The Chinese Navy

Xi Jinping has made his ambitions for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) perfectly clear, there is no mystery what he wants, first, that China should become a "great maritime power" and secondly, that the PLA "become a world-class armed force by 2050." He wants this latter objective to be largely completed by 2035. China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power focuses on China's navy and how it is being transformed to satisfy the "world class" goal. Beginning with an exploration of why China is seeking to become such a major maritime power, author Michael McDevitt first explores the strategic rationale behind Xi's two objectives. China's reliance on foreign trade and overseas interests such as China's Belt and Road strategy. In turn this has created concerns within the senior levels of China's military about the vulnerability of its overseas interests and maritime life-lines. is a major theme. McDevitt dubs this China's "sea lane anxiety" and traces how this has required the PLA Navy to evolve from a "near seas"-focused navy to one that has global reach; a "blue water navy." He details how quickly this transformation has taken place, thanks to a patient step-by-step approach and abundant funding. The more than 10 years of anti-piracy patrols in the far reaches of the Indian Ocean has acted as a learning curve accelerator to "blue water" status. McDevitt then explores the PLA Navy's role in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. He provides a detailed assessment of what the PLAN will be expected to do if Beijing chooses to attack Taiwan potentially triggering combat with America's "first responders" in East Asia, especially the U.S. Seventh Fleet and U.S. Fifth Air Force. He conducts a close exploration of how the PLA Navy fits into China's campaign plan aimed at keeping reinforcing U.S. forces at arm's length (what the Pentagon calls anti-access and area denial [A2/AD]) if war has broken out over Taiwan, or because of attacks on U.S. allies and friends that live in the shadow of China. McDevitt does not know how Xi defines "world class" but the evidence from the past 15 years of building a blue water force has already made the PLA Navy the second largest globally capable navy in the world. This book concludes with a forecast of what Xi's vision of a "world-class navy" might look like in the next fifteen years when the 2035 deadline is reached.

China’s shipbuilding industry has grown more rapidly than any other in modern history. Commercial shipbuilding output jumped thirteen-fold from 2002–12, ensuring that Beijing has largely reached its goal of becoming the world’s leading shipbuilder. Yet progress is uneven, with military shipbuilding leading overall but with significant weakness in propulsion and electronics for military and civilian applications. It has never been more important to assess what ships China can supply its navy and other maritime forces with, today and in the future. Chinese Naval Shipbuilding answers three pressing questions: What are China’s prospects for success in key areas of naval shipbuilding? What are the likely results for China’s navy? What are the implications for the U.S. Navy? To address these critical issues, this volume assembles some of the world’s leading experts and linguistic analysts, often pairing them in research teams. These sailors, scholars, industry professionals, and government specialists have commanded ships at sea, led shipbuilding programs ashore, toured Chinese vessels and production facilities, invested in Chinese shipyards, and analyzed and presented important data to top-level decision-makers in times of crisis. In synthesizing their collective insights, this book fills a key gap in our understanding of China, its shipbuilding industry, its navy, and what it all means.

‘The Making of the Modern Chinese Navy’ includes 14 historical case studies that help to illuminate a number of special characteristics of the modern-day Chinese navy most Chinese naval officers perhaps take for granted, including a belief in the Mandate of Heaven, tributary system and the fear of ‘losing face’ either in a diplomatic setting or by risking valuable equipment in battle. Ethnic and language differences, regional loyalties and political mistrust potentially exacerbate these problems. Special peculiarities include the Mongol dual-officer diarchy that led to the political commissar system utilized by the People’s Liberation Army. Outside influences, such as blockade, sanctions or embargoes, can exert a profound impact on China, just as foreign intervention or, equally important, a decision not to intervene, can often determine the outcome of major maritime events. [NP] The 14 case studies discuss many of these characteristics, while the Conclusion examines all case studies together and places them in a historical perspective. ‘The Making of the Modern Chinese Navy’assesses which of these historical characteristics and peculiarities are still present in full force in China and which ones may no longer have as great an impact on the contemporary Chinese navy.

Traditionally neglected, the Chinese navy today is gaining growing prominence in security priorities with Chinas opening to the outside world. With an expanding portfolio of missions, from defending territorial waters, backing up national claims to disputed islands, and guarding seaborne trade and sealines, the navy is undergoing a major modernization and expansion programme, with the development and introduction of new generations of warships, submarines, aircraft, and armaments. This paper examines all these aspects and their regional implications.

This book provides a comprehensive history of the modern Chinese navy from 1840 to the present. Beginning with a survey of naval developments in earlier imperial times, the book goes on to show how China has since the mid-19th century four times built or rebuilt its navy: after the Opium Wars, a navy which was sunk or captured by the Japanese in the war of 1894–1895; during the 1920s and 1930s, a navy again sunk or lost to Japan, in the war of 1937–1945; in the 1950s, a navy built with Soviet help, which stagnated following the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s; and finally the present navy which absorbed its predecessor, but with the most modern sections dating from the 1990s—a navy which continues to grow and prosper. The book also shows how the underlying strategic imperative for the Chinese navy has been the defense of China’s coasts and major rivers; how naval mutiny was a key factor in the overthrow of the Qing and the Nationalist regimes; and how successive Chinese governments, aware of the potent threat of naval mutiny, have restricted the growth, independence, and capabilities of the navy. Overall, the book provides—at a time when many people in the West view China and its navy as a threat—a rich, detailed, and realistic assessment of the true nature of the Chinese navy and the contemporary factors that affect its development.

A survey of Chinese naval operational history, Li’s book focuses on the major battles and important engagements of more than 1,200 Chinese naval operations from 1949-2009, including the joint landing campaigns in the Taiwan Strait Crises, naval battles in the South China Sea, air defense against American pilots during Operation Rolling Thunder, and anti-piracy operations in Africa. His findings elucidate the origin of and changes of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) by examining its adaptation, modernization, and setbacks in the past sixty years. Based upon newly available Chinese sources and personal interviews with retired generals, admirals, and PLA officers, the work offers Chinese perspective on the study of PLAN war fighting history. The untold operational stories of the Chinese captains, boatswains, sailors, gunners, and naval pilots provide a first-hand look at a naval officer and his crew during the Cold War and beyond. They also indicate important lessons learned by the naval leaders who faced the enemies during a period when the PLAN underwent a complex transformation. China’s New Navy explains how the Chinese Navy’s operational experience brought about its reform. The PLAN changed from a coastal defensive fleet in the 1950s, to a modern navy in the 2000s. It concludes that some early experiences are still relevant to Beijing’s leaders as they consider specific strategic and operational challenges. Li redefines and adapts such strategic Cold War concepts as nuclear deterrence and local warfare to be meaningful in today’s strategic context, one in which PLAN is ready to open fire first in a defensive offense against the other sea powers like the U.S. Navy.

Bernard Cole takes a comprehensive look at China’s Navy, a Navy that continues to grow while the U.S. Navy shrinks. Of particular note, according to the author, is Beijing’s increased attention to guarding its vital sea lanes because of the nation’s growing dependence on maritime trade, especially energy supplies. He provides a thorough description of China’s naval establishment, including its personnel system, followed by a detailed view of its ships, submarines, and aircraft, all marked by technical sophistication and capability as China reaches the top rank of the world’s maritime powers. His evaluation is based on extensive interviews with Chinese and other naval experts, in-depth perusal of original documents, and visits to Chinese warships, training facilities, and shore establishments. The Great Wall at Sea is on the U.S. Navy's Professional Reading List.