The Dilemma Of Disintegration Nationalist China S Policy Toward Japan 1931 1937

This study attempts to analyze systematically the rationale, evolution, and consequences of Chiang Kai-shek's "unity before resistance" doctrine, which was the basis of Nanking's appeasement policy. The author argues that there were a number of independent variables that influenced Nanking's attitude toward Japan: 1) the internal disintegration of China; 2) factional conflicts within the Kuomintang;3) ineffective administration; 4) the vicissitudes of nationalism; 5) the material backwardness of China; and 6) international mediation. All of these factors were interrelated. The intervening variables were Chiang Kai-shek's personality, his patterns of political behavior, his way of ruling, and his perception of internal and external crises. By adopting the temporary appeasement policy toward Japan, Chiang hoped to gain enough time to consolidate China and his supreme leadership. But Chiang’s appeasement policy in fact engaged his government in two races - one with Japanese aggression and the other with domestic opposition.

A guide to the thesis literature on China and Inner Asia written between 1976 and 1990. Includes more than 10,000 entries for dissertations in the arts and sciences, law, medicine, theology, engineering and other disciplines. Entries are grouped in topical chapters and each entry includes bibliographic information and an abstract.

This is the first volume of a four-volume encyclopaedia which combines public administration and policy and contains approximately 900 articles by over 300 specialists. This Volume covers entries from A to C. It covers all of the core concepts, terms and processes of applied behavioural science, budgeting, comparative public administration, develo

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.

This comprehensive, up-to-date analysis of Japanese policy between the two world wars utilizes both English and Japanese sources to present Japan as an independent agent, not a state whose policy was determined by the actions of other countries. Beginning with Japan's disappointment with the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919, Nish examines the roots of Japanese discontent and feelings that ambitions in China were being unreasonably restrained. He explains British and American policies in the region as reactive, but concludes that their responses helped to determine which factions would dominate Japan's political arena. This non-partisan account is even-handed in apportioning responsibility for the events leading to the Second World War. While some Japanese politicians in the 1920s tried to follow the international path, there were others who tended to side with the army in establishing Japan's position, first in Manchuria and later in North and Central China in the 1930s. Conscious of the nation's unpopularity in the western world, Japan allied itself with Germany and Italy in the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 and the Tripartite Alliance of 1940. To pursue its own national objectives, Japan joined her allies in making war on the United States and the colonial empires of Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Its forces succeeded in overrunning many colonial territories; and, with a view to easing the problems of occupying them, Japan liberalized its harsh military policies, granting independence to Burma and the Philippines and welcoming Asian leaders to Tokyo for the Greater East Asian Conference of November 1943.