The Acquisition Of Weapons Systems

According to the Government Accountability Office, sustainment of weapon systems accounts for approximately 70 percent of the total life-cycle costs. When sustainment is not considered early in the development process or as an integral part of the systems engineering design, it can negatively affect the ability of the Air Force to maintain and improve the weapon system once it enters service. At the request of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Weapons Systems Sustainment Planning Early in the Development Life Cycle identifies at what point or phase of the development of a weapons system sustainment planning should be integrated into the program; examines and provides recommendations regarding how sustainment planning should be evaluated throughout the development process; investigates and describes the current challenges with sustainment planning and determines what changes have occurred throughout the acquisition process that may have eroded sustainment planning; and identifies opportunities for acquisitions offices to gain greater access to sustainment expertise.

GAO reviewed the processes that France, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Israel, and the Soviet Union use to acquire weapon systems. GAO found that, in the four countries visited: (1) the Ministries of Defense have a separate directorate or agency responsible for the entire procurement function for all new weapon system acquisitions although the military services play a role in the acquisition process; (2) each country follows roughly the same general acquisition phases for its major weapons systems; (3) each country conducts two major types of tests, developmental and operational; (4) the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel generally use a specific monetary level to designate a major weapon system, but France and West Germany use more general criteria; (5) the extent of ownership or control over the defense industrial base varies; and (6) each country's legislature exercises varying degrees of oversight of the defense budget and most major acquisition programs. The Soviet Union offered the most contrast because it has a planned command economy which is hierarchically organized with a single political party. In general, the Soviet Union prefers: (1) modest technology advances; (2) low cost; (3) weapons in quantity; (4) disciplined system acquisition; (5) conservative design; and (6) extensive operational testing. However, even with this data, it would be difficult to compare the efficiency of the other countries' acquisition processes to the United States' because of fundamental political, cultural, and economic differences. Significant variations make it difficult to determine if the United States should adopt any of the acquisition practices of the other countries.

A broad historical overview of changing institutional patterns of technological innovation with the Defense Department's major weapons laboratories.

DOD acquires new weapons for its warfighters through a management process known as the Defense Acquisition System. Chapter 1 contains GAOs 16th annual assessment of the Department of Defenses (DOD) $1.66 trillion portfolio of 86 major weapon systems acquisition programs. It examines changes in the portfolio since 2016, including DODs progress implementing acquisition reforms. The Department of Defense (DOD) faces mounting challenges in protecting its weapon systems from increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. Chapter 2 addresses (1) factors that contribute to the current state of DOD weapon systems cybersecurity, (2) vulnerabilities in weapons that are under development, and (3) steps DOD is taking to develop more cyber resilient weapon systems.

Army and the Air Force have encountered limitations in their sustainment plans for some fielded weapon systems because they lacked needed technical data rights. The lack of technical data rights has limited the services flexibility to make changes to sustainment plans that are aimed at achieving cost savings and meeting legislative requirements regarding depot maintenance capabilities. During our review we identified seven Army and Air Force weapon system programs where these military services encountered limitations in implementing revisions to sustainment plans C-17 aircraft, F-22 aircraft, C-130J aircraft, Up-armored High- Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), Stryker family of vehicles, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, and M4 carbine. Although the circumstances surrounding each case were unique, earlier decisions made on technical data rights during system acquisition were cited as a primary reason for the limitations subsequently encountered. As a result of the limitations encountered due to the lack of technical data rights, the services had to alter their plans for developing maintenance capability at public depots, new sources of supply to increase production, or competitive offers for the acquisition of spare parts and components to reduce sustainment costs. For example, the Air Force identified a need to develop a capability to perform maintenance on the C-17 at government depots but lacked the requisite technical data rights. Consequently, the Air Force is seeking to form partnerships with C-17 subvendors to develop its depot maintenance capability. Its efforts to form these partnerships have had mixed results, according to Air Force officials, because some sub-vendors have declined to provide the needed technical data.