The First Principle In Late Neoplatonism

In The First Principle, Jonathan Greig offers a new examination of the Neoplatonic notion of the One and the respective causal frameworks behind the One in the two late Neoplatonists, Proclus and Damascius (5th–6th centuries A.D.).

Damascius was head of the Neoplatonist academy in Athens when the Emperor Justinian shut its doors forever in 529. His work, Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles, is the last surviving independent philosophical treatise from the Late Academy. Its survey of Neoplatonist metaphysics, discussion of transcendence, and compendium of late antique theologies, make it unique among all extant works of late antique philosophy. It has never before been translated into English. The Problems and Solutions exhibits a thorough?going critique of Proclean metaphysics, starting with the principle that all that exists proceeds from a single cause, proceeding to critique the Proclean triadic view of procession and reversion, and severely undermining the status of intellectual reversion in establishing being as the intelligible object. Damascius investigates the internal contradictions lurking within the theory of descent as a whole, showing that similarity of cause and effect is vitiated in the case of processions where one order (e.g. intellect) gives rise to an entirely different order (e.g. soul). Neoplatonism as a speculative metaphysics posits the One as the exotic or extopic explanans for plurality, conceived as immediate, present to hand, and therefore requiring explanation. Damascius shifts the perspective of his metaphysics: he struggles to create a metaphysical discourse that accommodates, insofar as language is sufficient, the ultimate principle of reality. After all, how coherent is a metaphysical system that bases itself on the Ineffable as a first principle? Instead of creating an objective ontology, Damascius writes ever mindful of the limitations of dialectic, and of the pitfalls and snares inherent in the very structure of metaphysical discourse.

This volume dispels the idea that Platonism was an otherworldly enterprise which neglected the study of the natural world. Leading scholars examine how the Platonists of late antiquity sought to understand and explain natural phenomena: their essays offer a new understanding of the metaphysics of Platonism, and its place in the history of science.

The Neoplatonists have a perfectionist view of freedom: an entity is free to the extent that it succeeds in making itself good. Free entities are wholly in control of themselves—they are self-determining, self-constituting, and self-knowing. Neoplatonist philosophers argue that such freedom is only possible for non-bodily things. The human soul is free insofar as it rises above bodily things and engages in intellection, but when it turns its desires to bodily things, it is drawn under the sway of fate and becomes enslaved. Ursula Coope discusses this notion of freedom and its relation to questions about responsibility. She explains the important role of notions of self-reflexivity in Neoplatonist accounts of both freedom and responsibility. In Part I, Coope sets out the puzzles Neoplatonist philosophers face about freedom and responsibility and explains how these puzzles arise from earlier discussions. Part II explores the metaphysical underpinnings of the Neoplatonist notion of freedom (concentrating especially on the views of Plotinus and Proclus). In what sense, if any, is the ultimate first principle of everything (the One) free? If everything else is under this ultimate first principle, how can anything other than the One be free? What is the connection between freedom and nonbodiliness? Finally, Coope considers in Part III questions about responsibility, arising from this perfectionist view of freedom. Why are human beings responsible for their behaviour, in a way that other animals are not? If we are enslaved when we act viciously, how can we be to blame for our vicious actions and choices?

The first edition of this book appeared in 1953; the second, revised and enlarged, in 1960. The present, third edition is essentially a reprint of the second, except for the correction of a few misprints and the following remarks, which refer to some recent publications* and replace the brief preface to the second edition. Neither Eudemus nor Theophrastus, so I said (p. 208f.) knew a branch of theoretical philosophy the object of which would be something called OV ~ OV and which branch would be distinct from theology. And there is no sign that they found such a branch (corresponding to what was later called metaphysica generalis) in Aristotle. To the names of Eudemus and Theophrastus we now can add that of Nicholas of Damascus. In 1965 H.J. Drossaart Lulofs published: Nicolaus Damascenus On the Philosophy oj Aristotle (Leiden: Brill), i. e. fragments of his 1tEpt TIj.

Neoplatonic Demons and Angels is a collection of studies which examine the place reserved for angels and demons not only by the main Neoplatonic philosophers, but also in Gnosticism, the Chaldaean Oracles and Christian Neoplatonism.

Although Neoplatonism has long been studied by classicists, until recently most philosophers saw the ideas of Plotinus et al as a lot of religious/magical mumbo-jumbo. Recent work however has provided a new perspective on the philosophical issues in Neoplatonism and Pauliina Remes new introduction to the subject is the first to take account of this fresh research and provides a reassessment of Neoplatonism's philosophical credentials. Covering the Neoplatonic movement from its founder, Plotinus (AD 204-70) to the closure of Plato's Academy in AD 529 Remes explores the ideas of leading Neoplatonists such as Porphyry, lamblichus, Proclus, Simplicius and Damascius as well as less well-known thinkers. Situating their ideas alongside classical Platonism, Stoicism, and the neo-Pythagoreans as well as other intellectual movements of the time such as Gnosticism, Judaism and Christianity, Remes provides a valuable survey for the beginning student and non-specialist.