The Battle Of Pharsalus 48 Bc

In August 48 BC, following the earlier battle at Dyrrhachium, the two greatest Roman commanders of their generation met in battle again at Pharsalus in Greece. Julius Caesar, conqueror of Gaul, had been defeated at Dyrrhachium and forced to retreat but now stood at bay to face Pompey the Great, conqueror of the East. At stake lay the future of the ailing Roman Republic, each man believing he alone had the solution to restoring Republican government. Gareth Sampson examines the campaigns which led up to the battle as well as the role played by the various regional powers who got drawn into the Roman Civil War. The Battle of Pharsalus itself is analyzed in detail to determine the strengths and weakness of both armies and their various commanders, as well as the organization, equipment and tactics of the forces involved in the battle which culminated in a decisive victory for Caesar. The author concludes with consideration of the aftermath of the battle, which saw Pompey murdered in Egypt and Caesar distracted by the affairs of the East.

In August 48 BC, following the earlier battle at Dyrrhachium, the two greatest Roman commanders of their generation met in battle again at Pharsalus in Greece. Julius Caesar, conqueror of Gaul, had been defeated at Dyrrhachium and forced to retreat but now stood at bay to face Pompey the Great, conqueror of the East. At stake lay the future of the ailing Roman Republic, each man believing he alone had the solution to restoring Republican government. Gareth Sampson examines the campaigns which led up to the battle as well as the role played by the various regional powers who got drawn into the Roman Civil War. The Battle of Pharsalus itself is analyzed in detail to determine the strengths and weakness of both armies and their various commanders, as well as the organization, equipment and tactics of the forces involved in the battle which culminated in a decisive victory for Caesar. The author concludes with consideration of the aftermath of the battle, which saw Pompey murdered in Egypt and Caesar distracted by the affairs of the East.

In 49 BC the Roman Republic collapsed once more into bloody civil war. At the heart of this war lay the two greatest living Roman commanders, and former allies, Pompey the Great and Julius Caesar, each having built their own factions within the Roman oligarchy and refusing to compromise. The subsequent civil war would be fought for control of the Republic with each man determined to restore peace and stability to Rome, under their leadership. Yet despite this clash it was eighteen months before the two men met in Battle at Dyrrhachium in Albania. Gareth Sampson outlines the strategic background, describing the early campaigns of the civil war and the factions of Caesar and Pompey that fought for control of the vast resources of the Republic. The Battle of Dyrrhachium itself is analysed to determine the strengths and weakness of both armies and their various commanders as well as the tactics used in the phases of the battle which culminated in victory for Pompey. Focus is also given to the aftermath of the battle that saw Caesar defeated and Pompey in the ascendancy.

Increasing tension between Julius Caesar and Pompeius Magnus (Pompey the Great) after the death of Marcus Licinius Crassus soon degenerated into military conflict. With his hand considerably strengthened by his election as Dictator by the Senate in Rome, Caesar knew that power would only be a reality once he had militarily defeated Pompey. By August 49BC, Caesar had effectively destroyed Pompey's armies in Spain, but, by the time he had crossed the Adriatic pursuing him eastward, his forces were heavily outnumbered. Even with the reinforcements brought by Mark Antony, his attempt to crush Pompey by laying siege to Dyrrachium was unsuccessful and he eventually had to withdrew into Thessaly, with Pompey in pursuit. The stage was set for the final clash of the two titans of the Roman world and the odds were heavily in Pompey's favour, with 45,000 men against Caesar's 22,000. However, the veteran legions loyal to Caesar were the best in the Roman army and the challenge he faced clearly stimulated Caesar's tactical genius for battle. Guessing that Pompey would attempt to overwhelm his right wing with his cavalry, he concealed elite cohorts of legionnaries behind his own heavily outnumbered horsemen with orders to fight at close quarters like pikemen. Caesar's predictions were correct and, far from overwhelming his exposed right flank, Pompey's left flank was routed, allowing Caesar to envelop and scatter the rest of his army. Simon Sheppard expertly charts the events leading up to the Pharsalus campaign, the course of the battle itself and the seismic implications of this decisive clash between the two greatest generals of their age.

When Caesar marched into Greece, Pompey had the strategic option of avoiding battle and transporting himself by sea to Italy, securing the peninsula in the absence of Caesar and his forces. Another strategy for Pompey would be, with his numerical superiority, to intercept supplies from Caesar s forces. But there was politics above these decisions and, under pressure from the Senate, Pompey was forced to offer battle at Pharsalus. Contemporary historians of the battle recalled that Pompey missed an opportunity to try to repeat Cannae (216 BC) with his possible cavalry superiority on both flanks – and not on just one. Even considering the Enipeus River as an obstacle, this would not prevent the possibility of distributing light cavalry and infantry on both flanks, of course limiting the extension and strength on the river side. Caesar would hardly fall into a trap like Cannae, but a Battle of Ruspina almost finished him off, and that s what we ll try in this simulation.

The Commentaries on the Civil War is an account written by Julius Caesar of his war against Gnaeus Pompeius and the Senate. It covers the events of 49-48 BC, from shortly before Caesar's invasion of Italy to Pompey's defeat at the Battle of Pharsalus and flight to Egypt with Caesar in pursuit. It closes with Pompey assassinated, Caesar attempting to mediate rival claims to the Egyptian throne, and the beginning of the Alexandrian War.

Perpendicular battle orders, or Agmen Impetum, were not standard in the more infantry-based Roman army; but from the middle to the end of the empire when they faced more cavalry-based armies (Gothic Germans and Sassanid Persians), they witnessed the strength of the so-called boar-head (Schweinskopf) - frontal infantry attack with flanking cavalry. Caesar was narrowly defeated by Labienus - one of his legates (commanders of consular legions) in the Gallic Wars - employing a battle order similar to Agmen Impetum at the Civil War battle of Ruspina in 46 BC. This would not preclude the possibility of distributing light cavalry and infantry on both sides, of course limiting the extent and force on the side of the obstacle. Caesar would hardly fall into a trap like Cannae but a one likely Ruspina nearly killed him, and that s what we ll try in this simulation.

This eBook has been formatted to the highest digital standards and adjusted for readability on all devices. The Commentaries on the Civil War is an account written by Julius Caesar of his war against Gnaeus Pompeius and the Senate. It covers the events of 49-48 BC, from shortly before Caesar's invasion of Italy to Pompey's defeat at the Battle of Pharsalus and flight to Egypt with Caesar in pursuit. It closes with Pompey assassinated, Caesar attempting to mediate rival claims to the Egyptian throne, and the beginning of the Alexandrian War.