The Fires Of October The Planned Us Invasion Of Cuba During The Missile Crisis Of 1962

It was the closest we ever came to unleashing the Third World War.... The image of that world was so horrible to contemplate that both sides stepped away from that precipice and opted for peace. Fires of October is the exhilarating military history of the Cuban Missile Crisis exploring in detail the strategic plans implemented by American Armed Forces as they headed towards a catastrophic nuclear collision with Cuba and the USSR. Using recently declassified material, Blaine Pardoe systematically recounts the origins of the crisis, from the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and Cuba s military metamorphosis, to the internal disorganization of the US military, which exacerbated tensions between the USA, Cuba, and the USSR. Pardoe reveals that the invasion plans were based on old intelligence, outdated maps, and misconceptions about the size, strength, and composition of the Soviet forces in Cuba; for the first time, and with harrowing results, he scrutinizes the potential fallout had the invasion gone ahead. Gripping and unnerving, Fires of October shows us just how close the world came to nuclear war.

Ever since Thucydides pondered reasons for the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, writers, philosophers, and social scientists have tried to identify factors that promote conflict escalation: for example, history (tomorrow's wars are often rooted in yesterday's conflicts), changing balance of power among nations, or domestic political forces. In the end, however, these "causes" are constructed by human beings and involve the memories, emotions, and motives of both the leaders and the led. In July 1914, the long-standing peace of Europe was shattered when the Sarajevo assassinations quickly escalated to World War I. In contrast, at the height of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis could have easily plunged the world into a thermonuclear world war, but was ultimately peacefully resolved. Why the different outcomes? In Roots of War: Wanting Power, Seeing Threat, Justifying Force, David G. Winter identifies three psychological factors that contributed to the differences in these historical outcomes: the desire for power, exaggerated perception of the opponent's threat, and justification for using military force. Several lines of research establish how these factors lead to escalation and war: comparative archival studies of "war" and "peace" crises, laboratory experiments on threat perception, and surveys of factors leading people to believe that a particular war is "just." The research findings in Roots of War also demonstrate the importance of power in preserving peace through diplomatic interventions, past and present.

From the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of American Prometheus comes the first effort to set the Cuban Missile Crisis, with its potential for nuclear holocaust, in a wider historical narrative of the Cold War—how such a crisis arose and why, at the very last possible moment, it never happened. “Fresh and thrilling.... A fascinating work of history that is very relevant to today’s politics.” —Walter Isaacson, bestselling author of The Code Breaker Pulitzer Prize-winning author Martin J. Sherwin introduces a dramatic new view of how luck and leadership avoided a nuclear holocaust during the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Set within the sweep of the Cold War and its nuclear history, every chapter of this gripping narrative of the origins and resolution of history’s most dangerous thirteen days offers lessons and a warning for our time. Gambling with Armageddon presents a riveting, page turning account of the crisis as well as an original exploration of the evolving place of nuclear weapons in the Post-World War II world.

October 1962, The Cuban Missile Crisis: the confrontation that brought the world closer to nuclear catastrophe than ever before or since. Both John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev were determined to avoid nuclear war, but events could easily have spiraled out of control with cataclysmic results. Drawing on an extensive body of research, including primary sources released only in the last few years, this work places the crisis in a broader international and chronological context than previously possible. Discover how America was responsible for causing the conflict and Cuba's role as an important actor rather than a superpower pawn.

Every major government’s military makes plans for waging wars, hoping that they never have to be employed. In the early part of the last century the US government prepared a number of war contingency plans for invading a number of nations—both hostile and friendly. These color-coded plans were designed for various political and military events, some of which actually unfolded in the Second World War. Never Wars: The US War Plans to Invade the World explores and provides details on a number of these key military invasion plans, their triggers, units involved, etc. Some of these plans, if executed, would have altered the globe or changed the events of the twentieth century and beyond. Included with this was the 1914 war plan against a triumphant Germany, a 1935 plan to attack Great Britain, the 1920s US plans to land forces in Mexico to topple their government, a plan for invading China and even a 1905 strike into the heart of Canada. From a plan to invade the Azores to an incursion into Cuba, Never Wars presents never before published plans for the US to strike out at the world.

For many years historians of the Cuban missile crisis have concentrated on those thirteen days in October 1962 when the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war. Mark White’s study adds an equally intense scrutiny of the causes and consequences of the crisis. Missiles in Cuba is based on up-to-date scholarship as well as Mr. White’s own findings in National Security Archive materials, Kennedy Library tapes of ExComm meetings, and correspondence between Soviet officials in Washington and Havana—all newly released. His more rounded picture gives us a much clearer understanding of the policy strategies pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union (and, to a lesser extent, Cuba) that brought on the crisis. His almost hour-by-hour account of the confrontation itself also destroys some venerable myths, such as the unique initiatives attributed to Robert Kennedy. And his assessment of the consequences of the crisis points to salutary effects on Soviet-American relation and on U.S. nuclear defense strategy, but questionable influences on Soviet defense spending and on Washington’s perception of its talents for "crisis management," later tested in Vietnam.