The Formative Years 1947 1950

Traces the usage of- and meaning given to- the terms "roles and missions" relating to the armed forces and particularly to the United States Air Force, from 1907 to the present.

The twentieth century witnessed the emergence of three-dimensionality in war: surface forces flow became prey for attackers operating above and below the earth and its oceans. The aerial weapon, prophesied for centuries, became a reality, as did air power projection forces. This insightful book by Warren A. Trest traces the doctrinal underpinnings of the modern United States Air Force, the world's only global air force. We the men and women who serve in the Air Force, but also our fellow airmen in America's other military services are the heirs and beneficiaries of a long heritage of doctrinal development and military thought. Our predecessors pursued a vision of airborne global reach and power that often put them at odds with those who could not break free of the confines of conventional thought and lock-step traditionalism. Fortunately, they had the courage of their convictions and the faith in their vision to continue to pursue the goal of global air power despite such resistance. Today, America is a genuine aerospace power, and that pioneering vision dating to the days of the Wright brothers, has expanded to encompass operations in space and between the mediums of air and space. As we approach the new millennium, it is well to ponder the lessons and the history of how a small group of truly gifted airmen transformed their nation's military establishment, and, in so doing, the world around them.

The first volume of the history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, written by the office's own Historical Office. It covers the founding of the office and key events, policies, and persons, especially in light of the early stages of the Cold War.

Right after World War II, the United States felt secure in its atomic monopoly. With the American "Pax Atomica" in place, the free world held an apparent strategic advantage over the Soviet bloc and saw itself as a bulwark against communist expansion. But America's atomic superiority in the early postwar years was more fiction than fact. From 1945 until 1950, the U.S. atomic arsenal was poorly coordinated, equipped and funded. The newly formed Atomic Energy Commission inherited from the Manhattan Engineer District a program suffering from poor organization, failing infrastructure and internal conflict. The military establishment and the Air Force's Strategic Air Command little knew what to do with this new weapon. The Air Force and the AEC failed to coordinate their efforts for a possible atomic air offensive and war plans were ill-conceived, reflecting unrealistic expectations of Air Force capabilities and possible political outcomes. This lack of preparedness serves as a case study in the tenuous nature of American civilian-military relationships. Instructors considering this book for use in a course may request an examination copy here.