Tax Expenditure Reporting And Its Use In Fiscal Management

This note aims to inform governments on how to account for tax expenditures and use that information in fiscal management. The emphasis is on developing and emerging market economies, where the use of such accounts is in its infancy because of data constraints, insufficient human and financial resources, and weak fiscal institutions. Most developing economies, more-over, do not have tax policy units in their Ministry of Finance to provide analytical support to the govern¬ment and legislature that integrates all revenue policy aspects. As a result, the tax policy framework can be fragmented: line ministries compete in the provision of sectoral tax incentives, but do not report on their cost. The note is organized as follows. The second section outlines the role that tax expenditure measurement and reporting can play in fiscal management. The third section provides a step-by-step approach on how tax expenditure accounts can be built, with emphasis on data, methods and models, and institutional requirements. The section is concerned primarily with the direct cost of tax expenditures—that is, the revenue forgone because of them. It does not deal with their indirect costs, which could include economic efficiency losses and additional tax administration resources, and it does not address assessment of the benefits of tax expenditures. The fourth summarizes the current sta¬tus of tax expenditure reporting in developing econo¬mies, with some reference to advanced economies. The last section concludes.

Locates tax expenditure management within the broader discourse of liberal democratic political theory.

Abstract: "Tax expenditures, in the form of tax provisions, are government expenditures. They are conceptually and functionally distinct from those tax provisions whose purpose is to raise revenue. Tax expenditure programs are comparable to entitlement programs. Therefore, tax expenditures must be analyzed in spending terms and integrated into the budgetary process to ensure fiscal accountability. In addition, tax expenditures must be audited for performance and the information must be published (with comprehensive analysis) to ensure fiscal transparency. The author analyzes the concept and definition, size, and effects of tax expenditures, as well as the fiscal accountability and transparency of tax expenditure spending. In short, tax expenditures affect (1) the budget balance, (2) budget prioritization in allocation, (3) the effectiveness and efficiency of fiscal resources, and (4) the scope for abuse by taxpayers, government officials and legislators. While reviewing the current practices in tax expenditures against the requirements of fiscal accountability and transparency, she finds that this fiscal area must be strengthened. The author sketches four building blocks to strengthen tax expenditures toward fiscal accountability and transparency, based on the literature developed by Surry and McDaniel, the practices from industrial and developing countries, the Campos and Pradhan fiscal accountability model, and the International Monetary Fund's fiscal transparency code. The author argues that normative/benchmark tax structure, a revenue-raising component of the tax system, should be formalized. The normative/benchmark tax structure should be legally defined in the tax law and should be transparent. The tax receipts from this normative/benchmark tax structure should be quantified and published. Presently, many countries could publish imputed tax revenue from normative/benchmark tax structures because such data is available. Only if imputed tax revenue is published in the same way as the other budget components-tax revenue received, tax expenditures, direct expenditures, and fiscal balance-will a budget system be truly transparent in terms of revenue-raising activities and expenditure activities. In addition, when the tax revenue-raising activity is formalized, the inherent spending nature of tax expenditures is further exposed. Therefore, tax expenditures should be added to direct expenditures forming total government expenditures. Furthermore, the conventional concept of the size of government should be remedied by including both direct expenditures and tax expenditures."--World Bank web site.

The Maldives has identified the estimation and regular reporting of tax expenditures (TEs) as one of the top priority areas in continuing its tax modernization process. TEs are alternative policy tools (e.g., to direct transfers and other spending measures) in the form of provisions in the tax legislation that modify the tax liability of individuals or companies. The cost of TEs should be identified, measured, and publicly reported to improve transparency in fiscal management.

Tax expenditures, in the form of tax provisions, are government expenditures. They are conceptually and functionally distinct from those tax provisions whose purpose is to raise revenue. Tax expenditure programs are comparable to entitlement programs. Therefore, tax expenditures must be analyzed in spending terms and integrated into the budgetary process to ensure fiscal accountability. In addition, tax expenditures must be audited for performance and the information must be published (with comprehensive analysis) to ensure fiscal transparency. The author analyzes the concept and definition, size, and effects of tax expenditures, as well as the fiscal accountability and transparency of tax expenditure spending. In short, tax expenditures affect (1) the budget balance, (2) budget prioritization in allocation, (3) the effectiveness and efficiency of fiscal resources, and (4) the scope for abuse by taxpayers, government officials and legislators. While reviewing the current practices in tax expenditures against the requirements of fiscal accountability and transparency, she finds that this fiscal area must be strengthened. The author sketches four building blocks to strengthen tax expenditures toward fiscal accountability and transparency, based on the literature developed by Surry and McDaniel, the practices from industrial and developing countries, the Campos and Pradhan fiscal accountability model, and the International Monetary Fund's fiscal transparency code. The author argues that normative/benchmark tax structure, a revenue-raising component of the tax system, should be formalized. The normative/benchmark tax structure should be legally defined in the tax law and should be transparent. The tax receipts from this normative/benchmark tax structure should be quantified and published. Presently, many countries could publish imputed tax revenue from normative/benchmark tax structures because such data is available. Only if imputed tax revenue is published in the same way as the other budget components-tax revenue received, tax expenditures, direct expenditures, and fiscal balance-will a budget system be truly transparent in terms of revenue-raising activities and expenditure activities. In addition, when the tax revenue-raising activity is formalized, the inherent spending nature of tax expenditures is further exposed. Therefore, tax expenditures should be added to direct expenditures forming total government expenditures. Furthermore, the conventional concept of the size of government should be remedied by including both direct expenditures and tax expenditures.