The Collapse Of Middle East Peace

In this fast-paced, well-researched work, author Dennis "D.J." Deeb objectively traces the rise and fall of the Oslo Peace Accords between the Israelis and the Palestinians. What went wrong with peace?This work analyzes Israeli leader Ariel Sharon's statements and past record as a military and government leader with regards to the Peace Process. Deeb also discusses the corruption within the Palestinian Authority that has hindered the peace process, including the mismanagement of Palestinian Authority President Yasir Arafat. The author examines and supports what has become known as "The Mitchell Report," released in the spring 2001, in offering a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. He also considers and evaluates the recent Road Map To Peace proposal offered by President George W. Bush in the spring of 2003. Since 1993, both Israeli and Palestinian leaders have failed to implement and have violated provisions of the Oslo Accords. As the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who gave his life in the name of peace, and to whom this writing is dedicated, articulated so clearly during the signing of the Oslo Accords, "enough blood and tears."Finally, Deeb argues that the intent behind the Oslo Accords encompass the link between the end of war and the era of peace, that the Israelis and Palestinians should both return to the table for negotiations based upon the recommendations of "The Mitchell Report" and the Quartet Road Map To Peace to negotiate a final and lasting settlement rooted in the Oslo Peace Accords.

In Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, Alasdair Drysdale and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, two noted Middle East scholars, present the first detailed examination of Syria's role in the long struggle for an Arab-Israeli peace. They paint a surprising portrait of a county whose power is out of proportion to its size, economy, and resources. They explore the reasons behind this phenomeno most importantly, the Machiavellian brilliance of its leader, Hafez al-Asad. The authors address the origins of the Asad regime, Syrias strategy toward its Arab neighbors, its conflict with Israel, and the history of its relationships with the Soviet Union and the United States. The authors argue forcefully that Syrian involvement is vital in an effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The collapse of both sets of Arab-Israeli negotiations in 2000 led not only to recrimination and bloodshed, with the outbreak of the second intifada, but to the creation of a new myth. Syrian and Palestinian intransigence was blamed for the current disastrous state of affairs, as both parties rejected a "generous" peace offering from the Israelis that would have brought peace to the region. The Truth About Camp David shatters that myth. Based on the riveting, eyewitness accounts of more than forty direct participants involved in the latest rounds of Arab-Israeli negotiations, including the Camp David 2000 summit, former federal investigator-turned-investigative journalist Clayton E. Swisher provides a compelling counter-narrative to the commonly accepted history. The Truth About Camp David details the tragic inner workings of the Clinton Administration's negotiating mayhem, their eleventh hour blunders and miscalculations, and their concluding decision to end the Oslo process with blame and disengagement. It is not only a fascinating historical look at Middle East politics on the brink of disaster, but a revelatory portrait of how all-too-human American political considerations helped facilitate the present crisis.

This historical study of international Middle East politics in regional perspective presents a comprehensive analysis of the interplay between inter-Arab politics and the conflict with Israel—the two key issues which have shaped the Middle East contemporary history (and made it simultaneously tumultuous and a focus of international affairs). The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict addresses the changing political behavior of the regional Arab system in the Palestine conflict, from total enmity to negotiated peace with Israel. This change is explained as a reflection of state formation process and constant thrust of ruling elites to disengage from compelling supra-state commitments stemming from Pan-Arab nationalist ideology and Islamic political culture. The book scrutinizes the role of Arab summit conferences which, since 1964, became the main collective Arab institution for decision making on common core issues—foremost of which was the conflict with Israel. The summits' main role was to legitimize incremental departure from the overburdening Palestine conflict whose powerful collective symbolism threatened states' autonomy. Summits' consensus sanctioned shifts from hitherto established collective Arab norms toward Israel as well as on inter-Arab relations, in accordance with core actors' interests. The summits offer a view to the Arab regional system's evolution as a negotiated inter-state order based on mutual recognition of sovereign states as opposed to compulsive collectivism in the name of Pan-Arabism. They were, in fact, a manipulation of the regional Arab system by primary participants' coalitions through employment of financial, ideological, and political trade-offs to resolve inter-Arab differences and reach a consensus on redefined collective goals.

With new talks in the Middle East Peace Process about to begin, the shadows of previous negotiations fall heavily across all involved. In this powerful and absorbing testimony, one of leading figures of the Oslo talks, former Prime Minister Ahmed Qurie ('Abu Ala') takes us behind closed doors and inside the negotiating rooms of Wye River, Stockholm and Camp David, where the terms of peace and a Palestinian state were sketched out, argued over, and eventually lost. Larger than life figures emerge from the minutes of these dramatic meetings - released here for the first time. Qurei recounts both the Israelis' intractability and the dynamic inside the Palestinian camp with candour and insight. This indispensable first-hand account provides a completely new perspective on the history, issues and personalities that will determine the future of the Middle East.

Peace in Tatters was born in a set of questions with which the author, an Israeli scholar, has struggled for some years: What went wrong in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process before the July 2000 Camp David summit and during the crucial negotiations? How have the dominant narratives about the collapse of the peace process been crafted? Does the ongoing crisis mark the end of the road for the idea that the conflict can be settled on the basis of a two-state solution, with Palestinians and Israelis living as peaceful neighbors? Yoram Meital offers a powerful explanation of how and why the peace process developed, evolved, and ultimately fell apart. Though rich in historical context, Peace in Tatters focuses primarily on the critical years of 2000-2004. Meital examines the major developments in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the evolving public-political discourse in Israeli and Palestinian societies, and US policy in the Middle East. He also explores the dramatic repercussions of the aborted political process for Israelis and Palestinians, and for their opinions about the failure of the negotiations and the eruption of violence. His clear-sighted appraisal will help readers not only to understand what went wrong, but also to see present events in an essentially different way.

An Arab diplomat analyzes the history of the relations between Israel and the Arab countries and describes his involvement in the efforts to achieve a peaceful solution.

"The definitive and gripping account of the sometimes exhilarating, often tortured twists and turns in the Middle East peace process, viewed from the front row by one of its major players."--Bill Clinton The Missing Peace, published to great acclaim last year, is the most candid inside account of the Middle East peace process ever written. Dennis Ross, the chief Middle East peace negotiator in the presidential administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, is that rare figure who is respected by all parties: Democrats and Republicans, Palestinians and Israelis, presidents and people on the street in Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Washington, D.C. Ross recounts the peace process in detail from 1988 to the breakdown of talks in early 2001 that prompted the so-called second Intifada-and takes account of recent developments in a new afterword written for this edition. It's all here: Camp David, Oslo, Geneva, Egypt, and other summits; the assassination of Yitzak Rabin; the rise and fall of Benjamin Netanyahu; the very different characters and strategies of Rabin, Yasir Arafat, and Bill Clinton; and the first steps of the Palestinian Authority. For the first time, the backroom negotiations, the dramatic and often secretive nature of the process, and the reasons for its faltering are on display for all to see. The Missing Peace explains, as no other book has, why Middle East peace remains so elusive.