Terrorist Watchlist Checks And Air Passenger Prescreening

Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Background: HSPD-6 and Terrorist Screening: NCTC and Terrorist Ident.; TSC and Terrorist Watch-Listing and Screening; (3) CBP and TSA and International Air Passenger Pre-screening: CBP and Advanced Passenger Info. System (APIS); APIS Pre-departure/Pre-arrival Final Rule; (4) TSA ¿No Fly¿ and ¿Automatic Selectee¿ Watchlists; Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS); CAPPS and Checked Baggage Screening; CAPPS and Passenger Screening at Airport Security Checkpoints; TSA Secure Flight Program; (5) Misidentifications: Disclosure Under FOIA and Privacy Act; DHS Redress Mechanisms; (6) Fair, Accurate, Secure, and Timely Redress Act of 2009; (7) Issues for Congress. Illustrations.

Considerable controversy surrounds U.S. air passenger prescreening and terrorist watchlist checks. In the past, such controversy centered around diverted international flights and misidentified passengers. More recently, however, the foiled conspiracy to bomb airlines bound for the United States from the United Kingdom (UK) has raised questions about the adequacy of existing processes to prescreen air passengers against terrorist watchlists. Observers have noted that the suspected conspirators may have been able to board aircraft bound for the United States without having been screened against the consolidated terrorist screening database (TSDB) maintained by the U.S. government prior to the flight's departure. Many of those observers have also noted that because the UK is a participant in the visa waiver program, British nationals are able to visit the United States temporarily for business or pleasure without acquiring a visa a U.S. consular post abroad -- a process during which they would be screened against the TSDB. Although all ticket purchasers are screened against aviation security watchlists (the "No Fly" and "Automatic Selectee" lists) at the point of purchase by air carriers, some international air passengers may not be screened against the larger, consolidated TSDB by U.S. border security officials prior to a flight's departure (wheels up) if they purchased their tickets just prior to the gates closing on a flight. In response to the recent plot, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has reportedly issued a temporary order requiring that passenger name records (PNRs) be provided preflight to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for transatlantic flights originating in the UK, as opposed to 15 minutes after the flight's departure as normally required under current law. In addition, CBP is seeking greater amounts of PNR data preflight from all air carriers and to retain that data for a greater length of time. U.S. authorities maintain that these measures are necessary to provide greater aviation and border security. Some Europeans, however, strongly oppose such data sharing and view U.S. demands for such data, without data privacy safeguards, as an infringement on their national and collective sovereignties. Complicating matters further, in July 2006, the European Court of Justice ruled that the existing agreement between the European Commission and CBP to exchange passenger name records was illegal. The Court ordered the cessation of this data exchange on September 30, 2006, in the absence of a new agreement that addresses the Court's objections with the existing agreement. If not resolved, this impasse could significantly affect travel from European Union countries to the United States. The continuing controversy surrounding U.S. air passenger prescreening processes and terrorist watchlist checks underscores that screening passengers for more intensive searches of their person or baggage, or to prevent them from boarding an aircraft in the event of a terrorist watchlist hit, is likely to be a difficult proposition for the federal agencies tasked with aviation and border security. These agencies include DHS's Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and CBP, as well as the Terrorist Screening Center, which is administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The adequacy of existing systems to screen air passengers against terrorist watch lists has been questioned, most notably by the 9/11 Commission. Yet, considerable controversy surrounds air passenger prescreening systems, such as the "No Fly" or "Automatic Selectee" lists, underscoring that screening passengers for more intensive searches of their persons or baggage, or to prevent them from boarding an aircraft in the event of a terrorist watch list hit, is likely to be a difficult proposition for the federal agencies tasked with aviation security. Today, those agencies pricipally include the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-administered Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). In October 2004, TSA unveiled the Secure Flight program - the next generation domestic air passenger prescreening system. Secure Flight consists of four elements: (1) a streamlined rule for more intensive screening; (2) an identity authentication process; (3) a passenger name check against the consolidated terrorist screening database (TSDB); and (4) an appeals process for passengers who may have been misidentified. The TSC has consolidated the "No Fly" and "Automatic Selectee" lists with the TSDB. Since CBP has assumed responsibility for prescreening passengers on inbound and outbound international flights, TSA will only prescreen domestic flights under Secure Flight. The Administration has propsed creating an Office of Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO) - under DHS's Border and Transportation Security Directorate - to oversee Secure Flight, among other screening, expedited inspection, and credentialing programs. Congress included provisions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) requiring: (1) TSA to assume the airline passenger prescreening function from U.S. air carriers after it establishes an advanced passenger prescreening system for domestic flights that utilizes the consolidated TSDB: (2) CBP to prescreen passengers on international flights against the TSDB prior to departure; and (3) DHS to establish appeals procedures by which persons who are identified as security threats may challenge such determinations. Also, in the FY 2005 DHS Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-334), Congress prohibited TSA from spending any appropriated funds on the deployment of CAPPS II, Secure Flight, or any successor system, until the Government Accountability Office reports that certain conditions have been met, including the establishment of an appeals process. Several issues may emerge for Congress. To what extent is the FBI-administered TSC supporting the air passenger screening activities of both the TSA and CBP? Has the quality and quantity of the records on the "No Fly" list been improved? Will the TSA and CBP be able to divide cleanly responsibility for screening air passengers on domestic and international flights, respectively? Will the proposed SCO be an effective mechanism to coordinate multiple border and transportation security screening programs? When will TSA be able to deploy an advanced air passenger screening system and assume the day-to-day administration of the "No Fly" lists from the airlines?

