The Auctions Of Swiss Government Bonds

We review the main issues that arise in the design of treasury bill auctions and survey the relevant empirical literature. We also provide a detailed description of the actual design of these auctions in a sample of 42 industrial and developing countries.

Most treasuries around the world sell their securities at auctions either directly or indirectly through an agent, usually the central bank. Although they can control both the rules and the timing of the auction, they may not be able to control the information and valuations of bidders. The purpose of this paper is to identify those economic indicators whose announcement is likely to have a significant impact on government securities prices and, hence, on bidders’ behavior at auctions of government securities. This information could be used to schedule treasury securities auctions so as to minimize public debt management costs.

This conference proceedings of the second "Round Table on Capital Market Reforms in Asia" held in Tokyo in April 2000, which was organised by the OECD and the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), focused on bond market development in Asia.

This collection discusses the role of financial institutions and markets in East Asian and Japan, corporate governance and new technology and how to redesign the East Asian and Japanese financial systems.

The OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook provides regular updates on trends and developments associated with sovereign borrowing requirements, funding strategies, market infrastructure and debt levels from the perspective of public debt managers.