Symposium On The Foundations Of Modern Physics 1987

The lectures focus on the relevance of the Copenhagen interpretation today and on the philosophy of Wolfgang Pauli.

The theory of quantum mechanical measuring process has been a subject of increasing research interest during recent years. The revival of interest in it was encouraged during the 1980's due to the advances on the formal and conceptual structures of quantum mechanics, accompanied with new experimental possibilities and technological demands, as well as due to new ideas on the interpretation of the theory. This proceedings is devoted to reviewing the present situation on quantum measurement theory and discussing the related philosophical implications.

Symposium on the Foundations of Modern Physics 1993 is the fourth in a series of conferences held in Joensuu, Finland, in the years 1985, 1987 and 1990 and is devoted to offering discussions on foundational problems of quantum mechanics and other fundamental physical theories, taking into account new experimental developments. The surveying of the progress with respect to fundamental questions of the quantum theory of measurement forms the guiding line of thought of the present Symposium, the main themes discussed being: the interrelation of quantum measurement and irreversibility; the physics of information (concerned with questions of information processing and quantum noise); quantum interference and mesoscopic quantum effects (searching for the micro-macro borderline); and the quantum-classical relationship (the need for classical pointer and their realisation).

We are often told that quantum phenomena demand radical revisions of our scientific world view and that no physical theory describing well defined objects, such as particles described by their positions, evolving in a well defined way, let alone deterministically, can account for such phenomena. The great majority of physicists continue to subscribe to this view, despite the fact that just such a deterministic theory, accounting for all of the phe nomena of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, was proposed by David Bohm more than four decades ago and has arguably been around almost since the inception of quantum mechanics itself. Our purpose in asking colleagues to write the essays for this volume has not been to produce a Festschrift in honor of David Bohm (worthy an undertaking as that would have been) or to gather together a collection of papers simply stating uncritically Bohm's views on quantum mechanics. The central theme around which the essays in this volume are arranged is David Bohm's version of quantum mechanics. It has by now become fairly standard practice to refer to his theory as Bohmian mechanics and to the larger conceptual framework within which this is located as the causal quantum theory program. While it is true that one can have reservations about the appropriateness of these specific labels, both do elicit distinc tive images characteristic of the key concepts of these approaches and such terminology does serve effectively to contrast this class of theories with more standard formulations of quantum theory.

Why does one theory "succeed" while another, possibly clearer interpretation, fails? By exploring two observationally equivalent yet conceptually incompatible views of quantum mechanics, James T. Cushing shows how historical contingency can be crucial to determining a theory's construction and its position among competing views. Since the late 1920s, the theory formulated by Niels Bohr and his colleagues at Copenhagen has been the dominant interpretation of quantum mechanics. Yet an alternative interpretation, rooted in the work of Louis de Broglie in the early 1920s and reformulated and extended by David Bohm in the 1950s, equally well explains the observational data. Through a detailed historical and sociological study of the physicists who developed different theories of quantum mechanics, the debates within and between opposing camps, and the receptions given to each theory, Cushing shows that despite the preeminence of the Copenhagen view, the Bohm interpretation cannot be ignored. Cushing contends that the Copenhagen interpretation became widely accepted not because it is a better explanation of subatomic phenomena than is Bohm's, but because it happened to appear first. Focusing on the philosophical, social, and cultural forces that shaped one of the most important developments in modern physics, this provocative book examines the role that timing can play in the establishment of theory and explanation.