The Behavior Of Financial Markets Under Rational Expectations

The financial markets have become more and more important in modern society. The behavior of the financial markets, and its impacts on our society, relies crucially on the behavior of market participants, aka the investors of different types. Although descriptions of the financial markets on the macro level have caught great attentions of investors, regulators, and the ordinary people, how the market participants interact with each other in the financial market may provide deeper insights on how and why the financial markets behave. This book tries to supply as much research on the micro level of financial market behavior as possible to the readers. The author has been doing financial research, especially on the micro level, during the past two decades. The academic research on this broad area has undergone a rapid growth, with new results, methods, theories, and even paradigms, emerging and burgeoning almost every year. As a financial researcher in one of China’s top universities, the author has kept monitoring, digesting, and synthesizing the research articles in the area. This book is the outcome of this decades-long routine research work of the author. The book covers the fundamental economic theories of how different investors receive and interpret information. The empirical results of investors behavior are also discussed in depth. The book also shows the basic academic techniques of modeling the investors behavior.

This paper investigates the nature and the presence of bubbles in financial markets. Are bubbles consistent with rationality? If they are, do they, like Ponzi games, require the presence of new players forever? Do they imply impossible events in finite time, such as negative prices? Do they need to go on forever to be rational? Can they have real effects? These are some of the questions asked in the first three sections. The general conclusion is that bubbles, in many markets, are consistent with rationality, that phenomena such as runaway asset prices and market crashes are consistent with rational bubbles. In the last two sections, we consider whether the presence of bubbles in a particular market can be detected statistically. The task is much easier if there are data on both prices and returns. In this case, as shown by Shiller and Singleton, the hypothesis of no bubble implies restrictions on their joint distribution and can be tested. In markets in which returns are difficult to observe, possibly because of a nonpecuniary component, such as gold, the task is more difficult. We consider the use of both "runs tests" and "tail tests" and conclude that they give circumstantial evidence at best.

A powerful challenge to contemporary economics and a new agenda for global finance In the wake of the global financial crisis that began in 2007, faith in the rationality of markets has lost ground to a new faith in their irrationality. The problem, Roman Frydman and Michael Goldberg argue, is that both the rational and behavioral theories of the market rest on the same fatal assumption—that markets act mechanically and economic change is fully predictable. In Beyond Mechanical Markets, Frydman and Goldberg show how the failure to abandon this assumption hinders our understanding of how markets work, why price swings help allocate capital to worthy companies, and what role government can and can't play. The financial crisis, Frydman and Goldberg argue, was made more likely, if not inevitable, by contemporary economic theory, yet its core tenets remain unchanged today. In response, the authors show how imperfect knowledge economics, an approach they pioneered, provides a better understanding of markets and the financial crisis. Frydman and Goldberg deliver a withering critique of the widely accepted view that the boom in equity prices that ended in 2007 was a bubble fueled by herd psychology. They argue, instead, that price swings are driven by individuals' ever-imperfect interpretations of the significance of economic fundamentals for future prices and risk. Because swings are at the heart of a dynamic economy, reforms should aim only to curb their excesses. Showing why we are being dangerously led astray by thinking of markets as predictably rational or irrational, Beyond Mechanical Markets presents a powerful challenge to conventional economic wisdom that we can't afford to ignore.

Do traders in futures markets make use of all relevant information and is this reflected in prices? This collection of original essays by a team of international economists considers these and other questions central to futures markets.

'Stock-Market Psychology gives an excellent overview of the state-of-the-art literature on this subject in the fields of economics, psychology and finance. . . a comprehensive overview of the behavior of investors in the stock market. As such, this book is valuable for the classroom. . . Stock-Market Psychology provides researchers with numerous ideas for future research and readers with useful and fun tips without taking away our hopes of ever becoming rich from investing in stocks. What more is there to ask from a book?' - Joost M.E. Pennings, Journal of Economic Psychology 'George Goodman (Adam Smith) once wrote, "you can find out who you are by investing in the stock market, but it will be an expensive lesson". It is far smarter and cheaper to read Wärneryd's book instead. At a time when global stock markets are driven by emotions and passions, and are highly volatile, Chapter Six will tell you why, far better than a hundred analysts' reports.' - Shlomo Maital, TIM-Technion Institute of Management and the Samuel Neaman Institute for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology, Israel The rationale behind how people value and trade stocks is of unparalleled interest to governments, companies and other participants in stock markets. The book focuses on the way in which investors process information and form expectations about future gains. It argues that humans fall short of the perfect information processing required by theory, and that their expectations are based on more than just future company earnings.

Economists broadly define financial asset price bubbles as episodes in which prices rise with notable rapidity and depart from historically established asset valuation multiples and relationships. Financial economists have for decades attempted to study and interpret bubbles through the prisms of rational expectations, efficient markets, and equilibrium, arbitrage, and capital asset pricing models, but they have not made much if any progress toward a consistent and reliable theory that explains how and why bubbles (and crashes) evolve and can also be defined, measured, and compared. This book develops a new and different approach that is based on the central notion that bubbles and crashes reflect urgent short-side rationing, which means that, as such extreme conditions unfold, considerations of quantities owned or not owned begin to displace considerations of price.

Economists and scholars in related fields discuss the concept of rationality of expectations from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view, and at both individual and collective levels. Concerning the first aspect, the book focuses on how agents collect and process information and how market opinion is formed. Concerning the second aspect, it presents studies based on individual price expectations and on the consensus revealed by survey data. Contributors analyze price expectations in a variety of markets, periods, and countries, paying special attention to financial markets which have represented the main field of study over the last ten years. Annotation copyrighted by Book News Inc., Portland, OR

This book originated from a 2010 conference marking the fortieth anniversary of the publication of the landmark "Phelps volume," Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory, a book that is often credited with pioneering the currently dominant approach to macroeconomic analysis. However, in their provocative introductory essay, Roman Frydman and Edmund Phelps argue that the vast majority of macroeconomic and finance models developed over the last four decades derailed, rather than built on, the Phelps volume's "microfoundations" approach. Whereas the contributors to the 1970 volume recognized the fundamental importance of according market participants' expectations an autonomous role, contemporary models rely on the rational expectations hypothesis (REH), which rules out such a role by design. The financial crisis that began in 2007, preceded by a spectacular boom and bust in asset prices that REH models implied could never happen, has spurred a quest for fresh approaches to macroeconomic analysis. While the alternatives to REH presented in Rethinking Expectations differ from the approach taken in the original Phelps volume, they are notable for returning to its major theme: understanding aggregate outcomes requires according expectations an autonomous role. In the introductory essay, Frydman and Phelps interpret the various efforts to reconstruct the field--some of which promise to chart its direction for decades to come. The contributors include Philippe Aghion, Sheila Dow, George W. Evans, Roger E. A. Farmer, Roman Frydman, Michael D. Goldberg, Roger Guesnerie, Seppo Honkapohja, Katarina Juselius, Enisse Kharroubi, Blake LeBaron, Edmund S. Phelps, John B. Taylor, Michael Woodford, and Gylfi Zoega.