a framework for policy reform, the following steps (mirroring typical weaknesses) are prerequisites for developing a country's subnational debt market:middot; Reducing moral hazard.middot; Improving market transparency.middot; Strengthening market governance.middot; Establishing a level playing field.middot; Developing local capacity for accounting, budgeting, and financial management.In countries where the government shows a clear commitment to market development, says Noel, the IBRD should support the framework needed for policy-based operations that establish hard budget constraints. In doing so, the IBRD should concentrate on (1) supporting national and local capacity building in those areas essential for developing a subnational debt market and (2) financing specific subnational projects with strictly nonrecourse loans.At the same time, the World Bank Group should offer a variety of lending and guarantee instruments that encourage private financing for investments by subnational entities - including, for example, equity participation in (or lines of credit or partial credit guarantees to) financial intermediaries specializing in subnational investment finance or in funds for financing local infrastructure.This paper - a product of the Private and Financial Sectors Development Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region - was prepared as background for a manual on policy issues relating to domestic debt markets. Michel Noel may be contacted at [email protected].