The Future Of Political Islam

September 11; vitriolic rhetoric against the United States by prominent Muslims; the war against terrorism shifts from Afghanistan to the Philippines and Indonesia. It is easy to believe Islam and Muslims are enemies of the West; it is also wrong. This sweeping survey of trends in the Muslim world contends that the issue is not whether Islam plays a central role in politics, but what Muslims want. To focus on radicalism and extremism blinds us from another trend: liberal political Islam. Proponents of liberal political Islam emphasize human rights and democracy, tolerance and cooperation. They face an uphill struggle as authoritarian regimes oppress opposition and use Islam to justify their undemocratic rule. As people are denied avenues to participate and criticize, as secular ideologies have failed, religion has come to play a central role in politics. The outcome of the struggle between extremists and liberals will determine the future of political Islam.

For years, scholars hypothesized about what Islamists might do if they ever came to power. Now, they have answers: confusing ones. In the Levant, ISIS established a government by brute force, implementing an extreme interpretation of Islamic law. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Tunisia's Ennahda Party governed in coalition with two secular parties, ratified a liberal constitution, and voluntarily stepped down from power. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, the world's oldest Islamist movement, won power through free elections only to be ousted by a military coup. The strikingly disparate results of Islamist movements have challenged conventional wisdom on political Islam, forcing experts and Islamists to rethink some of their most basic assumptions. In Rethinking Political Islam, two of the leading scholars on Islamism, Shadi Hamid and William McCants, have gathered a group of leading specialists in the field to explain how an array of Islamist movements across the Middle East and Asia have responded. Unlike ISIS and other jihadist groups that garner the most media attention, these movements have largely opted for gradual change. Their choices, however, have been reshaped by the revolutionary politics of the region. The groups depicted in the volume capture the contradictions, successes, and failures of Islamism, providing a fascinating window into a rapidly changing Middle East. It is the first book to systematically assess the evolution of mainstream Islamist groups since the Arab uprisings and the rise of ISIS, covering 12 country cases. In each instance, contributors address key questions, including: gradual versus revolutionary approaches to change; the use of tactical or situational violence; attitudes toward the nation-state; and how ideology, religion, and political variables interact. For the first time in book form, readers will also hear directly from Islamist activists and leaders themselves, as they offer their own perspectives on the future of their movements. Islamists will have the opportunity to challenge the assumptions and arguments of some of the leading scholars of Islamism, in the spirit of constructive dialogue. Rethinking Political Islam includes three of the most important country cases outside the Middle East-Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan-allowing readers to consider a greater diversity of Islamist experiences. The book's contributors have immersed themselves in the world of political Islam and conducted original research in the field, resulting in rich accounts of what animates Islamist behavior.

Mr. Fuller has attempted to fill the gap in our understanding of the diversity of political Islam and its place in world politics. It is a central thesis of his work that political Islam is not an exotic and distant phenomenon but can be understood in the context of the universal struggle by both liberals and authoritarians as they try to make sense of a troubling and rapidly modernizing world. Mr. Fuller sees political Islam as the one organizing principle that pervades the daily life in the Muslim world more profoundly than any other single ideological or conceptual force in that society. Therefore, one could argue that political Islam is also part of a drive to restore the identity and dignity of a world where a once glorious past has somehow led many to see only a bleak and future-less present.

The continued prominence of Islam in the struggle for democracy in the Muslim world has confounded Western democracy theorists who largely consider secularism a prerequisite for democratic transitions. Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai offer a comprehensive view of the complex nature of contemporary political Islam and its relationship to democracy.

Political Islam in Tunisia uncovers the secret history of Tunisia's main Islamist movement, Ennahda, from its origins in the 1960s to the present. Banned until the popular uprisings of 2010-11 and the overthrow of Ben Ali's dictatorship, Ennahda has until now been impossible to investigate. This is the first in-depth account of the movement, one of Tunisia's most influential political actors. Drawing on more than four years of field research, over 400 interviews, and access to private archives, Anne Wolf masterfully unveils the evolution of Ennahda's ideological and strategic orientations within changing political contexts and, at times, conflicting ambitions amongst its leading cadres. She also explores the challenges to Ennahda's quest for power from both secularists and Salafis. As the first full history of Ennahda, this book is a major contribution to the literature on Tunisia, Islamist movements, and political Islam in the Arab world. It will be indispensable reading for anyone seeking to understand the forces driving a key player in the country most hopeful of pursuing a democratic trajectory in the wake of the Arab Spring.

An accessible and comprehensive account of the global dimensions of political Islam in the twenty-first century, explaining political Islam, nationalism and globalization and providing a detailed account of Al Qaeda.

The strength of the initial revolutionary movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya or Syria lay in not having a specific leadership. Rather, these movements comprised men and women from different classes, backgrounds and religions, all coming together. In Egypt this was very apparent – many came together from a variety of secular, leftist and Islamist groups – there was no leadership. It was clear from the very beginning that these were not ‘Islamist revolutions’ as some labeled them. The Islamists in many of these countries joined the efforts afterwards; in fact, in the beginning the Islamists were very hesitant to become involved. The first to push the Islamist movement to participate were the young members of Tunisia’s Al-Nahda. For the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the group’s leadership initially said that they would not be involved, but they were then encouraged to do so by the younger generation. Within the Brotherhood it was quite clear that there was – and remains – a fracture concerning strategy. Whilst the lack of a central leadership brought the initial movements strength, it was to become their weakness. Why? We know now that following the removal of the dictators it quickly became apparent that there was a lack of vision and clarity about what the people actually wanted. All we know is what they didn’t want; so we are still unsure as to what the future will hold. Across the board, the movements’ early strength became their weakness. From the secularists to the Islamists, these pertinent questions persist: what is the future and what do they want? These questions must be applied from the outset in order to understand the strengths and weaknesses of these movements. Ultimately, the situation is complex, with many issues to consider; this is where we are—a complex region facing complex challenges with complex dimensions. Consequently, it pays to be cautious when attempting to predict future developments in Muslim-majority countries. The current period is quite critical—a turning point. Something has changed and we can’t go back. It is now up to the young generation, even the Islamists. My position on this is quite clear – it can’t be done by killing or torturing people – if someone is dealing with politics, be they secular or Islamist, it doesn’t matter; as long as he or she is non-violent and respects the rule of law and the democratic process, he or she is entitled to be involved in the process and be part of the political discussion. Why? because is it good for all of us; it is good for you because there is nothing in Islam – and this is my position – that says that religion should take over the state. It should be about democratic and majority processes—this is Islamic.