The Committee S Investigation Into Counterfeit Electronic Parts In The Department Of Defense Supply Chain

The committee's investigation into counterfeit electronic parts in the Department of Defense supply chain : hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, first session, November 8, 2011.

The committee's investigation into counterfeit electronic parts in the Department of Defense supply chain : hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, first session, November 8, 2011.

In March of 2011, the Senate Armed Services Committee initiated an investigation into counterfeit electronic parts in the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain. The investigation uncovered overwhelming evidence of large numbers of counterfeit parts making their way into critical defense systems. It revealed failures by defense contractors and DOD to report counterfeit parts and gaps in DO D's knowledge of the scope and impact of such parts on defense systems. The investigation exposed a defense supply chain that relies on hundreds of unvetted independent distributors to supply electronic parts for some of our most sensitive defense systems. And, it found overwhelming evidence that companies in China are the primary source of counterfeit electronic parts in the defense supply chain.

A Senate Armed Services Committee investigation discovered counterfeit electronic parts from China in the Air Force's largest cargo plane, in assemblies intended for Special Operations helicopters, and in a Navy surveillance plane among 1,800 cases of bogus parts. The year-long investigation launched by Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., the committee's chairman, and Ranking Member Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., found a total number of suspect counterfeit parts involved in those 1,800 cases exceeding 1 million. The Committee's report includes detailed descriptions of how counterfeits are flooding the supply chain, risking the performance and reliability of critical defense systems. In just one example described in the report, the U.S. Air Force says that a single electronic parts supplier, Hong Dark Electronic Trade of Shenzhen, China, supplied approximately 84,000 suspect counterfeit electronic parts into the DOD supply chain.

" Counterfeit parts-generally the misrepresentation of parts' identity or pedigree-can seriously disrupt the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain, harm weapon systems integrity, and endanger troops' lives. In a November testimony (GAO-12-213T), GAO summarized preliminary observations from its investigation into the purchase and authenticity testing of selected, military-grade electronic parts that may enter the DOD supply chain. As requested, this report presents GAO's final findings on this issue. The results are based on a nongeneralizable sample and cannot be used to make inferences about the extent to which parts are being counterfeited. GAO created a fictitious company and gained membership to two Internet platforms providing access to vendors selling military-grade electronic parts. GAO requested quotes from numerous vendors to purchase a total of 16 parts from three categories: (1) authentic part numbers for obsolete and rare parts; (2) authentic part numbers with postproduction date codes (date codes after the last date the part was manufactured); and (3) bogus, or fictitious, part numbers that are not associated with any authentic parts. To determine whether the parts received were counterfeit, GAO contracted with a qualified, independent testing lab for full component authentication analysis of the first two categories of parts, but not the third (bogus) category. Part numbers have been altered for"

Electronic parts are used throughout industry to run everyday products, such as cell phones, and also highly technical products, such as aircraft, missiles, and spacecraft. Unlike cell phones, which are often replaced every year, the highly technical products may remain in service from 20 to more than 80 years. But what happens if the original electronic part, with a life cycle of 18 months, is no longer available? Some manufacturers have discovered that they have unwittingly purchased counterfeit ones. Counterfeit Electronic Parts and Their Impact on Supply Chains examines how these items are negatively affecting the aviation, spacecraft, and defense sectors and what can be done about it. As the inflow of counterfeit electronic parts does not appear to be slowing down, Counterfeit Electronic Parts and Their Impact on Supply Chains investigates the possible solutions to combat the issue, including legislation and standards, and other solutions that are government driven but that may be impacted by continuing budget cuts. The book also presents a high-level compilation of supply chain best practices identified in a survey of electronic parts manufacturers and government contractors. It is a must-read for those interested in a comprehensive review of the challenge of counterfeit electronic parts and the consequences of their use in both consumer and industrial products.