Terrorism And Transnational Organized Crime

The emergence of new hybrid (state and nonstate) transnational criminal/terrorist franchises in Latin America operating under broad state protection now pose a tier-one security threat for the United States. Similar hybrid franchise models are developing in other parts of the world, making understanding the new dynamics an important factor in a broader national security context. This threat goes well beyond the traditional nonstate theory of constraints activity such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking into the potential for trafficking related to weapons of mass destruction by designated terrorist organizations and their sponsors. These activities are carried out with the support of regional and extra regional states actors whose leadership is deeply enmeshed in criminal activity, which yields billions of dollars in illicit revenues every year. These same leaders have a publicly articulated, common doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States and its allies that explicitly endorses as legitimate the use of weapons of mass destruction. The central binding element in this alliance is a hatred for the West, particularly the United States, and deep anti-Semitism, based on a shared view that the 1979 Iranian Revolution was a transformative historical event. For Islamists, it is evidence of divine favor; and for Bolivarians, a model of a successful asymmetrical strategy to defeat the "Empire." The primary architect of this theology/ideology that merges radical Islam and radical, anti-Western populism and revolutionary zeal is the convicted terrorist Ilich Sánchez Ramirez, better known as "Carlos the Jackal," whom Chávez has called a true visionary.

This book explains the history and development of organized crime and clearly demonstrates the economics and practices of crime in the era of globalization.

Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) Crime-Terrorism Partnerships and Transformations; (3) The Crime-Terrorism Toolbox; (4) Interaction of Terrorism and Crime: Dawood Ibrahim¿s D-Co.; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia; 2004 Madrid Bombers; The Taliban; Abu Ghadiyah, Monzer Al Kassar and Viktor Bout; Hezbollah; Al Qaeda; 2005 London Bombings; Al-Shabaab; Mexico¿s La Familia, Colombia¿s Medellin, Italy¿s Mafia, and Brazil¿s Prison Gangs; (5) Selected U.S. Gov¿t. Actions Addressing the Confluence of International Terrorism and Transnat. Organized Crime; State Dept.; Treasury Dept.; Fin¿l. Crimes Enforce. Network; DoD; DoJ: IOC-2; DEA; FBI; DHS; Intell. Comm¿y.; (6) Counterterrorism: What Role for Anti-Crime?

Contributors offer a wide range of challenges to commonly-held views on transnational crime and approaches to fighting it, suggesting that current international policies follow an American model that exaggerates its threat out of proportion.

Chapter 8: Online presence from the ChRI to Kavkaz Center -- The role played by the media -- The Kavkaz Center -- About Kavkaz Center (The Caucasus Center) -- Old and new media -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Chapter 9: Convergence as a diaspora response -- The Russian-speakingdiaspora in Europe -- Linkages between transnational organized crime, separatists, and jihadist terrorism -- Mutual support in operations -- Mutual support in media exploitation -- Russian-speakingjihadists in Syria -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Chapter 10: Lessons from Russian-speaking transnational organized crime and jihadist terrorist cases in Sweden -- The Swedish court cases -- The arrival of Russian-speakingcriminal and jihadistnetworks in Sweden -- Economic crimes and financing of terrorism -- Extortion within the Caucasus diaspora -- Illegal guns and explosives -- Provision of foreign fighters to terrorist groups in Syria -- Contract murders -- Transnational large-scaleserial burglaries and shoplifting -- The April 2017 vehicle borne terrorist attack in Stockholm -- Concluding remarks on the Swedish court cases -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Chapter 11: Implications for counterterrorism and policing -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Seminar paper from the year 2012 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict Studies, Security, grade: 1,0, Humboldt-University of Berlin, language: English, abstract: “We will direct every resource at our command to win the war against terrorists, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence. We will starve the terrorists of funding, turn them against each other, rout them out of their safe hiding places, and bring them to justice” (Cited in Biersteker and Eckert 2008: 1). President George W. Bush, September 24, 2001 In the immediate aftermath of the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 President W. Bush declared America’s “War on Terrorism” in which he assured to defeat terrorist movements and their methods of funding that could be used to support the acts of global terrorist (Biersteker and Eckert 2008; 1). The examination of broader terrorism studies literature shows “financial and material resources are correctly perceived as the lifeblood of terrorist operations, and governments have determined that fighting the financial infrastructure of terrorist organizations is the key to their defeat” (Grialdo and Trinkunas 2007; 1). Since the attacks of 9/11 the US has designed a strong strategy to fight terrorist groups and their financing. International and national measures have been carried out such as the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the enforcement of international sanctions, and the expansion of law enforcement to target terrorism financing and disrupt terrorist operation (Sheppard 2002). However, the spectrum of terrorist funding is broad. In particular, the increasing reliance on criminal activities by terrorist since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decline of state sponsorship, such as the rising pressure of law enforcement, network structures became an essential source to safeguard the existence of many terrorist and criminal groups. The development of the so- called “crime- terror” nexus, in which two traditionally autonomous groups started to expose various operational and structural parallels, implicated a key income source for terrorists and has brought sheer difficulty to develop successful strategies to freeze the terrorist monetary trail. In the following, this essay examines the involvement of terrorist groups in criminal activities as a source of funding and whether or not it is a sustainable and profitable source for terrorist funding. Moreover, we try to evaluate to what extent the so- called “terror-crime nexus” poses a threat to global security.

The involvement of insurgent and extremist groups in criminal activity is an issue that has been a concern of U.S. administrations for decades. In recent years, some observers have claimed that interactions between international terrorists and criminals are increasing. If true, expanded links between criminal and terrorist networks could increase U.S. vulnerability to attack by terrorist groups with enhanced criminal capabilities and financial resources. An expanded range of combined criminal and terrorist activity could also affect the global economy and U.S. foreign policy goals, undermining licit international commerce and the promotion of good governance and rule of law. Threats posed by a crime-terrorism nexus may be particularly challenging, as the scale and nature of their cooperation are believed to vary widely and limited anecdotal evidence largely serves as the basis for current understanding of the problem. U.S. efforts to combat the relationship between crime and terrorism are a subset of broader policy responses to transnational crime and international terrorism individually. While numerous U.S. strategies and programs are designed to combat international terrorism and transnational crime separately, fewer efforts focus specifically on addressing the confluence of the two. Those efforts that do exist focus mainly on (1) human smuggling and clandestine terrorist travel, (2) money laundering and terrorist financing, and (3) narcoterrorism links between drug traffickers and terrorists. Many of these efforts, including the creation of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, the reorganization of the Treasury Departments Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and the expanded extraterritorial jurisdiction authority to investigate and prosecute international narcoterrorism cases, occurred in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Congress played a large role in such efforts, holding at least eight hearings specifically on some aspect of c.

The nexus between terrorism and organised crime consists of a strategic alliance between two non-state actors who are able to exploit illegal markets, threaten the security of individuals, and influence policy-making on a global level. Recent Europol reports have pointed towards the importance of studying the links between organised crime and terrorist groups, and have underlined that the nature and extent of these connections have seldom been addressed from an academic perspective. Considering the danger that both organised crime and terrorism currently pose to the world, the collusion between these two phenomena is of urgent contemporary interest. Basing itself on geographical case-studies, this book contributes to the existing literature in three ways: by enriching the empirical knowledge on the nature of the crime-terror nexus and its evolution; by exploring the impact of the nexus within different economic, political and societal contexts; and by expanding on its theoretical conceptualization. This book was originally published as a special issue of Global Crime.