Tactical Air Power

Presents a case study of one air-ground team's experience with the theory and practice of tactical air power employed during the climactic World War 2 campaigns against the forces of Nazi Germany.

"Air Power for Patton's Army" is a case study of one air-ground team's experience with the theory and practice of tactical air power employed during the climactic World War II campaigns against the forces of Nazi Germany. By the summer of 1944, the Allies had four fighter-bomber tactical air commands supporting designated field armies in northwest Europe, and in the fall they added a fifth (making four American and one British). Of these, the U.S. Third Army commanded by Lt. Gen. George S. Patton and the XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC) led by Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland deserve special attention as perhaps the most spectacular air-ground team of the Second World War on the Allied side. From the time Third Army became operational on August 1, 1944, until the guns fell silent on May 8, 1945, Patton's troops covered more ground, took more enemy prisoners, and suffered more casualties than any other Allied army in northwest Europe. General Weyland's XIX TAC was there every step of the way: in the high summer blitzkrieg across France to the Siegfried Line, in the battle of attrition and positional warfare in Lorraine reminiscent of World War One's western front, in the emergency drive to rescue American troops trapped at Bastogne and help clear the Ardennes of Germans in the Battle of the Bulge, and finally, in crossing the Rhine and charging across southern Germany to the Czech and Austrian borders. There, Third Army forces linked up with Soviet military units converging on the fabled German Redoubt area from the east.

A fascinating study of the changing military role of air power in the twentieth century, this book examines the sensational impact of the Great War, the pioneering work of air power theorists and visionaries in the interwar period, the air arms race, the SecondWorld War in Europe and the Far East, and finally, the post-war period.

Ian Gooderson presents a study of close air support in World War II, with the analysis focusing on the use of tactical air power by British and American forces during the campaigns in Italy and northwestern Europe between 1943 and 1945.

Illustrated with 3 charts, 28 maps and 88 photos. This insightful work by David N. Spires holds many lessons in tactical air-ground operations. Despite peacetime rivalries in the drafting of service doctrine, in World War II the immense pressures of wartime drove army and air commanders to cooperate in the effective prosecution of battlefield operations. In northwest Europe during the war, the combination of the U.S. Third Army commanded by Lt. Gen. George S. Patton and the XIX Tactical Air Command led by Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland proved to be the most effective allied air-ground team of World War II. The great success of Patton’s drive across France, ultimately crossing the Rhine, and then racing across southern Germany, owed a great deal to Weyland’s airmen of the XIX Tactical Air Command. This deft cooperation paved the way for allied victory in Western Europe and today remains a classic example of air-ground effectiveness. It forever highlighted the importance of air-ground commanders working closely together on the battlefield.

In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.