The Evolution Of Exchange Rate Regimes Since 1990 Evidence From De Facto Policies

This paper presents a monthly database on de facto exchange rate regimes that covers all IMF members since 1990. Information from IMF country reports and other sources, including exchange rate data, is utilized to determine de facto exchange rate policies. Countries are categorized based on these policies using the IMF nomenclature adopted in 1999. This approach ensures the forward compatibility of the database. The database is then used to examine whether the "bipolar view" of exchange regimes holds with de facto regimes. It is found that the proportion of countries adopting "intermediate" regimes has indeed been shrinking in favor of greater flexibility or greater fixity, especially for countries more integrated with international markets. Analyses based on Markov chains of regime transitions, however, provide (mixed) evidence against the bipolar view.

Using recent advances in the classification of exchange rate regimes, this paper finds no support for the popular bipolar view that countries will tend over time to move to the polar extremes of free float or rigid peg. Rather, intermediate regimes have shown remarkable durability. The analysis suggests that as economies mature, the value of exchange rate flexibility rises. For countries at a relatively early stage of financial development and integration, fixed or relatively rigid regimes appear to offer some anti-inflation credibility gain without compromising growth objectives. As countries develop economically and institutionally, there appear to be considerable benefits to more flexible regimes. For developed countries that are not in a currency union, relatively flexible exchange rate regimes appear to offer higher growth without any cost in credibility.

An empirical study of exchange rate regimes based on data compiled from 150 member countries of the International Monetary Fund over the past thirty years. Few topics in international economics are as controversial as the choice of an exchange rate regime. Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, countries have adopted a wide variety of regimes, ranging from pure floats at one extreme to currency boards and dollarization at the other. While a vast theoretical literature explores the choice and consequences of exchange rate regimes, the abundance of possible effects makes it difficult to establish clear relationships between regimes and common macroeconomic policy targets such as inflation and growth. This book takes a systematic look at the evidence on macroeconomic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes, drawing on the experience of some 150 member countries of the International Monetary Fund over the past thirty years. Among other questions, it asks whether pegging the exchange rate leads to lower inflation, whether floating exchange rates are associated with faster output growth, and whether pegged regimes are particularly prone to currency and other crises. The book draws on history and theory to delineate the debate and on standard statistical methods to assess the empirical evidence, and includes a CD-ROM containing the data set used.

This paper examines the recent evolution of exchange rate policies inthe developing world. It looks at why so many countries have made a transition from fixed or "pegged" exchange rates to "managed floating"currencies. It discusses how economies perform under different exchangerate arrangements, issues in the choice of regime, and the challenges poised by a world of increasing capital mobility, especially when bankingsectors are inadequately regulated or supervised.

In this paper, I survey the issue of exchange rate regime choice from the perspective of both the industrial and emerging economies taking an historical perspective. I first survey the theoretical issues beginning with a taxonomy of regimes. I then examine the empirical evidence on the delineation of regimes and their macroeconomic performance. The penultimate section provides a brief history of monetary regimes in industrial and emerging economies. The conclusion considers the case for a managed float regime for today's emerging economies.

This paper examines the impact of exchange rate regimes on bilateral trade while differentiating the effects of "words" and "deeds". Our findings-based on an extended database for de jure and de facto exchange rate classifications-show that while fixed exchange rate regimes increase trade, there is no systematic difference in the effects of policy announcements versus actions to maintain exchange rate stability. The trade generating effect of more stable exchange rate regimes is however more pronounced when words and actions are aligned, both in the short and long-run. Policy credibility therefore plays an important role in determining the effects of de jure and de facto exchange rate arrangements such that deviations between the two could be costly. In addition, we find evidence that (i) the impact of hard pegs such as currency unions is broadly similar to that of conventional pegs; (ii) the currency union and direct peg effects evolve over time; and (iii) the effects of more stable regimes are heterogeneous across country groups.

The themes of this study are the exchange rate regimes chosen by policy makers in the twentieth century, the means used to maintain these regimes, and the impact of these decisions on individual national economies and the world economy in general. The book draws heavily on new research showing the lessons and the legacy left for policy makers by the gold standard and the attempt at its resurrection in the 1920s. In examining issues such as the gold exchange standard, the gold bullion standard, the experience of floating exchange rates, the Bretton Woods arrangements, the EMS and the ERM, and the Currency Board approach, there is a conscious attempt to draw out the relevance of history for policy makers now.

Growing global imbalances threaten to induce a collapse of the dollar, which could in turn produce a severe recession in the rest of the world. This crisis could force countries to say "never again" and search for a system to prevent similar disasters. The system that could do so is a reference rate system—where countries' authorities are forbidden from intervening in order to push the exchange rate too far from what is termed the "reference rate." It could help a country's authorities manage its exchange rate to avoid large misalignments, assist the private sector in forming more dependable expectations of future exchange rates and thus to manage their businesses more efficiently in a world of floating exchange rates, and aid the International Monetary Fund in designing and managing an effective system of multilateral surveillance. The world economy would function better as a result, with less chance of the global imbalances leading to a world recession.