The Cold War And Soviet Insecurity

In this long-awaited sequel to his acclaimed Russia's Road to the Cold War (1979), Vojtech Mastny offers a thorough history of the early years of the Cold War, drawing upon his extensive research in newly opened Soviet archives. Just as the earlier volume offered the definitive portrait of Joseph Stalin's foreign policy during World War II, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity affords readers an equally superb account of Stalin's foreign policy during his last years. Combining important new data with the fascinating insights of one of our leading authorities on Soviet affairs, this book illuminates a crucial period in recent world history.

“A creative, carefully researched, and incisive analysis of U.S. strategy during the long struggle against the Soviet Union.” —Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy “Craig and Logevall remind us that American foreign policy is decided as much by domestic pressures as external threats. America’s Cold War is history at its provocative best.” —Mark Atwood Lawrence, author of The Vietnam War The Cold War dominated world affairs during the half century following World War II. America prevailed, but only after fifty years of grim international struggle, costly wars in Korea and Vietnam, trillions of dollars in military spending, and decades of nuclear showdowns. Was all of that necessary? In this new edition of their landmark history, Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall engage with recent scholarship on the late Cold War, including the Reagan and Bush administrations and the collapse of the Soviet regime, and expand their discussion of the nuclear revolution and origins of the Vietnam War. Yet they maintain their original argument: that America’s response to a very real Soviet threat gave rise to a military and political system in Washington that is addicted to insecurity and the endless pursuit of enemies to destroy. America’s Cold War speaks vividly to debates about forever wars and threat inflation at the center of American politics today.

The Cold War dominated world affairs during the half century following World War II. It ended in victory for the United States, yet it was a costly triumph, claiming trillions of dollars in defense spending and the lives of nearly 100,000 U.S. soldiers. Apocalyptic anti-communism sharply limited the range of acceptable political debate, while American actions overseas led to the death of millions of innocent civilians and destabilized dozens of nations that posed no threat to the United States. In a brilliant new interpretation, Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall reexamine the successes and failures of America’s Cold War. The United States dealt effectively with the threats of Soviet predominance in Europe and of nuclear war in the early years of the conflict. But in engineering this policy, American leaders successfully paved the way for domestic actors and institutions with a vested interest in the struggle’s continuation. Long after the U.S.S.R. had been effectively contained, Washington continued to wage a virulent Cold War that entailed a massive arms buildup, wars in Korea and Vietnam, the support of repressive regimes and counterinsurgencies, and a pronounced militarization of American political culture. American foreign policy after 1945 was never simply a response to communist power or a crusade contrived solely by domestic interests. It was always an amalgamation of both. This provocative book lays bare the emergence of a political tradition in Washington that feeds on external dangers, real or imagined, a mindset that inflames U.S. foreign policy to this day.

The Cold War was initiated in Canada in 1945 by the dramatic defection of Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet cipher clerk. This event marked the start of over four decades of muted conflict between the Soviet Union and the West and became a major element of public life in Canada. This book examines the response of the Canadian government to these events and the systematic repression of communists and the Left, directed at civil servants, scientists, trade unionists, and political activists. These campaigns were undertaken in a secrecy imposed by the government, and supported by the RCMP security services. It also discusses the development of Canada's Cold War policy, the emergence of the new security state, and the deepening political alignment of Canada with the United States.

In this long-awaited sequel to his acclaimed Russia's Road to the Cold War (1979), Vojtech Mastny offers a thorough history of the early years of the Cold War, drawing upon his extensive research in newly opened Soviet archives. Just as the earlier volume offered the definitive portrait of Joseph Stalin's foreign policy during World War II, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity affords readers an equally superb account of Stalin's foreign policy during his last years. Combining important new data with the fascinating insights of one of our leading authorities on Soviet affairs, this book illuminates a crucial period in recent world history.

This essential new volume reviews the threat perceptions, military doctrines, and war plans of both the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, as well as the position of the neutrals, from the post-Cold War perspective. Based on previously unknown archival evidence from both East and West, the twelve essays in the book focus on the potential European battlefield rather than the strategic competition between the superpowers. They present conclusions about the nature of the Soviet threat that could previously only be speculated about and analyze the interaction between military matters and politics in the alliance management on both sides, with implications for the present crisis of the Western alliance. This new book will be of much interest for students of the Cold War, strategic history and international relations history, as well as all military colleges.

After World War II, the escalating tensions of the Cold War shaped the international system. Fearing the Worst explains how the Korean War fundamentally changed postwar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union into a militarized confrontation that would last decades. Samuel F. Wells Jr. examines how military and political events interacted to escalate the conflict. Decisions made by the Truman administration in the first six months of the Korean War drove both superpowers to intensify their defense buildup. American leaders feared the worst-case scenario—that Stalin was prepared to start World War III—and raced to build up strategic arms, resulting in a struggle they did not seek out or intend. Their decisions stemmed from incomplete interpretations of Soviet and Chinese goals, especially the belief that China was a Kremlin puppet. Yet Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il-sung all had their own agendas, about which the United States lacked reliable intelligence. Drawing on newly available documents and memoirs—including previously restricted archives in Russia, China, and North Korea—Wells analyzes the key decision points that changed the course of the war. He also provides vivid profiles of the central actors as well as important but lesser known figures. Bringing together studies of military policy and diplomacy with the roles of technology, intelligence, and domestic politics in each of the principal nations, Fearing the Worst offers a new account of the Korean War and its lasting legacy.