The Dynamics Of Bargaining Games

The reader may learn by participating in a wide variety of bargaining interactions, ranging from co-operative to competitive two-person bargaining to large group negotiations, and equal to unequal power positions.

The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition. Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a more complete description of how a competitive equlibrium is achieved. Whereas economists have made use of a macroscopic description of markets in which certain behavioral characteristics, such as price-taking behavior, are taken for granted, Gale uses game theory to re-evaluate this assumption, beginning with individual agents and modelling their strategic interaction. A strategic foundation for competitive equilibrium shows how such interaction leads to competitive, price-taking behavior. Essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium.

The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since the time of Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of competition. Making use of insights from game theory, search theory and bargaining theory, the author develops a model to explain what actually goes on in markets and how a competitive general equilibrium is achieved. Essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium.

This book uses game theory to analyze the strategies developed in negotiation processes. Offering a detailed analysis of competition and cooperation, it explores various bargaining strategies that result from the application of Nash equilibrium and mixed strategies. Employing a blend of game theory and real-world examples, the authors describe typical negotiation scenarios and unveil the art of negotiation strategy – dissecting both competitive and cooperative tactics. This comprehensive analysis explores the multifaceted dimensions of negotiation, highlighting not only formal aspects but also the economic, social, political, and human factors at play. The authors discuss the basic structures of cooperative and non-cooperative games and conduct a comprehensive analysis of the language games that take place in negotiations. They examine how negotiators belonging to different forms of life can trade with each other when their respective language games are different and prone to misinterpretation. The book also probes arbitration and mediation as conflict-resolution tools within this intricate landscape. Designed for the curious minds seeking insight into negotiation strategies, as well as students and scholars of diverse fields, this book fosters an understanding of negotiation's labyrinthine pathways. "Dynamics of Rational Negotiation" unlocks the door to negotiation's complexities, inviting readers to unravel the layers of human interaction.

"This volume brings together all of Ken Binmore's influential experimental papers on bargaining along with newly written commentary in which Binmore discusses the underlying game theory and addresses the criticism leveled at it by behavioral economists."--BOOK JACKET.

Many social or economic conflict situations can be modeled by specifying the alternatives on which the involved parties may agree, and a special alternative which summarizes what happens in the event that no agreement is reached. Such a model is called a bargaining game, and a prescription assigning an alternative to each bargaining game is called a bargaining solution. In the cooperative game-theoretical approach, bargaining solutions are mathematically characterized by desirable properties, usually called axioms. In the noncooperative approach, solutions are derived as equilibria of strategic models describing an underlying bargaining procedure. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides the reader with an up-to-date survey of cooperative, axiomatic models of bargaining, starting with Nash's seminal paper, The Bargaining Problem. It presents an overview of the main results in this area during the past four decades. Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory provides a chapter on noncooperative models of bargaining, in particular on those models leading to bargaining solutions that also result from the axiomatic approach. The main existing axiomatizations of solutions for coalitional bargaining games are included, as well as an auxiliary chapter on the relevant demands from utility theory.