The Dieppe Raid

In 1942, a full two years before D-Day, thousands of men, mostly Canadian troops eager for their first taste of battle, were sent across the Channel in a raid on the French port town of Dieppe. Air supremacy was not secured; the topography of the town and its surroundings - hemmed in by tall cliffs and steep beaches - meant any invasion was improbably difficult; the result was carnage, the beaches turned into killing grounds even as the men came ashore, and whole regiments literally decimated. Why was the Raid ever mounted? Was the whole thing even, as has been darkly alleged, expected and even intended to fail, a cynical conspiracy to prove to the Americans, at the expense of so many Canadian lives, the impracticability of staging the Normandy landings for another two years? Robin Neillands goes behind the myths to tell what really happened, and why.

On 19 August 1942 a mainly Canadian force left England in an attempt to seize the German-occupied French port of Dieppe, on a mission that has been described as the largest raid in history. The result was a complete disaster. That some 4,000 Canadian soliders and marines should wait over 21/2 years for combat and then be killed, maimed, or captured in a single morning is one of the great tragedies of the Second World War, and represents for Canadians a problem of acceptance. Many books, and accounts by participants, have failed to explain certain mysteries, such as: "Why was itexecuted when it was known to court failure?" and, "Who was responsible?" Brian Villa has devoted nearly eight years to examining documents in search of answers to these and other questions about a major event of the war that has been subjected to much obfuscation. The result is a book thatunravels all the complexities that led to it, having the British Chiefs of Staff, and especially the vagaries of Lord Louis Mountbatten, who was ultimately responsible as Chief of Combined Operations. As the first thorough examination of the disaster--one that will fascinate the general reader for its detective-like treatment of facts and evidence leading to clarification--this book is a primary contribution to the literature of the Second World War. Students of political science will value anAppendix that examines the evidence in an attempt to answer the question: Why do governments do what they know they should not do? Combined Operations.

With its trademark "you are there" style, Mark Zuehlke's tenth Canadian Battle Series volume tells the story of the 1942 Dieppe raid. Nicknamed "The Poor Man's Monte Carlo," Dieppe had no strategic importance, but with the Soviet Union thrown on the ropes by German invasion and America having just entered the war, Britain was under intense pressure to launch a major cross-Channel attack against France. Since 1939, Canadian troops had massed in Britain and trained for the inevitable day of the mass invasion of Europe that would finally occur in 1944. But the Canadian public and many politicians were impatient to see Canadian soldiers fight sooner. The first major rehearsal proved such a shambles the raid was pushed back to the end of July only to be cancelled by poor weather. Later, in a decision still shrouded in controversy, the operation was reborn. Dieppe however did not go smoothly. Drawing on rare archival documents and personal interviews, Mark Zuehlke examines how the raid came to be and why it went so tragically wrong. Ultimately, Tragedy at Dieppe honors the bravery and sacrifice of those who fought and died that fateful day on the beaches of Dieppe.

The German part in the 19 August 1942 Dieppe raid has largely been ignored. Launched by Winston Churchill to appease his Soviet counterparts, Operation JUBILEE was one of the Allies’ greatest debacles of the war. The majority of the 6,100 soldiers and marines dispatched by Lord Louis Mountbatten were captured or killed. Just 2,211 of the 4,963 Canadians involved returned to England. Two years later the Canadian Army fought from Normandy into Germany with fewer men captured than at Dieppe. By exploring the German experience, this superbly researched book provides answers to previously unasked operational questions. How well were the Nazi occupiers prepared for an attack on Dieppe? What threat did the raid pose to the Germans’ defense of mainland Europe? What lessons did the Wehrmacht learn, and did their High Command use the Dieppe experience when preparing for the inevitable Allied invasion of ‘Fortress Europe’? How did Hitler and his henchmen respond to the Western Allies' failure to break down their defenses in occupied western Europe? The book also addresses how Goebbels’ propaganda machine exploited the victory, and the reaction of the German people. Drawing on extensive German source materials, the Wehrmacht's role in defeating Operation JUBILEE is comprehensively examined in fascinating detail, adding a new dimension to the history of this poorly-planned and under-resourced adventure.

Winston Churchill was under pressure. The Soviets felt that they were fighting the Germans by themselves. Stalin demanded that Britain should open a second front to draw German forces away from the east. Though the advice Churchill received from his staff was that an invasion of France would not be possible for at least another year, the British Prime Minister knew he had to do something to help the Russians. The result was a large-scale raid upon the port of Dieppe. It would not be the second front that Stalin wanted, but at least it would demonstrate Britain's intent to support the Soviets and it would be a useful rehearsal for the eventual invasion. Dieppe was chosen as it was thought that the success of any invasion would depend on the capture of a major port to enable heavy weapons, vehicles and reinforcements to be landed in support of the landing forces. After an earlier postponement, the raid upon Dieppe, Operation _Jubilee_, was eventually scheduled for 19 August 1942. The assault was the most ambitious Allied attack against the German Channel defences of the war so far. Some 6,000 infantry, 237 naval vessels and seventy-four squadrons of aircraft were involved. Though the debate surrounding Jubilee's purpose and cost has raged in the years since the war, many vital and important lessons were learnt. All of these factors are covered in this official battle summary, a detailed and descriptive account of the Dieppe Raid, which was written shortly after the war and is based on the recollections of those who were involved.

In August 1942, Allied forces mounted an attack on the German-held port of Dieppe; titled Operation Jubilee, it represented a rehearsal for invasion. The amphibious attack saw over 6,000 infantrymen, predominantly Canadian, put ashore, tasked with destroying German structures and gathering intelligence. The doomed raid was an abject failure, and became Canada’s worst military disaster. Eyewitness at Dieppe is a long-overdue reissue of New Zealand-born writer Wallace Reyburn’s dramatic account of the raid. He was with the first soldiers clambering ashore, and aboard the last ship returning to England after six hours of carnage. Awarded an OBE as the only war correspondent to witness the street fighting first-hand, Reyburn was fortunate not be numbered among Dieppe’s dead, suffering just a minor wound inflicted by mortar shell fragments. His book, Rehearsal for Invasion was a wartime bestseller. Accompanied by freelance journalist Ross Reyburn’s new foreword on his father’s account, this new edition tells us more about Wallace’s intriguing life and details the shortcomings of his father’s book, dictated by wartime censorship corrected in the post-war years through a withering condemnation of raid’s mastermind Lord Mountbatten.

A new history of the hitherto inexplicable Dieppe raid of 1942- the first time Americans fought in Europe during World War Two- and its true purpose.

The story of Jack Pooltons war experience, from his initial training to his capture and attempted escapes from a POW camp.