The European Monetary System And European Monetary Union

When the European Monetary System (EMS) was created in 1978, economists on both sides of the Atlantic predicted its early failure. Today, EMS is alive and well, continuing to defy conventional economic wisdom. The authors address three major questions about the European Monetary System (EMS): how it came into being, how it works and how it may evolve into a fully-fledged monetary union.

This text provides an unrivalled account of the history, theory and practice of monetary integration in Europe.

This book, edited by Paul R. Masson, Thomas Krueger, and Bart G. Turtelboom, contains the proceedings of the seminar held in Washington, D.C. on March 17-18, 1997, cosponsored by the IMF and Fondation Camille Gutt. Conference participants discussed implications of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on exchange and financial markets, and consequently on the activities of market participants and private and official institutions. The five main themes of the seminar were the characteristics of the euro and its potential role as an international currency; EMU and international policy coordination; EMU and the relationship between the IMF and its EMU members; lessons of European monetary integration for the international monetary system; and the transitioin to EMU.

A Europe Made of Money is a new history of the making of the European Monetary System (EMS), based on extensive archive research. Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol highlights two long-term processes in the monetary and economic negotiations in the decade leading up to the founding of the EMS in 1979. The first is a transnational learning process involving a powerful, networked European monetary elite that shaped a habit of cooperation among technocrats. The second stresses the importance of the European Council, which held regular meetings between heads of government beginning in 1974, giving EEC legitimacy to monetary initiatives that had previously involved semisecret and bilateral negotiations. The interaction of these two features changed the EMS from a fairly trivial piece of administrative business to a tremendously important political agreement. The inception of the EMS was greeted as one of the landmark achievements of regional cooperation, a major leap forward in the creation of a unified Europe. Yet Mourlon-Druol’s account stresses that the EMS is much more than a success story of financial cooperation. The technical suggestions made by its architects reveal how state elites conceptualized the larger project of integration. And their monetary policy became a marker for the conception of European identity. The unveiling of the EMS, Mourlon-Druol concludes, represented the convergence of material interests and symbolic, identity-based concerns.

Europe’s financial crisis cannot be blamed on the Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro’s invention. Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar’s privileged position in the international monetary system, and Germany’s persistent current account surpluses in Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later. Here is an account that helps readers understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community’s Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988–89, which set out the plan for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.

Recoge: 1. International motives for the EEC iniative - 2. The EBB and flow of european monetary integration - 3. The EMS and the conditions for its proper operation - 4. Five years with EMS - 5. The furure of EMS.