The Biological Weapons Taboo

The non-use of biological weapons has been described as the 'great mystery of biological warfare.' This volume solves that mystery by analysing the bioweapons taboo, in the first comprehensive study of the concept.

Richard M. Price asks why, among all the ominous technologies of weaponry throughout the history of warfare, chemical weapons carry a special moral stigma. Something more seems to be at work than the predictable resistance people have expressed to any new weaponry, from the crossbow to nuclear bombs. Perceptions of chemical warfare as particularly abhorrent have been successfully institutionalized in international proscriptions and, Price suggests, understanding the sources of this success might shed light on other efforts at arms control.To explore the origins and meaning of the chemical weapons taboo, Price presents a series of case studies from World War I through the Gulf War of 1990–1991. He traces the moral arguments against gas warfare from the Hague Conferences at the turn of the century through negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. From the Italian invasion of Ethiopia to the war between Iran and Iraq, chemical weapons have been condemned as the "poor man's bomb." Drawing upon insights from Michel Foucault to explain the role of moral norms in an international arena rarely sensitive to such pressures, he focuses on the construction of and mutations in the refusal to condone chemical weapons.

foreword by William S. Cohen, U.S. Secretary of Defense Biological weapons pose a horrifying and growing threat to the United States and to the world in general. Revelations about Iraq's weapons research and the plans of the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan serve as frightening reminders of the potential for military or terrorist use of biological agents. The essays in this book, many of which were originally published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, examine the medical, scientific, and political dimensions of limiting the threat posed by biological weapons. The contributors consider the current threat posed by biological weapons, the history of attempts to control them, episodes in which biological agents have been used, Iraq's biological warfare program, and policies that the United States might pursue to reduce the threat. Contributors Suzanne Barth, Pamela Berkowsky, Kristin A. Birkness, Stephen Black, W. Russell Byrne, W. Seth Carus, Marie Chevrier, George W. Christopher, Theodore J. Cieslak, Richard Danzig, Edward M. Eitzen, Jr., Charles C. Engel, James R. Ferguson, Laurence R. Foster, David R. Franz, Arthur M. Friedlander, Carol S. Fullerton, Jeanne Guillemin, Charles E. Haley, Harry C. Holloway, David L. Hoover, John M. Horan, Martin Hugh-Jones, Peter B. Jahrling, Robert P. Kadlec, Akiko Kimura, Shellie A. Kolavic, Alexander Langmuir, John R. Livengood, Karl Lowe, Steven Mauvais, David J. McClain, Matthew Meselson, Ann E. Norwood, Julie A. Pavlin, Graham S. Pearson, Ilona Popova, Alexis Shelokov, Jeffrey D. Simon, Shauna L. Simons, Michael R. Skeels, Laurence Slutsker, Robert Sokolow, Robert V. Tauxe, Thomas J. Török, Jonathan B. Tucker, Robert J. Ursano, Victor Utgoff, Ann M. Vrtis, Robert P. Wise, Olga Yampolskaya, Allan P. Zellicoff, Raymond A. Zilinskas

This book analyses the Syria crisis and the role of chemical weapons in relation to US foreign policy. The Syrian government's use of such weapons and their subsequent elimination has dominated the US response to the conflict, where these are viewed as particularly horrific arms - a repulsion known as the chemical taboo. On the surface, this would seem to be an appropriate reaction: these are nasty weapons and eradicating them would ostensibly comprise a 'good' move. But this book reveals two new aspects of the taboo that challenge this prevailing view. First, actors use the taboo strategically to advance their own self-interested policy objectives. Second, that applying the taboo to Syria has actually exacerbated the crisis. As such, this book not only provides a timely analysis of Syria, but also a major and original rethink of the chemical taboo, as well as international norms more widely.

The threat of biological weapons has never attracted as much public attention as in the past five years. Yet there has been little historical analysis of such weapons over the past half-century. Deadly Cultures sets out to fill this gap by analyzing the historical developments since 1945 and addressing three central issues: why states have continued or begun programs for acquiring biological weapons, why states have terminated biological weapons programs, and how states have demonstrated that they have truly terminated their biological weapons programs.

The population of the world of today is faced by a challenge that could threaten even its survival in the near future because of biological weapons and warfare. Biological weapons are not difficult to produce, relatively easy to hide, and in the hands of unscrupulous desperate, terrorists, could cause incredible damage to large populations anywhere in the world. The use of biological weapons in war and/or otherwise as a means of mass destruction may lead to manmade epidemics that will introduce bioengineered agents into the human populations, animals and plants which will have a devastating effect on living organisms and world economy. Confronted with this menace, the Biological Weapons Convention has singled out biological weapons for categorical prohibition. To protect humans, animals and plants from microbial diseases, a revolutionary approach to develop effective vaccines against epidemic causing agents and certainly against biological weapon agents in needed.

This publication gives a history of biological warfare (BW) from the prehistoric period through the present, with a section on the future of BW. The publication relies on works by historians who used primary sources dealing with BW. In-depth definitions of biological agents, biological weapons, and biological warfare (BW) are included, as well as an appendix of further reading on the subject. Related items: Arms & Weapons publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/arms-weapons Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT & CBRNE) publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/hazardous-materials-hazmat-cbrne

The evolution of the disarmament regime of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is described from 1980, when the first BTWC Review Conference was held, until 1998. The author analyses the results of SIPRI's first four review Conferences.