The Bloody Road To Tunis

As the Afrika Korps withdrew after a bruising defeat at El Alamein, it became apparent that Axis forces would not be able to maintain their hold over Libya. Rommel pulled his troops back to Tunisia, digging in along the Mareth Line, and turned westwards t

New history of la France libre, Vichy collaboration, and the resistance from the campaigns in Tunisia and Italy to Liberation.

Between April and August 1943, the U.S. Army’s II Corps saw two of its division commanders relieved of their commands. Each relief appeared tied to battlefield setbacks. MG Orlando Ward of the 1st Armored Division was relieved after his division failed to seize a narrow mountain pass near the town of Maknassy, in Tunisia. Ward’s superiors labeled him too cautious, unwilling or unable to motivate his soldiers to take their objective. Months later on the island of Sicily, MG Terry Allen was relieved of command of the 1st Infantry Division. His relief followed the failure to seize the Sicilian town of Troina. Allen’s superiors accused him of being too hesitant in committing his entire force to the attack. He was branded an insubordinate rebel who cared only for his own troops. In both cases, a standard history of the events emerged. It was based on the official U.S. Army account and a narrow reading of primary sources. This version of events ascribed each relief to flaws in Ward and Allen’s leadership ability. The standard description of the reliefs continues to appear in recent scholarship. However, some accounts departed from the accepted portrayal, and point to alternate reasons behind the reliefs. When these alternative accounts are considered along with a comprehensive examination of primary source material, a new argument emerges. Ward and Allen were removed from command for political and military reasons of expediency. From a broader perspective, this investigation revealed how wartime leaders dealt with unprecedented circumstances to accomplish their goals. Understanding the reliefs of Generals Ward and Allen provides insight into organizational decision making and its effect on the U.S. Army in the early portion of World War II.

This book focuses on the extent to which the physical terrain features across Egypt, Libya and Tunisia affected British operations throughout the campaign in North Africa during the Second World War. One main theme of the work analyses the terrain from the operational and tactical perspective and argues that the landscape features heavily influenced British operations and should now be considered alongside other standard military factors. The work differs from previous studies in that it considers these additional factors for the entire campaign until the Axis surrender in May 1943. Until now it has been widely assumed that much of the Western Desert coastal plateau was a broadly level, open region in which mobile armored operations were paramount. However this work concentrates on the British operations to show they were driven by the need to capture and hold key features across each successive battlefield. At the operational level planning was led by the need to hold key ground across Libya and especially the province of Cyrenaica during the crucial middle period of the campaign. A secondary theme of the work argues that British forces began to improvise certain tactical doctrines, which altered the early practice of combined arms assaults into one of the Infantry and Armored formations fighting largely separated battles until the autumn of 1942. Other developments in doctrine which were affected by the terrain included the practice of unit dispersal to hold key ground and the use of temporary units such as Jock columns to harass and engage the enemy. The two themes are inter-linked and contribute fresh insights to the debate on British methods of warfare. The author has consulted key primary documents, reports, war diaries and published memoirs, from major UK archives and compared these with the campaign historiography to develop the main themes of the work. These include the National Archives, the Churchill Archives Center, the Liddell-Hart Center for Military History, the National Army Museum, John Rylands Center, Imperial War Museum at London and Duxford and London and the Tank Museum Archives at Bovington. The sources include unit war diaries, after action reports, along with many of the key published and some unpublished memoirs. His text is supported by 24 pages of specially commissioned color maps.

A complete history of naval combat in the Mediterranean and North African campaigns throughout WWII. In the early summer of 1940, the Kingdom of Italy joined with Nazi Germany by challenging Britain for dominance in the Mediterranean region. With France on the verge of collapse and Britain facing imminent invasion, the Italians seized upon a rare opportunity to re-establish control. Heavily outnumbered, the British Mediterranean Fleet and its ground and air forces braced for a long and bloody conflict. Blue Water War tells the story of this epic struggle. The fighting across the Mediterranean and Middle East was waged at differing times against the combined forces of Italy, Germany and Vichy France over a wide area stretching from the coastal waters of Southern Europe to Madagascar and from Africa’s Atlantic coast to the Persian Gulf. Utilizing a variety of weapons including warships, submarines, and aircraft along with sizable merchant fleets, the British and their subsequent American partners maintained vital lines of communication, conducted numerous amphibious landings, interdicted Axis supply activities and eventually eliminated Axis maritime power within the theater. In turn, these actions facilitated multiple Allied victories that helped secure the defeat of the European Axis.

Cities the world over and in particular developing countries suffer from uneven development and inequality. This is often coupled with the view that these inequalities constitute unfortunate anomalies. In contrast, this edited volume draws out the ways in which the city has not been able to exist without its margins, both materially, ideationally, and socially. In this book the margins are, first, the mirrors of the city and, second, a fundamental route through which various centers can legitimate and sustain their power. Contemporary case studies are compared to a number of those from history with the accent on Asia, Africa and the Middle East, and engage with the underlying theoretical questions of what is the urban margin and what is marginality in urban society and spaces?

War is changing. Unlike when modern military doctrine was forged, the United States no longer mobilizes massive land forces for direct political gain. Instead, the US fights small, overseas wars by global mandate to overthrow dictators, destroy terrorist groups, and broker regional peace. These conflicts hardly resemble the total wars fought and expected by foundational military theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz, yet their paradigms are ingrained in modern thinking. The twenty-first-century's new geopolitical situation demands new principles for warfare—deemphasizing decisive land victory in favor of airpower, intelligence systems, and indigenous ground forces. In Thoughts on War, Phillip S. Meilinger confronts the shortcomings of US military dogma in search of a new strategic doctrine. Inter-service rivalries and conventional theories failed the US in lengthy Korea, Vietnam, and Middle East conflicts. Jettisoning traditional perspectives and their focus on decisive battles, Meilinger revisits historical campaigns looking for answers to more persistent challenges—how to coordinate forces, manipulate time, and fight on two fronts. This provocative collection of new and expanded essays offers a fresh, if controversial, perspective on time-honored military values, one which encourages a critical revision of US military strategy.