The Control Of Corporate Europe

Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements.

In light of the most severe financial crisis since the 1930s, this intelligent look at European corporate governance brings out the richness of European corporate governance systems and highlights historical weaknesses that will require further work for a sustainable corporate governance environment in the future.

Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs, and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence.

"The book provides unique empirical evidence on ownership and control change or persistence in Europe in the past decades. It would be especially useful for scholars and practitioners in corporate law, corporate governance, politics, and economic history as well as researchers, academic lecturers, students, and policy-makers in Europe"--

In the context of the financial and economic crisis, corporate governance and regulatory supervision failures, Laura Horn investigates one of the defining questions in social power relations in contemporary capitalism: who controls the modern corporation, and why.

Anne Lafarre combines wide ranging empirical legal and economic research to analyse and understand the real role of the AGM in the European businesses and corporate governance frameworks today.

Many citizens, politicians, and political activists voice concern about the political influence of business in the European Union. But do business interests really pull the strings in Brussels? Contrary to expectations, this book shows that business interests are no more influential than other interests in shaping contemporary EU policies. Andreas Dür, David Marshall, and Patrick Bernhagen present an original argument that stresses the role of public actors in facilitating or impeding interest groups’ lobbying success. Novel data on a large number of legislative proposals on the EU’s agenda and three case studies present strong support for this argument. The Political Influence of Business in the European Union offers new insights into how lobbying success depends on the demand and supply of information, as well as new ideas on how to measure lobbying success. The book advances a fresh perspective on the question of business power and shows why business interests often lose in the policy struggle.