The Army And Its Air Corps Army Policy Toward Aviation 1919 1941

'The Army and Its Air Corps was James P. TateÆs doctoral dissertation at Indiana University in 1976. During the past 22 years, TateÆs remarkable work has gained wide acceptance among scholars for its authoritative and well-documented treatment of the formative years of what eventually became the United States Air Force. Thoroughly researched but bearing its scholarship lightly, TateÆs narrative moves swiftly as it describes the ambitions, the frustrations, and the excruciatingly slow march to final success that never deterred the early airmen. Robert B. Lane Director Air University Press

From the Armistice in 1918 to the late 1930s, there was continuous controversy over the place of aviation in the military establishment. This book details how airpower visionaries, with varying degrees of tact, often risked charges of insubordination in preaching the gospel of airpower. As aviation technology advanced and as Army leaders were "educated" in the capabilities of aircraft, they showed genuine interest in the potential of airpower. The author contends that their decisions often favored the Air Corps and that the Air arm received a lion's share of the Army budget during a period of extreme austerity. Dr. Tate states that the Air Corps, far from being a stepchild, had become a princess by the late 1930s.

'The Army and Its Air Corps' was James P. Tate's doctoral dissertation at Indiana University in 1976. During the past 22 years, Tate's remarkable work has gained wide acceptance among scholars for its authoritative and well-documented treatment of the formative years of what eventually became the United States Air Force. Thoroughly researched but bearing its scholarship lightly, Tate's narrative moves swiftly as it describes the ambitions, the frustrations, and the excruciatingly slow march to final success that never deterred the early airmen. 'The Army and Its Air Corps' is one in a series of airpower history classics that the Air University Press is pleased to bring before a wider audience.

En redegørelse for doktriner for luftvåbnet i USA i perioden 1917-1941. Den medtager taktiske og strategiske erfaringer opnået under deltagelsen i Den 1. Verdenskrig 1914-1918. Emnerne er doktrinudvikling, anvendelse af luftvåbnet, langdistancebombning og doktrin for 2. Verdenskrig 1939-1941.

This study examines the development and usefulness of US air attack theory and doctrine during the interwar period, 1919-1941. This period represents more than twenty years of development in US Air Corps attack theory and doctrine. It was the first peacetime period of such development. Attack aviation during this time was a branch of aviation used to provide direct and indirect combat support to ground forces in the form of machine gun strafing, light bombing, and chemical attacks. From the earliest origins, attack theory and doctrine evolved primarily along two paths direct and indirect support of ground and air force objectives. The direct support approach was based on fundamental beliefs by the Army that attack aviation was an auxiliary combat arm, to be used directly on the battlefield against ground forces and to further the ground campaign plan. The indirect support approach, or air interdiction, was derived from the fundamental beliefs by the Air Corps that attack aviation was best used beyond the battle line and artillery range, against targets more vulnerable and less heavily defended, to further both the Air Force mission and the ground support mission. As attack doctrine evolved, range and hardened targets became problematic for the single-engine attack plane. Thus, attack theory and doctrine in terms of the indirect support approach, was adequately developed to be useful at the start of WWII. The use of light and medium bombers in North Africa showed the effectiveness of air interdiction and the indirect approach. Attack aviation had, indeed, established itself before WWII. Attack aviation, in the form of close air support, would have to wait for the lessons of WWII.