The Burden Of Trafalgar

This paper is written as part of a book-length study, currently in progress, of the origins and development of naval offensive thinking during the five decades or so leading up to the First World War. Its particular focus is the idea of the "decisive battle," i.e., the belief that dominated naval thinking in the Victorian and Edwardian periods that the goals of war at sea could, would, and ought to be settled by a single, all-destructive clash between massed battle fleets. The Great War would demonstrate, of course, that "real" war was a far cry from the "ideal" that had been promoted by the "pens behind the fleet." When the "second Trafalgar" failed to take place, apologists were quick to propose that this was only to be expected and that the "uneducated hopes" were disappointed because they had failed to grasp the distinction between what modern students of strategy call declaratory and action war planning. The implication was that the professional naval strategist did know the difference and had prepared all along to enjoy, as Churchill put it after the Battle of Jutland, "all the fruits of victory" without the need for the British to seek the battle at all.

This volume explains the evolution of maritime strategy through the twentieth century, and concludes with some speculations about its future in the next century. The forms and practices of navies and maritime strategy are analysed through the development of eight historical and contemporary topics drawn from the First and Second World Wars, the Cold War and post-Cold War period .

This book focuses on the key naval strategic objectives of obtaining and maintaining sea control. During times of war, sea control, or the ability of combatants to enjoy naval dominance, plays a crucial role in that side’s ability to attain overall victory. This book explains and analyzes in much greater detail sea control in all its complexities, and describes the main methods of obtaining and maintaining it. Building on the views of naval classical thinkers, this book utilizes historical examples to illustrate the main methods of sea control. Each chapter focuses on a particular method, including destroying the enemy forces by a decisive action, destroying enemy forces over time-attrition, containing enemy fleet, choke point control, and capturing important enemy's positions/basing area, The aim is to provide a comprehensive theory and practice of the struggle for sea control at the operational level. It should therefore provide a guide to practitioners on how to plan and conduct operational warfare at sea. The book will be of much interest to students of naval strategy, defence studies and security studies.

The years 1790 to 1830 saw Britain engage in an extensive period of war-waging and empire-building which transformed its position as an imperial state, established its reputation as a distinctive military power and secured naval preeminence. Despite this apparent success, Britain did not become a world super power in the conventional sense. Instead, as Professor Collins demonstrates, it operated as an enclave power, influencing or dominating many regions of the world without ever asserting global hegemony. Even in the 1820s, Britain still had to fight to maintain influence, and sometimes struggled to assert dominance on the borderlands of the empire. By locating naval and military power at the heart of Britain's relationship with the wider world, Bruce Collins offers an insightful reinterpretation of the interaction between military and naval war-making, the expansion of the empire, and the nature of the British regime. Using examples of conflicts ranging from continental Europe and Ireland to North America, Africa and India, he argues that the state’s effectiveness in war was crucial to its imperial expansion and gives new significance to British military conduct in an age of revolution and war.

This book explains both the strategic and the operational aspects of exercising control of the sea. The struggle for sea control consists of three mutually related and overlapping phases: obtaining, maintaining and exercising sea control. It is in the phase of exercising sea control when one’s strategic or operational success is exploited; otherwise, the fruits of victories achieved would be wasted. This work describes the strategy of a stronger side in wartime after a desired degree of control has been obtained, which is followed by a discussion on the objectives and main methods used in exercising sea control. The remaining chapters explain and analyze in some detail each of the main methods of exercising sea control: defence and protection of one’s own and destruction/neutralization of the enemy’s military-economic potential at sea, capturing the enemy’s operationally important positions ashore, destroying/weakening the enemy’s military-economic potential ashore and supporting one’s ground forces in their offensive and defensive operations on the coast. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, sea power and naval history.

Specifically structured around research questions and avenues for further study, and providing the historical context to enable this further research, Modern Naval History is a key historiographical guide for students wishing to gain a deeper understanding of naval history and its contemporary relevance. Navies play an important role in the modern world, and the globalisation of economies, cultures and societies has placed a premium on maritime communications. Modern Naval History demonstrates the importance of naval history today, showing its relevance to a number of disciplines and its role in understanding how navies relate to their host societies. Richard Harding explains why naval history is still important, despite slipping from the attention of policy makers and the public since 1945, and how it can illuminate answers to questions relating to economic, diplomatic, political, social and cultural history. The book explores how naval history has informed these fields and how it can produce a richer and more informed historical understanding of navies and sea power.

Gabriela A. Frei addresses the interaction between international maritime law and maritime strategy in a historical context, arguing that both international law and maritime strategy are based on long-term state interests. Great Britain as the predominant sea power in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shaped the relationship between international law and maritime strategy like no other power. This study explores how Great Britain used international maritime law as an instrument of foreign policy to protect its strategic and economic interests, and how maritime strategic thought evolved in parallel to the development of international legal norms. Frei offers an analysis of British state practice as well as an examination of the efforts of the international community to codify international maritime law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Great Britain as the predominant sea power as well as the world's largest carrier of goods had to balance its interests as both a belligerent and a neutral power. With the growing importance of international law in international politics, the volume examines the role of international lawyers, strategists, and government officials who shaped state practice. Great Britain's neutrality for most of the period between 1856 and 1914 influenced its state practice and its perceptions of a future maritime conflict. Yet, the codification of international maritime law at the Hague and London conferences at the beginning of the twentieth century demanded a reassessment of Great Britain's legal position.