The Angolan War

An investigation of the origins of the Angolan civil war of 1975-76. By looking at the interaction between internal and external factors, it reveals the domestic roots of the conflict and the impact of foreign intervention on the civil war. The formative influence of colonialism and anti-colonialism on the emergence of Angolan rivalry since 1961 is described, and the externalization of that power struggle is analysed from a perspective of both international and domestic politics.

'Tells the miserable story of a revolution destroyed, analysing the moves of the mighty and speaking up for the millions who have suffered as a result.' Guardian'Few journalists know Angola better than Victoria Brittain. This is an excellent and timely account of a conflict for which we in the West share much of the blame.' Jon Snow

As the Soviet Union teetered on the edge of collapse during the late 1980s, and America prepared to claim its victory, a bloody war still raged in Southern Africa, where proxy forces from both sides vied for control of Angola. The result was the largest battle on the dark continent since Al Alamein, with forces from both sides paying in blood what U.S.-Soviet diplomats were otherwise spending in diplomacy. The socialist government of Angola and its army, FAPLA, fully stocked with Soviet weapons, had only to wipe out a massive resistance group, UNITA, secretly supplied by the U.S, in order to claim full sovereignty over the country. A giant FAPLA offensive so threatened to succeed in overcoming UNITA that apartheid-era South Africa stepped in to protect its own interests. The white army crossing the border prompted the Angolan government to call on their own foreign reinforcementsÑthe army of Communist CubaÕs. Thus began the epic battle of Cuito Cuanavale, largely unknown in the U.S., but which raged for three months in the entirely odd match-up of South African Boers vs. CastroÕs armed forces, which for the first time in the Cold War proved what it could achieve. And it turned out the Cubans were very good. The South Africans were no slouches at warfare themselves, but had suffered under a boycott of weapons since 1977. The Cubans and Angolan troops, instead, had the latest Soviet weapons, easily delivered. But UNITA had its secret U.S. supply line and the South Africans knew how to fight, mainly at a disadvantage in air power for lack of spare parts. Meantime the Cubans overcame their logistic difficulties with an impressive airlift of troops over the Atlantic, while the Boers simply needed to drive next door. As a case study of ferocious fighting between East and WestÑalbeit proxies for the great powers on all sidesÑthis book unveils a remarkable episode of the end-game of the Cold War largely unknown to the public. The Angolans on both sides suffered heavily, but it was the apartheid South Africans versus CastroÕs armed forces that provides utter fascination in one of historyÕs rare match-ups.

When Portugal's colonial rule in Angola ended in 1974, three liberation groups-UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), and MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)-agreed to a tripartite movement for the fledgling nation. Conflicts quickly arose and the MPLA, with Cuban and Soviet assistance, drove its rivals from the capital, instigating a civil war, which continues into three periods (1975-1991, 1992-94, and 1998-2002). This volume covers the first period, focusing on the political history of the UNITA movement and its struggles with the MPLA. The Angolan civil war was the product of personal jealousies, contrasting ideologies, and ethnic animosities. From its inception, the conflict between UNITA and Angola's Marxist government was an international affair involving the U. S., the USSR, China, and many African states: W. Martin James III, who wrote his book near the close of the first period of civil war, contends that despite Gorbachev's "new thinking" and talk of peaceful solutions to regional conflicts, Soviet policy toward Angola marked a reversion to the Brezhnev Doctrine. The biggest MPLA-Cuban offenses occurred during Gorbachev's tenure with Soviet advisers at the brigade level directing an MPLA offensive. American policy toward Angola is also examined here. This is the first book to emphasize the dynamic role of UNITA in the Angolan liberation movement. James acknowledges that the importance of foreign powers in guaranteeing a government of national reconciliation. Just as important are strategies of compromise requiring trust in a political context where it is violated and submission for the common good where defiance is a remnant of the colonial past. Foreign policy analysts, African area specialists, and scholars of post-colonial history find this volume indispensible.

