The German Military In The Age Of Total War

Originally published in 1981 and now re-issued with a new Preface, this book contains contributions on key issues such as the origins of the First World War, the psychological impact of that war on the Germans, the enigmatic personality of Walter Rathenau, anti-semitism and paramilitarism, as well as German Ostpolitik during the Weimar period. The collapse of the Weimar Republic is re-examined and this is followed by an analysis of the social basis of the SS leadership corps, German reactions to the defeat in 1945 as observed by the British authorities and finally a wide-ranging comparatiste essay on why Germany did not experience a 20th century revolution in spite of the tremendous upheavals it suffered.

This anthology of historical war studies looks at military expansion from the French Revolution to WWII—and the enduring lessons for today. In the years after the Cold War, many governments sought to reduce the sizes of their armed forces. Along with this general reduction came a shift in military doctrine away from conventional warfare and toward counterinsurgency operations. But in light of new geopolitical developments, the pendulum is swinging back. Once again, armies are growing in size. Now is the time to look back at the age of total war and the hard-won military lessons about the buildup, composition and use of large formations. It is these lessons from history that this book addresses. What does history tell us about military expansion? How did armies prepare and train for a major conflict in times of peace? How did the armies ensure that the doctrine and training used in a small army was adequate for a drastically enlarged army in the case of total war? All these questions were as relevant then as they are now. This anthology analyzes a number of case studies and provides insights into themes and topics that characterized the so-called ‘reconstitution’ of armies in their historical and social contexts.

In the period 1900-1940 the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland reacted in divergent ways to the same foreign military threats. This volume argues that their internal politics and politico-military strategic culture are vital keys to understanding those differences.

Essays in honor of Francis Ludwig Carsten.

What is total war? Definitions abound, but one thing is certain—the concept of total war has come to be seen as a defining concept of the modern age. In The Age of Total War, celebrated historian Jeremy Black explores the rise and demise of an era of total war, which he defines in terms of the intensity of the struggle, the range (geographical and/or chronological) of conflict, the nature of the goals, and the extent to which civil society was involved. He contends that this era (roughly 1860–1945) was markedly different from the warfare that characterized earlier periods, and that it is very different from the situation that has evolved since, with its emphasis on asymmetrical conflict and limited warfare. Acknowledging that various definitions are problematic and often contradictory, Black argues that 1860 to 1945 was an era in which the prospect of war and the consequences of it were crucially important for human history. He focuses primarily on conflict between Western powers, including Japanese participation in the Russo-Japanese War. Trends and developments subsequent to 1945 have combined, Black asserts, to make a return to total war unlikely.

In the period 1900-1940 the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland reacted in divergent ways to the same foreign military threats. This volume argues that their internal politics and politico-military strategic culture are vital keys to understanding those differences.

The essays in Anticipating Total War explore the discourse on war in Germany and the United States between 1871 and 1914. The concept of "total war" provides the analytical focus. The essays reveal vigorous discussions of warfare in several forums among soldiers, statesmen, women's groups, and educators on both sides of the Atlantic. Predictions of long, cataclysmic wars were not uncommon in these discussions, while the involvement of German and American soldiers in colonial warfare suggested that future combat would not spare civilians. Despite these "anticipations of total war," virtually no one realized the practical implications in planning for war in the early twentieth century.