The European Powers And The German Question 1848 71

The causes of war have tended to attract more attention than the causes of peace, yet the two are intimately related, Indeed there was much talk of war during the unprecedentedly long periods of peace between the European great powers in the years 1815-1854 and again in 1871-1914, the Near Eastern crises of 1878 and 1887-8 being only two of the more notable examples. In the case of the latter, there occurred a spell of fatalistic and belligerent talk in both Berlin and Vienna which in many ways anticipated that which gripped those capitals by 1914. A study of the whole question of the best methods by which to defend and advance the national interest is often more illuminating on why wars were avoided that are studies of the documentation surrounding the Holy Alliance, the congress system or the Concert of Europe. It is clear that the Concert tended to become most active only after a war had already been fought, or when the powers had already decided that conflict was likely to prove too costly, dangerous and unpredicatable in its effects both at home and abroad. Thus the Russians twice advanced almost to the gates of Constantinople only to recoil at the implications of trying to obtain control of the Straits. Similarly, Habsburg thoughts of war were frequently neutralised by reminders of financial weakness. This valuable book will be welcomed by anyone wishing to understand the nature of European state relations in the nineteenth century. Professor Bartlett examines why major wars did happen and did not happen, with particular attention being paid to the events of 1914.

Mark Hewitson reassesses the relationship between politics and the nation during a crucial period in order to answer the question of when, how and why the process of unification began in Germany. He focuses on how the national question was articulated in the public sphere by the press, political writers and key political organizations.

Williams explores the effectiveness of various types of responses and strategies available to states when faced with demands for territorial revisions. She examines the situations surrounding the 19th-century unification of Germany, the breakup of Yugoslavia and the strife in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the ongoing struggle over the fate of Kashmir. The type of demand for territorial revisions, she argues, and the responses determine whether the outcome will be peace or war. While states should deter those states or groups that are imperialist, she points to the utility of pursuing a firm-but-flexible strategy toward those that are consolidationists. This analysis will be of considerable value to scholars, students, and policy makers involved with issues of contemporary nationalism, ethnic politics, and international relations.

Should we ever again trust Germany to behave itself? Germany on the March attempts to answer this question, treating familiar material in a unique, refreshing manner. The author explores the actual people, events, and ideas behind this stream of disturbing images and distrust associated with Germany. Kolkey provides special reference to the central role of domestic politics, relating it to the decision making process involved in the outbreak of all modern German wars. Germany on the March will be of interest to students of modern German History.

This book examines recognition of new states, the practice historically employed to regulate membership in international society. The last twenty years have witnessed new or lingering demands for statehood in different areas of the world. The claims of some, like those of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eritrea, Croatia, Georgia and East Timor, have achieved general recognition; those of others, like Kosovo, Tamil Eelam, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Somaliland, have not. However, even as most of these claims gave rise to major conflicts and international controversies, the criteria for acknowledgment of new states have elicited little systematic scholarship. Drawing upon writings of English School theorists, this study charts the practice from the late eighteenth century until the present. Its central argument is that for the past two hundred years state recognition has been tied to the idea of self-determination of peoples. Two versions of the idea have underpinned the practice throughout most of this period - self-determination as a negative and a positive right. The negative idea, dominant from 1815 to 1950, took state recognition to be acknowledgment of an achievement of de facto statehood by a people desiring independence. Self-determination was expressed through, and externally gauged by, self-attainment. The positive idea, prevalent since the 1950s, took state recognition to be acknowledgment of an entitlement to independence in international law. The development of self-determination as a positive international right, however, has not led to a disappearance of claims of statehood that stand outside of its confines. Groups that are deeply dissatisfied with the countries in which they presently find themselves continue to make demands for independence even though they may have no positive entitlement to it. The book concludes by expressing doubt that contemporary international society can find a sustainable basis for recognizing new states other than the original standard of de facto statehood.