The Angolan War of 1975-1976 focused international attention on an area -long relegated to the sidelines of world diplomacy and accented the historical momentum toward black control of southern African states. This book is the first to examine why a localized conflict in a remote area was the object of such extensive global concern. Dr. Klinghoffer discusses both the Soviet and the Cuban roles in Angola and evaluates the decisive change in Soviet foreign policy that, subsequently, caused the United States to question the very nature of Soviet-American detente. He answers the key question of whether the Soviet Union followed an overall plan for Angola or developed its policy over time, in reaction to the behavior of the United States, China, South Africa, Zaire, Portugal, and other political actors.

Following the publication of Al Venter’s successful Portugal’s Guerrilla Wars in Africa - shortlisted by the New York Military Affairs Symposium’s 'Arthur Goodzeit Book Award for 2013' - his Battle for Angola delves still further into the troubled history of this former Portuguese African colony. This is a completely fresh work running to almost 600 pages including 32 pages of color photos, with the main thrust on events before and after the civil war that followed Lisbon’s over-hasty departure back to the metrópole. There are also several sections that detail the role of South African mercenaries in defeating the rebel leader Dr Jonas Savimbi (considered by some as the most accomplished guerrilla leader to emerge in Africa in the past century). There are many chapters that deal with Pretoria’s reaction to the deteriorating political and military situation in Angola, the role of the Soviets and mercenaries in the political transition, as well as the civil war that followed. With the assistance of several notable military authorities he elaborates in considerable detail on South Africa’s 23-year Border War, from the first guerrilla incursions to the last. In this regard he received solid help from the former the head of 4 Reconnaissance Regiment, Colonel Douw Steyn, who details several cross-border Recce strikes, including the sinking by frogmen of two Soviet ships and a Cuban freighter in an Angolan deepwater port. Throughout, the author was helped by a variety of notable authorities, including the French historian Dr René Pélissier and the American academic and former naval aviator Dr John (Jack) Cann. With their assistance, he covers several ancillary uprisings and invasions, including the Herero revolt of the early 20th century; the equally troubled Ovambo insurrection, as well as the invasion of Angola by the Imperial German Army in the First World War. Former deputy head of the South African Army Major General Roland de Vries played a seminal role. It was he - dubbed ‘South Africa’s Rommel’ by his fellow commanders - who successfully nurtured the concept of ‘mobile warfare’ where, in a succession of armored onslaughts ‘thin-skinned’ Ratel Infantry Fighting Vehicles tackled Soviet main battle tanks and thrashed them. There is a major section on South African Airborne – the ‘Parabats’ –by Brigadier-General McGill Alexander, one of the architects of that kind of warfare under Third World conditions. Finally, the role of Cuban Revolutionary Army receives the attention it deserves: officially there were almost 50,000 Cuban troops deployed in the Angolan war, though subsequent disclosures in Havana suggest that the final total was much higher.

For almost 15 years, South Africa was involved in a civil war in Angola: the so-called Bush War on behalf of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola faction. The climax of the conflict portrayed in this history was the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, the largest military engagement on African soil since World War II. This book provides the firsthand, personal accounts of the clash leading up to Cuito Cuanavale for the first time in English, as told by the Soviet advisers to the Angolan army. Their experiences of the war as well as their views and assessment of their South African enemies and Cuban and Angolan allies will not only surprise and fascinate readers, but will also offer new insights into the war itself.

This is a thorough and sophisticated study of one of the most critical current issues in world politics. Bruce Porter examines Soviet policy and behaviour in Third World conflicts in the postwar period, focusing particularly on five examples: the Yemeni civil war, the Nigerian civil war, the Yom Kippur war, the Angolan civil war, and the Ogaden war. Aiming to illuminate various complex tactical and operational aspects of the USSR's policy in local conflicts, the author draws on a wide and eclectic range of sources. He pays close attention to the Soviet role as arms supplier and diplomatic actor in relation to both US policy and the dynamics of the local conflict, and he concludes with a careful consideration of the effectiveness of Soviet policy and of the implications for the United States.