The Foundation Of The Juridico Political

Hans Kelsen and Max Weber are conventionally understood as initiators not only of two distinct and opposing processes of concept formation, but also of two discrete and contrasting theoretical frameworks for the study of law. The Foundation of the Juridical-Political: Concept Formation in Hans Kelsen and Max Weber places the conventional understanding of the theoretical relationship between the work of Kelsen and Weber into question. Focusing on the theoretical foundations of Kelsen’s legal positivism and Weber’s sociology of law, and guided by the conceptual frame of the juridico-political, the contributors to this interdisciplinary volume explore convergences and divergences in the approach and stance of Kelsen and Weber to law, the State, political science, modernity, legal rationality, legal theory, sociology of law, authority, legitimacy and legality. The chapters comprising The Foundation of the Juridical-Political uncover complexities within as well as between the theoretical and methodological principles of Kelsen and Weber and, thereby, challenge the enduring division between legal positivism and the sociology of law in contemporary discourse.

Hans Kelsen and Max Weber are conventionally understood as the original proponents of two distinct and opposed processes of concept formation generating two separate and contrasting theoretical frameworks for the study of law. The Reconstruction of the Juridico-Political: Affinity and Divergence in Hans Kelsen and Max Weber contests the conventional understanding of the theoretical relationship between Kelsen’s legal positivism and Weber’s sociology of law. Utilising the conceptual frame of the juridico-political, the contributors to this interdisciplinary volume analyse central points of affinity and divergence in the work of these two influential figures. Thus, the chapters collected in The Reconstruction of the Juridico-Political offer a comprehensive reconsideration of these affinities and divergences, through a comparison of their respective reconstruction of the notions of democracy, the State, legal rights and the character of law. From this reconsideration a more complex understanding of their theoretical relationship emerges combined with a renewed emphasis upon the continued contemporary relevance of the work of Kelsen and Weber.

Hans Kelsen and the Natural Law Tradition provides the first sustained examination of Hans Kelsen’s critical engagement, itself founded upon a distinctive theory of legal positivism, with the Natural Law Tradition.

In this book, experts from the fields of law and philosophy explore the works of Aristotle to illuminate the much-debated and fascinating relationship between emotions and justice. Emotions matter in connection with democracy and equity – they are relevant to the judicial enforcement of rights, legal argumentation, and decision-making processes in legislative bodies and courts. The decisive role that emotions, feelings and passions play in these processes cannot be ignored – not even by those who believe that emotions have no legitimate place in the public sphere. A growing body of literature on these topics recognizes the seminal insights contributed by Aristotle. This book offers a comprehensive analysis of his thinking in this context, as well as proposals for inspiring dialogues between his works and those written by a selection of modern and contemporary thinkers. As such, the book offers a valuable resource for students of law, philosophy, rhetoric, politics, ethics and history, but also for readers interested in the ongoing debate about legal positivism and the relevance of emotions for legal and political life in today’s world.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) stands among the greatest thinkers of the Western world. There is hardly an area of thought, at least of philosophical thought, to which he did not make significant and lasting contributions. Particularly noteworthy are his writings on the foundations and limits of human knowledge, the bidimensional nature of perceptual or "natural" objects (including human beings), the basic principles and ends of morality, the character of a just society and of a world at peace, the movement and direction of human history, the nature of beauty, the end or purpose of all creation, the proper education of young people, the true conception of religion, and on and on. Though Kant was a life-long resident of Konigsberg, Prussia - child, student, tutor, and then professor of philosophy (and other subjects) - his thought ranged over nearly all the world and even beyond. Reports reveal that he (a bachelor) was an amiable man, highly respected by his students and colleagues, and even loved by his several close friends. He was apparently a man of integrity, both in his personal relations and in his pursuit of knowledge and truth. Despite his somewhat pessimistic attitude toward the moral progress of mankind - judging from past history and contemporary events - he never wavered from a deep-seated faith in the goodness of the human heart, in man's "splendid disposition toward the good.

This book critically examines the conception of legal science and the nature of law developed by Hans Kelsen. It provides a single, dedicated space for a range of established European scholars to engage with the influential work of this Austrian jurist, legal philosopher, and political philosopher. The introduction provides a thematization of the Kelsenian notion of law as a legal science. Divided into six parts, the chapter contributions feature distinct levels of analysis. Overall, the structure of the book provides a sustained reflection upon central aspects of Kelsenian legal science and the nature of law. Parts one and two examine the validity of the project of Kelsenian legal science with particular reference to the social fact thesis, the notion of a science of positive law and the specifically Kelsenian concept of the basic norm (Grundnorm). The next three parts engage in a critical analysis of the relationship of Kelsenian legal science to constitutionalism, practical reason, and human rights. The last part involves an examination of the continued pertinence of Kelsenian legal science as a theory of the nature of law with a particular focus upon contemporary non-positivist theories of law. The conclusion discusses the increasing distance of contemporary theories of legal positivism from a Kelsenian notion of legal science in its consideration of the nature of law.

Research on federalism is rarely concerned with its philosophical foundations. However, arguments on why and how best to organise a plurality of states in a multilevel political order have first been discussed by philosophers and continue to inspire contemporary reasoning on international and supranational relations not only in political philosophy. This book offers a unique overview of the philosophical foundations of federalism from both a historical and a systematic perspective. The analyses proposed by renowned scholars from the US and from several European countries cover classic writers such as Hobbes and the authors of the Federalist Papers, Kant and Rawls, and range from anthropological justifications of federal orders to contemporary problems of EU constitutionalism, the principle of subsidiarity and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The book is of relevance to anyone interested in philosophical justifications of federalism.

In 2010, Martin Loughlin, Professor of Public Law at the LSE, published Foundations of Public Law, 'an account of the foundation of the discipline of public law with a view to identifying its essential character'. The book has become a landmark in the field, and it has been said, notably by one of its major critics, that it now provides the 'starting point' for any deeper inquiry into the subject. The purpose of this volume is to engage critically with Foundations – conceptually, comparatively and historically – from the viewpoints of public law, private law, political, social and legal theory, as well as jurisdictional perspectives including the UK, US, India, and Continental Europe. Scholars also consider the legacy and continuing relevance of Foundations in the light of developments in transnational law, global law and regional integration in the European Union.