The adequacy of existing systems to screen air passengers against terrorist watch lists has been questioned, most notably by the 9/11 Commission. Yet, considerable controversy surrounds air passenger prescreening systems, such as the "No Fly" or "Automatic Selectee" lists, underscoring that screening passengers for more intensive searches of their persons or baggage, or to prevent them from boarding an aircraft in the event of a terrorist watch list hit, is likely to be a difficult proposition for the federal agencies tasked with aviation security. Today, those agencies pricipally include the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-administered Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). In October 2004, TSA unveiled the Secure Flight program - the next generation domestic air passenger prescreening system. Secure Flight consists of four elements: (1) a streamlined rule for more intensive screening; (2) an identity authentication process; (3) a passenger name check against the consolidated terrorist screening database (TSDB); and (4) an appeals process for passengers who may have been misidentified. The TSC has consolidated the "No Fly" and "Automatic Selectee" lists with the TSDB. Since CBP has assumed responsibility for prescreening passengers on inbound and outbound international flights, TSA will only prescreen domestic flights under Secure Flight. The Administration has propsed creating an Office of Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO) - under DHS's Border and Transportation Security Directorate - to oversee Secure Flight, among other screening, expedited inspection, and credentialing programs. Congress included provisions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) requiring: (1) TSA to assume the airline passenger prescreening function from U.S. air carriers after it establishes an advanced passenger prescreening system for domestic flights that utilizes the consolidated TSDB: (2) CBP to prescreen passengers on international flights against the TSDB prior to departure; and (3) DHS to establish appeals procedures by which persons who are identified as security threats may challenge such determinations. Also, in the FY 2005 DHS Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-334), Congress prohibited TSA from spending any appropriated funds on the deployment of CAPPS II, Secure Flight, or any successor system, until the Government Accountability Office reports that certain conditions have been met, including the establishment of an appeals process. Several issues may emerge for Congress. To what extent is the FBI-administered TSC supporting the air passenger screening activities of both the TSA and CBP? Has the quality and quantity of the records on the "No Fly" list been improved? Will the TSA and CBP be able to divide cleanly responsibility for screening air passengers on domestic and international flights, respectively? Will the proposed SCO be an effective mechanism to coordinate multiple border and transportation security screening programs? When will TSA be able to deploy an advanced air passenger screening system and assume the day-to-day administration of the "No Fly" lists from the airlines?

"The matching of airline passenger information against terrorist watchlist records (watchlist matching) is a frontline defense against acts of terrorism that target the nation's civil aviation system. In general, passengers identified as matches to the No-Fly list are prohibited from boarding commercial flights, while those matched to the Selectee list are required to undergo additional screening. Historically, airline passenger prescreening against watchlist records has been performed by commercial air carriers. As required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has developed an advanced passenger prescreening program--known as Secure Flight--to assume from air carriers the function of matching passenger information against terrorist watchlist records Since fiscal year 2004, TSA has received $358 million in appropriated funds for the development and implementation of Secure Flight, according to program officials. Also, since fiscal year 2004, GAO has been mandated to assess the development and implementation of the Secure Flight program We have reported on numerous challenges the program has faced, including those related to protecting passenger privacy, completing performance testing, fully defining and testing security requirements, and establishing reliable cost and schedule estimates, among other things. We have made recommendations to address these challenges, and TSA has generally agreed with them and has taken corrective actions"--Page 1-2.

The matching of airline passenger information against terrorist watchlist records (watchlist matching) is a frontline defense against acts of terrorism that target the nation's civil aviation system. In general, passengers identified as matches to the No-Fly list are prohibited from boarding commercial flights, while those matched to the Selectee list are required to undergo additional screening. Historically, airline passenger prescreening against watchlist records has been performed by commercial air carriers. As required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has developed an advanced passenger prescreening program, known as Secure Flight, to assume from air carriers the function of matching passenger information against terrorist watchlist records. Since fiscal year 2004, TSA has received $358 million in appropriated funds for the development and implementation of Secure Flight, according to program officials. TSA has generally achieved the statutory condition related to the appropriateness of Secure Flight's life-cycle cost and schedule estimates, and thus has generally achieved all 10 statutory conditions related to the development and implementation of the program. Although the program's cost and schedule estimates do not fully meet all related best practices, TSA has demonstrated that it completed all key activities and our overall assessment found that the agency had substantially satisfied best practices for developing the cost and schedule estimates.

Terrorism seems to have developed as a world-wide virus causing harm and destruction where ever it turns up and turning up at unexpected places as no doubt all viruses are intended to do. The attackers seek weaknesses in the target countries and the target countries seek defences and deterrents against the attackers. This new book highlights some of the anti-terrorist actions underway.