The Falaise Pocket

This WWII military history explores the dramatic turning point of the Battle of Normandy—illustrated throughout with archival photos and maps. On June 6th, 1944, the Allied forces embarked on Operation Overlord with the first wave of Normandy landings. But it wasn’t until August of that year that the tide of the battle—and the entire war—began to turn. The decisive moment came at the Battle of the Falaise Pocket. The German Army had managed to hold back the Allies for months, but its resources were running out, and the Allies ruled the skies. As the Allies began to push South and East, Hitler refused to permit Field Marshal von Kluge, the commander of Army Group B, to withdraw. General Montgomery ordered the Allied armies to converge on the Falaise area on August 8th, and by August 21st they had some 50,000 Germans surrounded. While many German soldiers did escape the encirclement, the losses were catastrophic. By the end of the month, Army Group B had retreated across the Seine, ending the battle of Normandy. This illustrated account examines the battle from the failed offensive at Mortain, looking at both German and Allied perspectives, using maps, diagrams and profiles to complete the story.

Originally published: Stroud: Sutton, 2004.

For seven weeks after D-Day, hundreds of thousands of Allied troops were bottled up along the landing beaches. Finally, 3,000 American and British planes bombarded a narrow path into enemy territory, and the Allies surrounded 100,000 die-hard Germans at Falaise. Breuer's stirring reconstruction of the battle as seen from both sides makes this one of the best WWII books of recent years.--JOHN BARKHAM REVIEWS. 34 photos.

By Aug. 1944, the Allies had broken out of the Normandy beachhead and were rapidly exploiting a breakthrough in the German lines. In early Aug., Hitler ordered a heavy single pronged attack to the west toward Avranches to cut off the US forces to the south. With the ‘Ultra’ intelligence, Bradley recognized this as an opportunity to encircle the German Army in France. By turning Patton’s Third Army, in the south, north towards Argentan, Bradley formed the lower jaw of a pincer movement while Montgomery ordered Crerar’s First Canadian Army south to push towards Falaise to form the upper jaw. Connecting the Allied armies between Falaise and Argentan would completely surround the German army. The encirclement of the German forces would be known as the Falaise pocket. To the north, Montgomery’s forces struggled to push south against the German defensive line. Patton’s Third Army, in concert with the XIX Tactical Air Command, was making extremely rapid progress. Late on the 12th of Aug., Bradley stopped Patton’s forces from moving north of Argentan. The decision to stop Third Army’s movement north allowed many German personnel to escape from the Falaise pocket. I will analyze the leadership decisions, command relationships, and what I think to be a lack of communication between the Allied leaders. Why did Montgomery, who was commander of the Allied ground forces in France, not close the pincer from the south? Why did Bradley stop forces at Argentan? Why didn’t Eisenhower get involved? The Allied leadership failed to capitalize or exploit the mistake made by Hitler driving the German Army westward. By not closing the pocket’s gap at Falaise, the Allied forces lost an opportunity to destroy a large percentage of the enemy in France. The major factor for this failure was conflicting commander personalities.

International award-winning modeler, Robert Doepp, embarks on his most ambitious piece of military miniature art to date with the recreation of a WWII image in 1:9 capturing every minute detail showcased in this comprehensive study of his stunning work.

“A great book” on the decisive engagement of the Battle of Normandy in the series that brings World War II battles to life (Army Rumour Service). The denouement of the battle of Normandy, the fighting around Falaise and Chambois in August 1944, and the pursuit of the retreating German armies to the Seine provided the Allies with an immense victory—all made possible by Operation Cobra . . . As US First Army and British Second Army squeezed the western and northern edges of the German salient, so Third Army rushed headlong eastwards and then north to create the lower of two pincers—the other formed as the Canadian First Army and the Polish 1st Armored Division pushed south of Caen. As could be expected, the Germans did not simply give up: they fought furiously to keep the pincers from closing. When they did, attacks from inside the pocket to break out and outside the pocket to break in led to fierce fighting between Chambois and Argentan. When the dust settled, between 80,000 and 100,000 troops had been trapped by the Allied encirclement. Estimates vary considerably, but it seems safe to say that at least 10,000 of the German forces were killed and around 50,000 became PoWs. The Past & Present Series reconstructs historical battles by using photography, juxtaposing modern views with those of the past together with concise explanatory text. It shows how much infrastructure has remained and how much such as outfits, uniforms, and ephemera has changed, providing a coherent link between now and then.

By August 1944, the Allies had broken out of the Normandy beachhead and were rapidly exploiting a breakthrough in the German lines. In early August, Hitler ordered a heavy single pronged attack to the west to cut off the US forces to the south. Bradley recognized this as an opportunity to encircle the German Army in France. By turning Patton's Third Army, in the south, north towards Argentan, Bradley formed the lower jaw of a pincer movement while Montgomery ordered Crerar's First Canadian Army south to push towards Falaise to form the upper jaw. Connecting the Allied armies between Falaise and Argentan would completely surround the German army. To the north, Montgomery's forces struggled to push south against the German defensive line. Patton's Third Army, in concert with the XIX Tactical Air Command, was making extremely rapid progress. Late on the 12th of August, Bradley stopped Patton's forces from moving north of Argentan. The decision to stop Third Army's movement north allowed many German personnel to escape from the Falaise pocket. The failure of the Allied forces to close the Falaise Gap was the result of lack of communication directly linked to the type of personalities of the commanders.