The Defence And Fall Of Singapore

Shortly after midnight on 8 December 1941, two divisions of crack troops of the Imperial Japanese Army began a seaborne invasion of southern Thailand and northern Malaya. Their assault developed into a full-blown advance towards Singapore, the main defensive position of the British Empire in the Far East. The defending British, Indian, Australian and Malayan forces were outmanoeuvred on the ground, overwhelmed in the air and scattered on the sea. By the end of January 1942, British Empire forces were driven back onto the island of Singapore Itself, cut off from further outside help. When the Japanese stormed the island with an an-out assault, the defenders were quickly pushed back into a corner from which there was no escape. Singapore’s defenders finally capitulated on 15 February, to prevent the wholesale pillage of the city itself. Their rapid and total defeat was nothing less than military humiliation and political disaster. Based on the most extensive use yet of primary documents in Britain, Japan, Australia and Singapore, Brian Farrell provides the fullest picture of how and why Singapore fell and its real significance to the outcome of the Second World War.

Shortly after midnight on 8 December 1941, two divisions of crack troops of the Imperial Japanese Army began a seaborne invasion of southern Thailand and northern Malaya. Their assault developed into a full-blown advance towards Singapore, the main defensive position of the British Empire in the Far East. The defending British, Indian, Australian and Malayan forces were outmanoeuvred on the ground, overwhelmed in the air and scattered on the sea. By the end of January 1942, British Empire forces were driven back onto the island of Singapore itself, cut off from further outside help. When the Japanese stormed the island with an all-out assault, the defenders were quickly pushed back into a corner from which there was no escape. Singapore's defenders finally capitulated on 15 February, to prevent the wholesale pillage of the city itself. Their rapid and total defeat was nothing less than military humiliation and political disaster. Based on the most extensive use yet of primary documents in Britain, Japan, Australia and Singapore, Brian Farrell provides the fullest picture of how and why Singapore fell and its real significance to the outcome of the Second World War.

This is an account of the fall of Singapore and Japan's 1941 military campaign in Malaya through the eys of Japanese soldiers who took part, based on interviews, memoirs, war diaries and other Japanese-language sources.

Churchill's description of the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942, after Lt-Gen Percival's surrender led to over 100,000 British, Australian and Indian troops falling into the hands of the Japanese, was no wartime exaggeration. The Japanese had promised that there would be no Dunkirk in Singapore, and its fall led to imprisonment, torture and death for thousands of allied men and women. With much new material from British, Australian, Indian and Japanese sources, Colin Smith has woven together the full and terrifying story of the fall of Singapore and its aftermath. Here, alongside cowardice and incompetence, are forgotten acts of enormous heroism; treachery yet heart-rending loyalty; Japanese compassion as well as brutality from the bravest and most capricious enemy the British ever had to face.

The true story of the 'the greatest defeat and largest capitulation' in British military history. The Fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942 is a military disaster of enduring fascination. For the 60th anniversary of the liberation of the island, Peter Thompson tells the explosive story of the Malayan campaign, the siege of Singapore, the ignominious surrender to a much smaller Japanese force, and the Japanese occupation through the eyes of those who were there - the soldiers of all nationalities and members of Singapore's beleaguered population. An enthralling and perceptive account, which never loses sight of the human cost of the tragedy - Yorkshire Evening Post. An insightful and dramatic analysis - The Good Book Guide

Includes more than 30 maps, plans and illustrations The fall of Singapore, the “Gibraltar of the East”, struck by the Imperial Japanese troops during the lightning Malaya campaign of 1942 was a great shock to the Allied cause during the Second World War. No less a person than Prime Minister Winston Churchill assessed it as the “worst disaster” and the “largest capitulation” in British military history. 85,000 British, Indian and Australian troops were marched into the captivity with 50,000 others who had been captured already in the campaign, their fate was to be a barbaric fate in the hands of the Japanese. Their commanders were to be made scapegoats and pilloried for not stopping the disaster, but the true blame in large part lies elsewhere... Australian General Henry Gordon Bennett’s account of the disaster is a gripping defence of his part in the campaign. Sent troops who were ill-equipped, with no experience, and little proper training; the Singapore command attempted to defend their position. Impregnable from seaborne assault, the walls, bastions and fixed positions were no help against the inland advance of the Japanese and with few antiquated fighters to protect them against the heavy air bombardment the Gordon Bennett and his men struggled against the odds. Starved of reinforcements, withheld in Australia and Great Britain, the men and their commanders had to do the best with what they had. In this fascinating book it would seem like the island fortress was doomed from the start in spite of the misguided high hopes of the high command.

The British military failure against the Japanese invasion of Singapore in 1942 is a well-documented and closely examined episode. While attention is frequently drawn to the role of the Colonial Governor and his staff during this period, the actions of the civil authorities have not been subjected to the same rigorous scrutiny. In this book, Ronald McCrum undertakes a close examination of the role and the responsibilities of the colonial authorities both in the lead-up to the war and during it. He contends that the colonial government, by pursuing different priorities, needlessly created distraction and confusion. Additionally, the poor, even hostile, relations that developed between the local government and the British military hierarchy impeded a joint approach to the growing threat and affected the course of this campaign. McCrum displays how the inept management of civil defence led to unnecessary loss of civilian life.